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I. Introduction 
China continues its rise towards a global economic superpower, yet it has become 
increasingly clear that this economic success story has caused severe damage to 
China’s environment (Edmonds 1994; Economy 2007). In a blue paper released on 
February 12th, 2014, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences warned that pollution 
made Beijing “nearly uninhabitable for human beings.”1 Word of dire environmental 
deterioration also reaches a broad international audience on an almost daily basis, as 
news outlets are abuzz with reports2 whose tone ranges from disconcerting to bizarre 
to outright apocalyptic. China’s bleak environmental situation might potentially have 
far-ranging implications in China and beyond:  
Water pollution and water scarcity are burdening the economy, rising 
levels of air pollution are endangering the health of millions of Chinese, 
and much of the country's land is rapidly turning into desert. China has 
become a world leader in air and water pollution and land degradation 
and a top contributor to some of the world's most vexing global 
environmental problems, such as the illegal timber trade, marine 
pollution, and climate change. As China's pollution woes increase, so, too, 
do the risks to its economy, public health, social stability, and 
international reputation. (Economy 2007: 1) 
                                                 
1 A report in the Chinese media citing the findings of the paper, “北京污染指数已接近不适合人类居住程
度 [Beijing’s pollution index makes the city nearly uninhabitable for human beings]” can be found 
here: http://finance.chinanews.com/cj/2014/02-12/5829935.shtml [2014-09-09], a Reuters report in 
English here: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/02/13/china-pollution-idUKL3N0LI 
02320140213 [2014-09-09]. Meanwhile, China Digital Times reports that the State Council 
Information Office has directed Chinese online news outlets to censor the report: 
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/02/ minitrue-delete-beijing-nearly-uninhabitable/ [2014-09-09]. 
2 See for example: “Choking on growth”, a series of reports run by the New York Times that directly 
links economic growth and environmental crisis, (accessible under: http://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2007 /12/29 /world/asia/choking_on_growth_10.html; accessed 2011/11/04); “Raising 
a stink. Efforts to improve China’s environment are having far too little effect” in The Economist from 
Aug 5th 2010. (http://www.economist.com/node/16744110, 2011-11-04); The East is grey from Aug. 
10th 2013 in the same publication [http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/ 21583245-china-
worlds-worst-polluter-largest-investor-green-energy-its-rise-will-have, 2013-12-04]; or “China’s out of 
control pollution” in Le Monde Diplomatique (October 2009; http://mondediplo.com/ blogs/china-s-
out-of-control-pollution [2001/11/04]. The minacious tone and thrust of these headlines are 
representative of the gros of Western reporting on China’s environmental situation. 
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Environmental degradation is now such that it actually is threatening the economic 
gains China has achieved over the last decades. (Lieberthal/Economy 2007) Some 
(Sharpiro 2001) have pointed to the Maoist legacy as the source of China’s 
environmental calamities; the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution resulted in very 
serious environmental damages and notions such as “struggling against nature” are 
still prevalent today in the mindset of many cadres. Others have documented the long 
and equally serious imperial legacy of environmental exploitation in China dating 
back several thousands of years (Elvin 2004).  
The Chinese central government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have 
realized the dimension of the crisis and its potentially disastrous impact on China’s 
future: Pan Yue 潘岳, then vice minister of China's State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA), warned in 2005 that “the [economic] miracle will end soon 
because the environment can no longer keep pace.”3 Beijing has also been addressing 
China’s environmental problems through a number of administrative measures: 
Since 1979, when the first Provisional Environmental Protection Law was passed 
(Palmer 1998), the central government has continued to adopt legislation to control 
pollution and establish an environmental impact assessment regime (Tang/Lo 1997). 
On various administrative levels, Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) and 
local service organizations (Lo et al. 2001) have been established to enforce these 
regulations and increase environmental governance capacity. The government has 
issued environmental white papers4, announced a comprehensive policy of ecological 
modernization (Zhang/Mol 2007) and changed its cadre evaluation system to 
incentivize environmentally compatible behavior (Golding 2011). Successes are, 
however, limited, and it must be asked whether the Chinese one-party state is 
structurally capable to address the issue sufficiently, especially since the CCP has tied 
its own fate – for better or for worse – to the success of its economic reforms and its 
capability to deliver economic growth.5  
                                                 
3Interview with the German newsmagazine DER SPIEGEL from 2005/07/03 (accessible under 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,345694,00.html. Accessed: 2011/11/12). 
4 http://china.org.cn/english/2006/Jun/170355.htm. 
5 An example for this double-bind is the issue of the green GDP index: In 2004, Chinese premier Wen 
Jiabao 温家宝 announced that the Chinese GDP index would be replaced by a “green GDP index” 
(绿色 GDP 指数) as the key performance measure for government and party officials on all levels of 
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The environmental crisis has not only provoked a response from the government, but 
also from the societal level: Ever since the early 1980s, a growing number of Chinese 
citizens, intellectuals, students, and activists have begun to voice their concerns over 
China's environmental situation, trying to raise awareness among the populace, and 
spurn its leaders to address the issue. The rise of such citizen engagement falls into a 
greater context of changing state-society relations China has been experiencing since 
the 1980s. After the collapse of the USSR and its East European satellite states, and 
heightened by the bloody suppression of the student movement on Tiananmen 
Square in 1989, observers of China have paid persistent attention to the 
reconfigurations state-society relationships have experienced in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). The gradual melting of the totalitarian glacier that was 
high Maoism has seen a turbulent revival of associational life in China moving to fill 
the expanding social space. 6  These changes are profound and potentially have 
wideranging political implications, some have spoken of an “associational revolution” 
(Wang/He 2004). In this context, environmental issues in particular appear to have 
a unique potential to challenge established state-society relationships in China, and 
to result in new forms of state-society interaction:  
The attitude of ‘pollute first, clean up later’ is illustrative of the clash 
between central versus local authorities, environmental interests versus 
economic interests and China’s First versus Third World. There, where the 
                                                 
state bureaucracy. The index would for the first time take into account environmental factors such as 
costs caused by pollution. The first green GDP accounting report, which addressed the year 2004, was 
published in September 2006. It showed that the financial loss caused by pollution stood at 511.8 
billion Yuan Renminbi (66.3 billion US-Dollars), which amounted to 3.05 percent of the nation's 
economy. When it became clear that the adjustment for environmental damage had reduced the 
growth rate to politically unacceptable levels, nearly zero in some provinces, the government quietly 
withdrew its support for the Green GDP methodology and suppressed the 2005 report, which had 
been due March 2007. Hence, China’s festering ecological crisis has the potential to metastasize into 
a political crisis for the CCP, a danger which is aggravated by an ideological void within the prevalent 
state ideology of the Chinese socialist leadership: Marxism-Leninism did not foresee how to deal with 
what Zweig (2003) calls the “externalities of development”, meaning the cost burdens that China’s 
economic development imposes on society (such as environmental pollution), and which have to be 
paid collectively and not by the producer of said costs.   
6 A survey conducted by the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs (minzhengbu, abbr. MOCA) in 1999 
already counted 136,841 social organizations (shehui zuzhi) nationwide (Liao 2000: 31). Ten years 
later, the 2009 survey by the same government agency reported that this amount had almost 
quadrupled to 431,000, together with over 190,000 non-governmental non-commercial social 
organizations (minban feiqiye danwei) all across China.[see: 2009 nian minzheng shiye fazhan tongji baogao 
(Statistical survey of civil affairs development in 2009). 
http://cws.mca.gov.cn/article/tjbg/201006/20100600081422.shtml?2; accessed 2011/10/16] 
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two clash, the limits of existing institutions are being challenged through 
environmental pressure, social conflict and political calls for reform. This 
should be a focus of scholarly attention, as it is the locus where shifts in 
environmental governance are likely to occur and novel rules of 
engagement between state, civil and market actors will be renegotiated. 
(Ho 2006: 14) 
Among the many theoretical paradigms developed to analyze these dynamics, few 
have held the continuing importance than the concept of an environmental civil society 
emerging in post-Mao China that is accompanied by a more and more vibrant 
discursive public sphere.7 Scholarship suggests that environmental citizen activism is 
on the forefront of these developments. Since the 1990s, the People’s Republic has 
witnessed a rising level of citizen involvement, a green activism that addresses 
environmental issues. (Schwartz 2004; Stalley/Yang 2006; Ho/Edmonds 2008; 
Mertha 2008; Wu 2009) This relatively new phenomenon of citizen participation is 
not narrowly limited to specific issue negotioations but has broader political 
implications. “[...] Rather than dealing solely with ecological issues, the 
environmental movement in China has increasingly incorporated the issue of civil 
rights into its arguments” (Lee 2006) and is thusly “promoting civil rights through 
the environmental movement.”  
Meanwhile, the number of environmental civic associations has skyrocketed. Within 
ten years after the founding of the first environmental NGO (ENGO) in 1994, “China 
was home to 2768 environmental NGOs with 224,000 members by the end of 2005” 
(Tang/Zhan 2008: 426). Additionally, the Chinese media landscape has been 
witnessed a “greening” of its programmatic focus (Bo 1998), state and commercial 
media outlets in print, TV, and radio are increasingly covering environmental issues, 
while several news outlets have emergered that exclusively cover green issues, such 
as the Green Weekly, the China Green Times, or the Environmental Protection Herald.8 
                                                 
7 The analytical boundaries between the two terms are not always drawn very clearly in the existing 
literature. Civil society seems to be used more often to refer to the associational dimension of social 
organizations and their interaction with the state (such as in the study of unions, NGOs, etc.), while 
public sphere is more widely used to describe the discursive and communicational dimensions between 
societal actors, including the arenas in which such discourses take places, such as newspapers, 
telecommunication, the internet, etc. 
8 For more information on the history and institutional affiliation of these newspapers, see: Bo 1998: 
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Alongside traditional media, the internet has become a new key avenue via which 
environmental issues are shared, discussed, and disseminated (see next chapter).  
These developments have caused some to assert that “a fledging green public sphere 
is emerging in China” (Yang/Calhoun 2007: 229) which in some way is mirroring 
the green public spheres that had emerged in Western industrialized nations decades 
earlier. (Torgerson 2000) This raises a series of questions: 
 Are the “civil society/public sphere” paradigm at all applicable to the Chinese 
experience? Is the “green public sphere” in particluar a useful heuristic concept? 
 How have the sociocultural and political conditions in China shaped state-society 
interactions around environmentalism, especially in the context of cultural 
globalization? In other words: What makes “environmentalism with Chinese 
characteristics” (Wong 2005) uniquely Chinese? 
 Why has citizen participation in China so notably coalesced around 
environmental issues? 
I.1  Thesis outline 
This is a study of Chinese environmentalism.  
Such a broad claim necessitates clarification: on one hand, the term “Chinese 
environmentalism” denotes an important form of civic participation in the People’s 
Republic of China revolving around environmental issues. In this context, this study 
strives to make a contribution to the larger ongoing academic debate concerning the 
social ontology of state-society relations in China. On the other hand, “Chinese 
environmentalism” signifies not only a geographical and political, but also a cultural 
denomination; Chinese environmentalism hence also refers to the sociocultural traits 
that give Chinese environmentalism its idiosyncratic character, i.e. 
“environmentalism with Chinese characteristics.” 
While this basic focus puts this study in the field of political science, its central 
research focus is not geared towards the institutional arrangements of associational 
                                                 
40-42. 
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structures in China (something that has been addressed in depth before by a great 
number of studies; see next chapter). Instead, I aim to explore the ideologically and 
culturally defined superstructures, the “imaginaries”, that provide guidance to and 
meaning for social interaction. More specifically, I will explore the underlying 
concepts and cultural repertoires through which Chinese environmental activists 
interact within the sociopolitical landscape of the People’s Republic.   
The study of such sociocultural idiosyncrasies is complicated by that fact that the 
notion of “Chineseness” in not only exceedingly difficult to define, but also 
increasingly untenable given the insights cultural globalization studies have produced 
over the last years. Not only are national borders increasingly meaningless given the 
global structure of transnational social interaction, but global transcultural flows of 
cultural objects, ideas, and concepts have produced “multiple modernities” that are 
characterized by hybridity, cultural mélange, and conceptual heterogeneity. A study 
of the idiosyncracies of “Chinese” environmentalism will hence take into account the 
fact that sociocultural developments in China are inextricably entangled with global 
cultural trends through a perpetual process of exchange and negotiation. Hence, the 
thesis will have to address how the interplay between the local and the global, the 
native and the foreign, the particular and the universal have shaped the Gestalt of 
environmentalism in China as it presents itself today.  
To accomplish this task, the present thesis draws from material usually not employed 
in political science: environmental nonfiction writing produced by Chinese 
environmentalists; many individuals engaged in environmental activism in China are 
not only reporters, NGO leaders, environmental educators, or social critics, but also 
authors whose collective literary efforts by now have resulted in a considerable body 
of literature that can summarily be labeled environmental nonfiction literature. These 
texts represent important source material that allows insight into the discursive and 
symbolic dimension of Chinese environmentalism. Moreover, given the fact that they 
are produced by a relatively small number of very committed, highly interconnected 
individuals who serve as the main driving force behind environmental activism in 
China, these texts can be regarded as representative for larger environmental 
discourses in general; given the social status and importance of their authors, their 
writings are highly influential and circulated widely. The advantage of this approach 
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is that it offers a relatively narrow, yet rich and representative, body of material 
through which the otherwise unmanageable amount of material produced on 
environmental issues in China can be meaningfully analyzed. As far as the 
transcultural aspect of Chinese environmentalism is concerned, these environmental 
authors play the role of what I will call “environmental cosmopolitans”, crucial 
intercultural mediators through which global environmental ideas, concepts, and 
images are integrated into already existing sociocultural frameworks. Given the 
importance of this source material, it is surprising that it has not yet been the object 
of a systematic, comprehensive analysis.  
In its analytic approach towards these texts, the thesis draws inspiration from what 
Appadurai, a leading theorist of transcultural studies, has called the “unleashing of 
the imagination” as a key characteristic of cultural globalization: the way in which 
processes of cultural exchange shape the socially constructed imaginary worlds social 
actors inhabit. The thesis argues that Chinese environmentalism as represented the 
context of environmental nonfiction has to be understood as the result of a confluence 
between two streams of imaginaries. One is what Castoriadis has called the “social 
imaginary”, the set of shared normative assumptions of a society about the proper 
order of things. The second imaginary plane is what Buell has called the 
“environmental imagination”, the modes of literary expression that articulate 
humanity’s relationship to nature.  
The present thesis combines methodological concepts of political science with 
insights from literature studies. It has benefitted from postcolonial literature studies 
in the sense that it is concerned with revealing previously concealed sociopolitical 
patterns through a close reading of literary sources. At the same time, I am less 
concerned with unmasking, deconstructing, and denouncing residual asymmetrical 
power relations between the once-ruling and the once-ruled through literary analysis. 
In a similar manner, the present thesis is not an exercise in Ecocriticism, by which I 
mean the study of the relationship between literature and the natural environment, 
but it regards environmental nonfiction as an important source to understand 
ideological and normative predispositions that ultimately have a political relevance 
concerning social interaction. Instead, my focus is on the point of intersection 
between the point where politics, literature, and nature intersect.  
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The confluence of imaginaries will be explored in four analytical chapters. Each 
chapter will introduce a number of important representatives of Chinese 
environmental nonfiction, and explore the discursive strategies, cultural imaginaries, 
and framing devices by which environmental activist-writers in China adapt to 
various ideas about themselves, their role, and their work into already existing 
sociocultural frameworks. The thesis will show how such deliberative framing 
strategies not only lend credibility and legitimacy to their causes vis-a-vis the state, but 
also foster the acceptance of their issues as well as their cultural recognizability 
amongst their intended audience.  
  
II. Looking for environmentalism 
with Chinese characteristics 
II.1  Theoretical considerations: In search for a ‘green public 
sphere’ in China.  
Hardly any other topic within Sinology has generated the amount of scholarship as 
has the discussion around the existence, genesis, and specific nature of civil society 
in China, a discussion that by now has grown to proportions where it is hard to 
maintain a comprehensive overview. Hence, yet another study that analyzes state-
society relations in China will first have to establish the added value of such an 
endeavor. By reviewing the existing scholarship, this chapter will map out the charted 
and some of the uncharted territory, and show how the introduction of new material 
– a body of textual sources summarily called environmental nonfiction – will 
illuminate facets that differ from those stressed by more traditional approaches such 
as comparative or quantitative political science studies. 
This chapter will make a number of arguments: First, existing scholarship has been 
characterized by an overly narrow research focus on the structural and institutional 
dimension of the Chinese public sphere: While environmental civic associations, 
such as e.g. NGOs form the “pivotal organizational basis” (Yang/Calhoun 2007: 213) 
for the Chinese green public sphere and thus have been studied extensively as far as 
their social structure and interdependencies vis-a-vis the state are concerned, the focus 
on particular institutional arrangements has limited explanatory value when it comes 
to explain the idiosyncratic character of the Chinese case. 
Secondly, more attention has to be paid to the transnational and transcultural 
constitution of the Chinese green public sphere. What influence do the dynamics of 
cultural globalization - especially the global flow of ideas, concepts and cultural 
objects – have? 
Thirdly, this has led to an imbalance within the existing literature: While the 
institutional dimension has been mapped out in painstaking detail, other aspects of 
China's environmental public sphere have received far less attention. The concept of 
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“greenspeak” (which will be discussed later) hints to a wider discursive dimension, 
while other studies have touched on the persistence of traditional forms of contention 
and participation,  but these points remain rather vaguely defined and understudied.  
This gap in research can be addressed by introducing new, previously neglected, 
source material. A small number of internationally connected and highly reputable 
environmental leaders in China has produced a body of textual sources – 
environmental nonfiction – that so far has not been at the center of any socio-political 
study of Chinese environmentalism. This source material can provide crucial insight 
into the discursive modes of state-society relations in China, within the context of 
both environmentalism and cultural globalization.  
II.1.1  Conceptual universalism and conceptual particularism 
For argumentative purposes, the following discussion is structured around two 
theoretical problems that arise within Habermas' immensely influential work on The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.9 The reason Habermas deserves special 
consideration in the context of this study is not only because his historical account of 
the emergence of a discursive Öffentlichkeit (normally translated as “public sphere” in 
English) as one of the defining key features of modernity has become a paradigm 
which has over the decades spawned an almost innumerable amount of studies on 
the subject in various academic disciplines. Habermas’ concept also is arguably the 
most important – certainly the most-often cited – Western work of reference in any 
academic study that aims to discuss the question of state-society relationships in 
China. A study on the Chinese public sphere is almost required to mention Habermas 
as the minimal acknowledgment towards the dimension of theory.  
“By the public sphere”, Habermas writes, “we mean first of all a social realm of our 
social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed.” He 
continues: 
                                                 
9 Originally published as Habitilationsschrift “Strukturwandel der Öffentlicheit: Untersuchungen zu einer 
Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft“ in 1962, translated into English in 1989. All subsequent quotes 
are from the 1989 English version. 
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The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of 
private people coming together as a public; they soon claimed the public 
sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, 
to engage themselves in a debate over the general rules governing 
relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of 
commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of this political 
confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people’s 
use of their reason. (Habermas 1989: 27) 
It has been pointed out by a number of scholars that the applicability of the concepts 
“civil society” and “public sphere” for the case of China is fraught with problems.10 
Habermas himself acknowledges that the emergence of the public sphere as he 
describes it is conceptually necessarily confined to the European historic experience 
and its very particular sociocultural and political developments: 
We conceive bourgeois public sphere as a category that is typical of an 
epoch. It cannot be abstracted from the unique developmental history of 
that 'civil society' originating in the European High Middle Ages; nor can 
it be transferred, idealtypically generalized, to any number of historical 
situations that represent formally similar constellations. Just as we try to 
show, for instance, that one can properly speak of public opinion in a 
precise sense only with regard to late-seventeenth-century Great Britain 
and eighteenth-century France, we treat public sphere in general as a 
historical category. (Habermas: 1989: xvii-xviii)  
Is it then methodologically permissible to extrapolate the emergence of the public 
sphere, rooted in a set of very specific historical and socio-cultural conditions 
prevalent in Europe, onto other cases such as China, which might not have had a 
very different set of structural and historical conditions? “In his ‘Theories of 
Postmodernism’, Frederic Jameson reminds us of the 'ungeneralizable' national 
situation in which Habermas offers his defense of high modernism against the 
ideological assault of the postmodern. Jameson seems to agree with Habermas that 
                                                 
10 On the question of applicability of the civil society paradigm for China, see e.g: Wakeman, 1993; 
Huang, 1993; Dean, 1997; Chamberlain, 1998; Saich, 2000: 139; Howell, 2004: 163–164; Kang/Han 
2008: 36-38. 
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the classical European Bürgerlichkeit, or the Bourgeois public sphere, remains to this 
day an only partially realized ideal even in the core Western democracies.” (cited in 
Zhang 2008: 148-149)11 Put differently, is the paradigm of “the Chinese public sphere” 
just more old wine in new skins, yet another manifestation of a persistent desire by 
the Western-dominated social sciences to understand (and ultimately, remake) the 
social world in terms that fit the US-European experience?  
[...] are we in fact not presuming a ‘normal’ path of sociopolitical 
development, transcending the specificities of local culture? Is what we 
hope to find simply a projection of our own, culturally specific path of 
development – or, worse, of what we merely idealize our own path to 
have been? Is our very inquiry tautological, formed around a 
noncontrovertible proposition? (Rowe 1993: 193) 
The problem becomes immediately tangible when we compare one of the key 
assumptions of Habermas' ideal case with the social reality of China: The relationship 
between the private realm and the state which had been characterized by Habermas 
as mainly antagonistic and conflictual: 
Society, now a private realm occupying a position in opposition to the 
state, stood on the one hand as if in clear contrast to the state. On the 
other hand, that society had become a concern of public interest to the 
degree that the production of life in the wake of the developing market 
economy had grown beyond the bounds of private domestic authority. 
The bourgeois public sphere could be understood as the sphere of private 
individuals assembled into a public body, which almost immediately laid 
claim to the officially regulated “intellectual newspapers” for use against 
the public authority itself. In these newspapers, and in moralistic and 
critical journals, they debated that public authority on the general rules 
of social intercourse in their fundamentally privatized yet publicly 
relevant sphere of labor and commodity exchange. (Habermas 1989: 52) 
                                                 
11 The Jameson quote Zhang refers to here reads: “Habermas' own vision of history, which seeks to 
maintain the promise of 'liberalism' and the essential utopian content of the first universalizing 
bourgeois ideology (equality, civil rights, humanitarianism, free speech and open media) despite the 
failure of those ideals to be realized in the development of capitalism itself.” Jameson, Fredric (1998): “Theories 
of Postmodernism.” In: The Cultural Turn: 25-26 [my emphasis]. 
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While not even wholly applicable to any European case12, the dichotomy model of 
“state versus society” fits even less with the Chinese record, where historically, the 
state played a much larger role in the formation and control of public opinion, and 
social organizations never managed to achieve full institutional independence from 
government bureaucracy: In the People’s Republic, “[the] party-state, rooted in an 
autocratic and non-pluralistic tradition, has continuously tried to maintain a high 
degree of control over social organizations through different forms of ‘state 
patronage’.” (Saich 2000: 124) From this perspective, “the Chinese case here may 
serve to highlight a blind spot in [Habermas’] approach.” (Wagner 2007: 2) 
The majority of research on state-society relations in China has endeavored to 
address this issue from a structuralist point of view. This means that most studies 
focus on civic associations and their particular organizational situatedness within the 
political system of China. One of the central challenges scholars have faced in the 
task of mapping out what has been called the “associational landscape” (Ma 2006: 
204) of the PRC has been to reconcile the tension between on the one hand the need 
to remain faithful to the conceptual ideal-case in order to maintain the sufficient 
methodological rigor, while on the other hand pay sufficient attention to the 
particularities of the Chinese case.  The most attention in this regard has been paid 
to the role of Chinese non-governmental organizations (NGOs).13 The founding and 
institutional set-up of Friends of Nature (Ziran zhi you 自然之友) in 1994 for example, 
the first NGO ever to be founded in China by Liang Congjie 梁从诫, has been the 
focus of a great number of studies, since the organization is generally regarded as a 
                                                 
12  Habermas’ representation of the European experience is not entirely congruent even with the 
historical record for Europe itself: It is certainly true that in Europe a more and more self-confident 
urban and commercial bourgeoisie fought a long and often bloody battle of emancipation against 
Europe's Ancien Régimes. However, such a view overlooks the fact that often the state was a very active 
participant in what would become the public sphere, and that is was often interaction between private 
and officially-run newspapers and other publications that constituted the bulk of discursive interaction 
within the public sphere, as for example Chartier has demonstrated in his 1990 work Les Origines 
Culturelles de la Révolution Française. I am adopting the argument of Wagner 2007 in this context (see: 
id. 2007: 2)  
13 See Ma 2006 for an excellent monograph on the subject. Also: Young 2004 for an introductory essay 
on the origins of NGOs in China. 
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milestone14 in the history of environmental civil society in China.15 Moreover, the 
advantage of this approach lies in the fact that is allows the maintenance of a sharp 
analytical focus on a relatively manageable number of cases, and allows the 
application of well-honed methodological tools that especially political scientists are 
familiar with, namely comparatives studies of various institutional arrangements in 
particular are a staple within political scientific practice. Another reason why the 
institutional perspective within the scholarship is so prevalent might lie in the fact 
that it is relatively easy to obtain quantifiable and/or qualifiable data on a relatively 
coherent number of social organizations without having a command of the respective 
language of the case country16: A reading of the bibliographies of studies on state-
society relations in modern China reveals that many rely entirely on secondary source 
material that has been translated from Chinese into English. However, it is for these 
very same reasons that the institutional analysis approach has major limitations when 
it comes to describe the social ontology of state-society relations in the People’s 
Republic in general and the idiosyncracies of the Chinese case in particular.  
In this context, the ideal-typical dichotomy model was very influential in the early 
research on state-society relations after 1978: scholarly literature that employed the 
Habermasian “civil society” or the “public sphere” paradigm onto modern China 
first emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s17, under the impression of the role 
                                                 
14 The establishment of FoN is considered the starting shot for NGO development in China after which 
a significant number of environmental citizen groups registered with the authorities. Studies which 
have analyzed this development have pointed to a distinct regional as well as sociographic pattern: 
Most of these early NGOs were concentrated in relatively affluent cities and recruited their members 
mostly from China’s young educated urban middle class: In Beijing alone, the number of ENGOs 
(environmental NGOs) doubled from 9 to 18 between 1995 to 1996 (Ho 2001: 901) According to 
Yang, the number of ENGOs increased sharply from nine in 1994 (4 of them being student 
organizations) to 28 in 1997. Between 1997 and 1999, at least 69 grassroots environmental groups 
were founded, 43 of which were university student associations, and by 2001, the number of student 
environmental organizations had reached 184. (Yang Guobin 2005: 50). These numbers 
approximately correspond to a 2003 survey on student environmental groups in China by Lu Hongyan 
who concluded that their number had mushroomed from 10 in 1996 to 182 in 2002. [Lu 2003] 
15 Ho 2001; Economy 2004; Schwartz 2004; Turner 2004; Yang 2005, Ho/Edmonds 2008. 
16 This phenomenon is not limited to China only. The political sciences in general and even more so 
the comparative political sciences in particular to a large degree suffer from the fact that too many 
studies too heavily rely on translated secondary source material as their authors lack the necessary 
training to access non-English primary source material or interpret it in its original socio-cultural 
context. For a vivid discussion for the Chinese case, see: Herrmann-Pillath (1995). 
17 See: Gold 1990; Sullivan 1990; Brook 1992; Solinger 1992, Whyte 1992; White 1993; Nevitt 1996; 
White et al. 1996; Brook/Frolic, eds. 1997; He 1997; Frolic 1997; O’Brien 1998. 
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social organizations such as solidarność were playing in the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. What transpired on Tiananmen Square in the summer of 1989 only 
reinforced these notions. Early studies almost uniformly operated within an 
analytical framework that had an overly homogenous understanding of “the state” 
and “society”, and regarded their interaction as antagonistic and conflictual. 18 
Reviewing these first tens of years of academic literature on the subject, Saich notes 
that in the majority of these early studies “almost all types of nonconformity or anti-
regime behaviour were cited as evidence of an emerging civil society.” (Saich 2011: 
256) Moreover, many – Western – observers expressed confidence that these 
struggles would eventually lead to the toppling of the socialist regime and the 
installation of Western-style democracy in China. (Sullivan 1990) One is reminded 
of what Huang calls the “the trap of ideological use” of theory -- the urge by observers 
to understand social reality in a framework that fits their own political and ideological 
predispositions. (id. 1998: 185) However, it became increasingly clear that the 
explanatory power of the state-vs.-society model for the Chinese case was limited: 
Whatever the nature of the social developments, it became clear that they were 
occurring embedded within in a larger socio-political context, path-dependent within 
the continuity of a Leninist-style party state that continued to not only tightly control 
social organizations, but also to forcefully assert its own position within what could 
be regarded as an emergent Chinese public sphere: “While social space has opened 
up, the state has continued to retain a great deal of its organizational power and has 
                                                 
18 Østergaard’s 1989 study in which he argued for the existence of a “nascent civil society in China” 
was arguably the first to operate under this "state versus society" paradigm (see: Gu 1994). He 
concluded that "the demonstrations in May 1989 [...] were a turning point. The shooting of unarmed 
civilians meant, furthermore, that an irreversible change took place in the relationship between the 
State [sic, M.L.] and society." [ibid: 41], an argument that was echoed in a 1990 article by David 
Strand (Strand 1990). In the same year, Gold argued that "the ruthless campaign of suppression that 
began on June 4 revealed in turn the degree to which [the CCP; M.L.] remains unwilling and unable 
to accept the reality of nascent civil society in China." (Gold 1990: 31) And in a 1994 study, Calhoun 
described the student protests as a "struggle for democracy". Given the precedent of the social 
movements that were successfully challenging socialist regimes in Eastern Europe at the time, it is not 
surprising that scholars chose to apply these lessons to China. Perry and Fuller argued that the 1989 
student protests had failed because China was “devoid of the institutional stage upon which the 
revolutions of 1989 were played out elsewhere in the Communist world.” (Perry/Fuller 1991: 663) 
and Cheek similarly attributed the 1989 failure in China to a lack of institutionalized civil society (such 
as independent labor unions or churches that had provided the ground for the union movements in 
the Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe). (Cheek 1992)  Such perspectives were refuted by studies 
that rejected the prevalent “state vs. society” model: Already in 1989, Walder argued that "it is 
tempting, but misleading, to characterize Beijing's popular rebellion as a movement by 'society' against 
the 'state'" (Walder 1989: 35-40), a view that since then has been strongly supported by a number of 
other studies (see e.g: Calhoun 1994; Zhao 2001; and Bejá 2006.). 
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moved to dominate the space and reorganize the newly emergent organizations. This 
is resulting in new hybrid forms of public/private that are difficult to define precisely.” 
(Saich 2011: 256; my emphasis) 
With the introduction of hybridity we have left the “high modernism” that 
characterized the original Habermasian approach, and entered into the complex and 
at times puzzling territories of postmodernism. Hybridity is one of the key concepts 
with which scholarship has aimed to move away from modernist universalism 
towards the recognition of particularism. The term, along with closely related terms 
such as syncretism, creolization, or métissage, has become an almost ubiquitous trope in 
cultural, literature, or postcolonial studies.19 “In the West, hybridity thinking is à la 
mode,” Pieterse wrote already in 2001, yet precisely because of its popularity 
“hybridity is fast becoming a routine, almost trite point of reference. […] As hybridity 
becomes a ubiquitous attribute or quality, by the same token it becomes increasingly 
meaningless, a universal soup: if everything is hybrid, what does hybridity mean?” 
(Pieterse 2001: 236)  
Given this problem, can we meaningfully combine Habermas’ theory with the 
hybridity concept? First, the notion of hybridity seems altogether applicable to 
Habermas’ concept: “In these usages of the term public sphere, he [Habermas] seems 
to be referring to a generalized phenomenon of an expanding public realm of life in 
modern society, which can take on different forms and involve different power 
relationships between state and society. He is hinting at a typology of public spheres, 
of which ‘the bourgeois’ is but one variety.” (Huang 1993: 217) Habermas conceived 
the “bourgeois” public sphere as merely one variant of several possible public spheres. 
For Habermas, the bourgeois variant represents a “liberal” model, which has to be 
“strictly distinguished” from, for example, another variant – “the plebiscitary-
                                                 
19 The term hybridity originally is closely associated with the natural sciences, especially biology. In 
the Laws of Mendelian Inheritance, formulated by 19th century biologist Gregor Mendel, hybridity is a 
key concept. Like a number of other terms from the natural sciences, hybridity since then has found 
its entry into the disciplines of social science, and especially in the field of postcolonial studies. Two 
important text in this regard are Bhabha’s 1994 work The Location of Culture, and Gilroy’s The Black 
Atlantic. Modernity and Double Consciousness (1993) For a good introduction to the historic development 
of the term “hybridity” in a non-biologist context see: Young 1995: 22-28; also: Hannerz 1987. 
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acclamatory form of regimented public sphere characterizing dictatorships in highly 
developed industrial societies.” (ibid: xviii)  
This notion of a possible variety of public spheres conceptually opens the door to the 
possibility of applying the civil society / public sphere paradigm to societies that do 
not share the cultural, historical or socio-political preconfigurations of the European 
ideal type. Schak/Hudson very convincingly sum up this approach when they state 
that: 
Civil Society is not all or nothing, either existing or not existing. It may 
appear and make some advances, then stall or go backwards, and this 
pattern varies with the different levels of authoritarianism as opposed to 
democratization in the societies concerned. Moreover, it is not unilinear, 
but path dependent. This, while there is some convergence between 
societies with or in the process of developing civil societies, each will have 
its idiosyncrasies.” (Schak/Hudson 2003: 1) 
Hence, scholarship suggests that it is possible to move away from simply applying a 
preconceived ideal type onto the Chinese case towards the recognition of its essential 
hybridity. But hybrid in what way? Exactly because hybridity is a term so open to 
analytical interpretation, its usefulness for the analysis of a social phenomenon such 
as “the Chinese green public sphere” depends on the analytical category through 
which one is approaching the concept: Pieterse has produced a critical typology of 
“hybridities” that shows its applicability in various fields of scholarship. He notes 
that in this context, the concept more often refers to cases of cultural, and less often 
to instances of institutional or structural hybridity, and is less common in political 
science literature. (Pieterse 2001:222-223) 
In this context, the voluminous body of scholarship on “civil society in China” can 
be understood as a growing effort to map out and account for its hybrid character, 
“its Chinese characteristics” so to speak. But the degree to which these studies have 
succeeded in this endeavor depends on the analytical focus of the respective study: 
In my view, the associational perspective is less qualified to satisfactorily do so, 
because of the limitations of its analytical scope, and its tendency to produce 
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diagrams of social structures and their interconnections that suffer from a certain 
ahistoric statism: 
Much ink has been spilled in efforts to introduce new theoretical labels that aim to 
accurately describe the “new hybrid forms” of associational life in China. As 
discussed above, one key idiosyncrasy in which the Chinese case deviates from the 
Western-derived ideal case is the often cooperative and non-conflictual relationship 
between state and non-state actors. Even more, from an institutional point of view it 
is sometimes almost impossible to distinguish state and non-state actors within the 
associational landscape of China.  
Due to the extraordinary size and diversity of China's societal reality, but also the at 
times breathtaking pace with which social change in China has been taking place 
over the last decades, the search for the label that describes Chinese social reality best 
has proven to be an exceedingly difficult task which has yielded mixed results. Indeed, 
the issue at hand is so complex that it is extraordinary challenging to refer to the 
whole picture all at once by employing just one conceptual framework. Thus, there 
has been a trend amongst scholars to selectively label state-society relations in China 
according to the aspect, perspective or particular facet of investigative focus.  
Examples of such attempts of re-conceptualizations include Frolic’s 1997 study that 
coined the term “state-led civil society” which is “created from the top down as an 
adjunct to state power.” (ibid: 48) Alternatively, Huang has proposed the concept of 
“the third realm” (1993), while Foster (2002) used the term “embedded within state 
agencies” to describe the institutional situation of business associations in the city of 
Yantai. Gu (1999) in his study on the relationship between Chinese intellectuals and 
the state during the reform period had made a similar observation: “It is 
methodologically problematic and empirically misleading to use such conceptions as 
‘civil society against the state’ in discussions of Chinese intellectual culture”. 
According to Gu, Chinese intellectuals were “a highly segmented” group “with 
different segments having different links to the state.” As a result, “the institutional 
base for the opposition of intellectuals to the party-state was weak.” Actions against 
the state were not mainstream and instead intellectuals generally “utilized the 
institutional leeway […] to develop their group life and to get the intellectual 
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groupings institutionalized”, a relationship which Gu calls “dependent 
independence”20: 
[...] Chinese intellectuals had their own ways to shift the relationship 
between state and society during the transitional period. To grasp the 
multilinear picture of the transition from communism to pluralism, we 
need an alternative approach that enables us to explain not only those 
phenomena that have originally been labeled "civil society," but also 
those that have little to do with the term "civil society. (Gu 1999: 427) 
 Kang and Han (2008) have introduced the concept of a system of “graduated 
controls” in which “[t]he state permits citizens limited freedom to organize, but social 
organizations are permitted neither to exist independently of the state nor to 
challenge the power of the state. At the same time, the state fully uses the capabilities 
of social organizations to provide public goods.” (Kang/Han 2008: 51-52) He 
Baogang has described this phenomenon as “semi-civil society in China”, a “feature 
of partial autonomy and overlapping with the state that makes Chinese social 
associations a semi- or quasi-civil society.” (He 1997: 8)  The problem of this sort of 
eclectic labeling has prompted no small amount of criticism that has been summed 
up most poignantly by Baum and Shevchenko (1999) when they write that the 
“labeling debate” reminds them of “the parable of the blind men and the elephant” 
(ibid: 333–334, also: 346), with each one trying to divine the overall shape of the 
massive beast from the respective extremity they are touching. 
A form of social organization in China that perfectly illustrates this conceptual 
confusion is the case of so-called GONGOs (government-organized non-
governmental organizations), which is a paradoxical label in itself. GONGOs are 
social organizations that were founded by and operate under the direct control of 
government agencies but enjoy differing degrees of autonomy from their supervisory 
government agency. 21  
                                                 
20 Gu borrows the term “dependent independence” from White, Howell, et al. (1996) in: The Search of 
Civil Society in China. 
21 For a list of environmental GONGOs in China see: Wu 2002: 51. Among the most prominent are: 
The China Environmental Science Association (CESA) founded in 1979 under the State 
Environmental Protection Administration; The China Wildlife Conservation Association (CWCA) 
founded in 1983 under the Ministry of Forestry, now State Forestry Bureau; The Beijing Energy 
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The core criteria differentiating a GONGO from a genuine independent 
societal group is that the initiative to establish a GONGO is taken by a 
government agency or institution. An important distinction between 
GONGOs and government agencies is that GONGOs do not implement 
projects directly through formal administrative systems but instead 
function more as research centers or consultants for government 
agencies. (Wu 2002: 46) 
The conceptual difficulty here lies in the fact that often there is little difference 
between a GONGO and a NGO when it comes to their institutional relationship to 
the state bureaucracy: While most studies agree on the general fact that the 
relationship between citizen-organized social organizations and the state 
bureaucracy in the PRC are not primarily antagonistic, but rather cooperative, there 
remains significant disagreement over the degree of autonomy these groups enjoy. 
(see: Young 2004, 2009; also  Raab 1996). Just as GONGOs, NGOs that operate in 
China also are subject to a strict and at the same time constantly changing set of 
government-enforced supervisory laws and cannot be said to operate in a truly 
independent manner. 22  At this point, the institutional differentiation between 
different organizational forms becomes not only exceedingly difficult, but at some 
point also increasingly arbitrary. Unger (2008) himself – maybe unintentionally – 
concedes the limits of the institutional analysis approach in the introduction to an 
edited volume on the question of corporatism in China.23  In the introduction, he 
states that the contributors’ aim is “to divine whether civil society or alternatively state 
corporatism better describes China's circumstances” (ibid: 7; my emphasis). 
                                                 
Efficiency Center (BECon) founded in 1993 under the Resource Institute of the State Development 
Planning Commission. 
22 Büsgen 2006: 1. On the legal regulatory framework for NGOs in China, see: Ma 2006: 76-103; 
23  Corporatism emphasizes the institutionalized incorporation of state influence into civic 
associations. Several scholars (Oi 1992; Chan 1993; Unger/Chan 1995; Saich, 2001; Unger 2008) 
argue that this concept describes state-society relations in China more aptly. By choosing the civil 
“society or corporatism” dichotomy, they put the analytical focus on the question on how (at times 
conflicting) interests that occur within the Chinese body politic are aggregated and accommodated: 
According to Chan (1993), "[...] the implicit ideology of state corporatism recognizes conflictual 
societal interests, in that the very purpose of establishing a corporatist structure is to keep these 
interests under control." (Chan 1994: 36). 
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Divination appears to exceed the limits of scientific endeavor, but the choice of words 
in this context is indicative of the epistemological limitations of this approach. 
II.1.2 Methodological nationalism and transnationalism 
Another factor preventing a comprehensive picture of what is called the Chinese 
public sphere has been what Beck and Sznaider call “methodological nationalism” 
(Beck/Sznaider 2006: 2).  
Methodological nationalism takes the following premises for granted: it 
equates societies with nation-state societies and sees states and their 
governments as the primary focus of social-scientific analysis. It assumes 
that humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations, which 
organize themselves internally as nation-states and externally set 
boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states. And it 
goes further: this outer delimitation as well as the competition between 
nation-states, represent the most fundamental category of political 
organization. (Beck/Sznaider 2006: 3) 
Habermas himself remained firmly in the boundaries of methodological nationalism 
when he mapped out emergence of the public sphere in Europe. Other important 
works for the discussion of the development of the public sphere have followed a 
similar approach, for example Benedict Anderson's hugely influential account on the 
role of “print-capitalism” for the formation of nationalism within the confines of the 
modern nation state at the end of the 18th century. His observation that nations, 
“imagined communities”, are “conceived in language, not in blood” (Anderson 1991: 
149), and are therefore “joinable in time” implicitly accepts Habermas paradigm of 
the importance of a (linguistically homogenous) public sphere as a key feature of 
modernity (although Anderson does not mention Habermas by name) However, his 
focus on the nation state as the central analytic category has been one of the main 
points for critique of Anderson's argument.24  
                                                 
24  It has to be asked whether such a critique is valid only now that high modernism has been 
thoroughly challenged by the rise of cultural globalization, or whether the national perspective had 
been too narrow from the outset: Even before the publication of Anderson’s study, Darnton in his The 
Literary Underground of the Old Regime (1982) had demonstrated how major portions of what surely 
both Habermas and Anderson would consider relevant for their approaches, a French-speaking public 
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As has been pointed out by Wakeman (1993) or Wagner (2007), the limitation of the 
“public sphere” concept to the nation state ignores the transnational character of the 
social phenomenon at the heart of its analysis. This is not only true for contemporary 
issues; by now, a substantial body of literature on the genesis of public spheres in late 
Qing and early republican China has demonstrated that transnational interaction, 
and especially Western agency, played a crucial role in shaping its social 
constitution.25  
The notion of a globally organized public, a “transnational civil society” that operates 
beyond the boundaries imposed by nation states has increasingly stimulated 
academic debate: “[Transnational civil society] refers to self-organized advocacy 
groups that undertake voluntary collective action across state borders in pursuit of 
what they deem the wider public interest.” (Price 2003: 580) According to Castells 
(2008) who had previously argued for the emergence of a “network society” as the 
new social morphology of societies, “[t]he process of globalization has shifted the 
debate from the national domain to the global debate, prompting the emergence of a 
global civil society and of ad hoc forms of global governance. Accordingly, the public 
sphere as the space of debate on public affairs has also shifted from the national to 
the global and is increasingly constructed around global communication networks.” 
(ibid: 78) The revolution in the IT sector, most notably the internet, has been the 
                                                 
sphere in pre-revolutionary France – newspapers, gazettes, flyers, pamphlets, etc. – were printed 
outside France and then smuggled into Paris, in order to avoid persecution by the agents of the Ancien 
Régime. 
25  Rankin (1986) acknowledges the importance of the Shanghai-based, Western-style Shenbao 
newspaper as a voice for business interests, Rowe in his studies ignores the fact that the merchants in 
Hankou where almost all either compradors of Western businesses in Shanghai or Westerners 
themselves. Another dimension of the role of the foreign community for the emergence of a civil 
society in late-Qing/early-Republican China is the role of the Chinese city, especially the treaty ports 
and Beijing. Shanghai has consistently been cast by different authors as the cradle of Chinese 
modernity, as a shining model ready to be emulated by the rest of China (see e.g. Lee 1999). Being a 
modern city existing within the boundaries of a deeply backward country, with its large community 
of Westerners, Shanghai confronted Chinese with a cultural and societal model wholly different from 
their own and provided an example of what Western concepts in  a Chinese environment might look 
like. (Strand 1989, Wagner 1995) However, 'modernity' within Shanghai itself was highly 
asymmetrical (Wagner 1995): modernity existed only in the city parts where the Westerners had 
settled in, and contrary to its universalistic claims, it proved to be highly exclusive when it came to the 
acceptance of the native Chinese. (Wasserstrom 2002) The case of Shanghai deserves special attention 
also because it is the place where one feature that is particularly important to a vibrant public sphere 
first emerged: the modern Western-style newspaper in Chinese language. The early newspaper 
business in China has been the subject to extensive research (see e.g. Elvin 1995; Janku 2003; 
Vittinghoff 2002) Especially the Shenbao newspaper, founded by the British businessman Ernest 
Major, has been in the focus of attention (see Mittler 2004 and 2007; Wagner 1995 and 2007). 
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crucial factor in the emergence of these global networks. Not only has it made 
organization and interlinking of single groups much easier, but it also provides new 
modes of information dissemination and new platforms such as global “salons” in 
cyberspace for discussion. (Dean 2001) Brown (2008) in this context explores the role 
transnational civil society actors play in enhancing accountability and legitimacy in 
global governance regimes, which Florini (2000) sees as the emergence of a “third 
force” on the global stage,  
Although the state system that has governed the world for centuries is 
neither divinely ordained nor easily swept away, in many ways that 
system is not well suited to addressing the world's growing agenda of 
border-crossing problems. (Florini 2000: 3) 
This statement points to the fact that it might not only be the means of circulation 
which undergo profound change, but that the issues themselves are increasingly 
transcending not only the borders but also the capacity of the nation state, a 
phenomenon that is not restricted to but maybe most notable for the case of  
environmental issues. It is hence no surprise that the new global public sphere is very 
notably coalescing around environmental issues. By now, the reality of global climate 
change has caused a profound rethinking of the role of the nation state, and cross-
national environmental issues such as water rights (Chellaney 2011) or cross-border 
pollution (Vogel 1997) increasingly pose the question whether environmental 
governance is beyond the capacity of singular nation states, and whether new modes 
of governance are necessary. (Mason 2008: 8-24) The reality is “that global 
environmental change decreases the capacity of nation states to fulfill their 
definitional functions without the cooperation of other states. The added stress due 
to environmental change also increases the demand for adaptive capacities of nation 
states, which further diminishes their resources to fulfill other core functions.” 
(Biermann and Dingwerth 2004: 1) Increasingly, a transnational civil society is 
growing into a supportive and complementary role to facilitate and enhance global 
environmental governance.  
The connection between governance and transnational civil society involvement has 
also drawn attention from scholars studying China: Some have remarked upon the 
transnational linkages of Chinese and Taiwanese NGOs and other civic associations 
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(Chen 2001; Morton 2005a), such as governmentally-sponsored GONGOs (Wu 
2002), to cooperate on specific issues. “China’s revolution in associationalism is not 
confined within its borders. It is also creating opportunities for expanding 
transnational linkages. Over the past few years an increasing number of Chinese 
NGOs have established extensive international networks (Sun 2001); they now 
participate in international conferences and promote Chinese concerns in 
international campaigns. Higher levels of cooperation between local and 
international NGOs have created a unique opportunity to exchange ideas and share 
experience. At a more practical level, many local NGOs now work directly with 
international partners to bring about change on the ground.” (Morton 2005a: 522-
523) 
II.2  Bringing culture back in: traditional repertoires of public 
contention within Chinese environmentalism 
Given the problems sketched out above, the modernism that characterizes the 
Habermasian approach has increasingly been challenged, mostly in the context of 
heightened efforts to map out the dynamics of cultural globalization. A number of 
scholars have sought to “bring culture back” into the analysis of popular participation 
and protest in China, in order to map out the “Multiple Modernities” that account 
for cultural particularities but at the same time all share certain features of 
modernity.26 Taylor touches on this issue when he differentiates an “acultural” and 
a “cultural theory of modernity” (Taylor 1995: 24). 
                                                 
26 Eisenstadt’s article on Multiple Modernities (2000) by now has become a standard reference to the 
argument of the cultural heterogeneity of modernity. For Eisenstadt, the 20th century can be 
understood in terms of the various patterns modernity took, even within the cradle of modernity itself: 
Communism, Fascism and National Socialism all represented forms of modernity, with the added 
irony that they all claimed to be able to overcome the upthrows “liberal-bourgeois modernity” had 
wrought. On the side of Africa, Asia, and South-America, modernity made its way over by mostly 
violent means, in the form of colonialism. Moreover, Eisenstadt argues that we cannot merely 
conceptualize the flows of modernity in terms of push factors, but also have to consider the pull factors, 
that is agency at the receiving end of the flow. Here, according to Eisenstadt, Western science and 
technology played a crucial part. On the one hand, it undermined the traditional systems of belief and 
power and therefore was met with considerable resistance. On the other hand, technology (especially 
of military nature) was seen as the paramount source of the Westerners’ power, and therefore was 
something to be desired, emulated and copied: “The appropriation of these themes and institutions 
permitted many in non-European societies—especially elites and intellectuals—to participate actively 
in the new modern universal (albeit initially Western) tradition, while selectively rejecting many of its 
aspects—most notably that which took for granted the hegemony of the Western formulations of the 
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In this light, scholars are increasingly paying attention to the cultural dimension of 
public participation in environmental issues. They have, for example, commented on 
the enduring use of ancient rituals in modern protests that draw on the long tradition 
of popular contention, from peasant rebellions in imperial times to twentieth-century 
revolutions. Claims and repertoires of many instances of contemporary resistance are 
strikingly similar to protests found in pre-modern China, as Perry and Selden put it: 
“Significant strains in contemporary popular protest can be traced back to imperial 
and republican era precedents.” (id. 2000: 8-9)  
Perry (2002) in her study on “Social Protest and State Power in China” finds that one 
of the most developed means of challenging authority in this enduring tradition is the 
creative appropriation of state rituals and official rhetoric. (Perry 2002: xxiii) 
Esherick and Wasserstrom in their analysis on “Political Theatre in China” in the 
context of the Tian’anmen protests of 1989 highlight the importance of the creative 
appropriation and subversion of official state rituals (that in turn are modeled on 
earlier, imperial traditions) by student protesters. (Esherick and Wasserstrom 1990: 
848) 
Some observers have made the point that Chinese environmental NGOs and activists 
are able to cope with political constraints, and in fact have been able to achieve their 
goals, overcome policy obstacles, and convince the government of their intentions 
through noncontentious means that have precedents in earlier, traditional modes of 
contention. This type of micro-politics has been called “negotiating with the state” 
(Saich 2001), “pushing the envelope” (Turner 2004), or “boundary-spanning 
contention” (O’Brien 2003). Chinese environmentalism seems to be uniquely 
qualified in this regard to serve as a vehicle for the advancement of citizen 
participation in general, since green issues have legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese 
government.27 As Yan Baohua, an associate of Friends of Nature puts it (as quoted in 
Cooper 2006): “This is our way in”, pointing to the fact that environmental issues 
                                                 
cultural program of modernity. The appropriation of themes of modernity made it possible for these 
groups to incorporate some of the Western universalistic elements of modernity in the construction of 
their own new collective identities, without necessarily giving up specific components of their 
traditional identities […].” (Eisenstadt 2001: 14-15) For further discussion of the concept, see: Taylor 
1995; Gaonkar 2001; Inda/Rosaldo 2002. 
27 See: Schwartz 2004; Yang 2005, Cooper 2006. 
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are perceived by many citizen activists as the avenue towards greater public 
participation in Chinese politics. 
For the particular case of Chinese environmentalism, Hung (2007) discusses the 
historic roots of Chinese environmentalism and comments on the changes and 
continuities in the political ecology of popular protest: Comparing official Qing-era 
documents from the 18th and 19th century detailing peasant protests caused by 
environmental calamities, he argues that  popular contention of government activity 
depended on the capacity of the Qing state to adequately respond to citizen needs; 
action repertoires employed by peasant activists oscillated between peaceful 
remonstrance and petitioning (at the height of Qing power), and violent protests and 
outright guerrilla warfare in later years.  
[P]eople in the early 19th century were confronted with threats of 
environmental crisis similar to those in the previous century, the 
particular political context of the period, namely, the falling capacity of 
the state, meant that people had to struggle for survival in ways very 
different from their fellow countrymen in the early 18th century. Local 
communities were no longer eager to organize nonconfrontational 
petitions to make their voices heard by the government official; for they 
realized that the officials could do little to help them anyway. As a result, 
victims of environmental disasters increasingly tended to resort to 
confrontational action to solve their problems. (Hung 2005: 318) 
Hung concludes that “the form of contention that was predominant in the early 19th 
century can be found in rural China today. Confrontational and disruptive protests 
have been increasing since the initiation of market reform in 1978. […] The dynamics 
of protest in these confrontational actions is reminiscent of the dynamics of collective 
violence in the early 19th century, as most documented cases of violent resistance 
show that the people resort to confrontational direct action only after they lose 
confidence in local officials’ willingness and capacity to help them. Another parallel 
between contemporary and early 19th-century protests is that appeals and complaints 
to higher-level governments about local officials is an increasingly popular method 
of protest. Again, it can be explained by the people’s increasing doubt in local 
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governments’ capacity and willingness to do justice.” (Hung 2005: 318-319) Similarly, 
Yang (2005) describes what he calls “mixed collection action repertoires”:  
The diverse ENGOs in China all aim to promote environmental 
consciousness, sustainable development and public participation. To 
achieve these goals, they have adopted a mixture of traditional and new 
collective action repertoires. Typically, they avoid confrontational 
methods and adopt approaches that encourage learning, co-operation 
and participation. Common practices include public lectures, workshops 
and conferences, salon discussions, ﬁeld trips, publication of newsletters 
and multimedia documents, and new forms of “electronic action” such 
as online discussions, online mailing lists and internet petitions. Although 
some organizations are edging their way into more contentious areas, the 
general tendency has been to shy away from radical issues and tactics. 
(Yang 2005: 52) 
As appealing as these perspectives might appear, one should avoid the mistake to 
replace the statism of the institutionalist approach with similarly imprecise culturalist 
arguments that ascribe the idiosyncrasies of civil society in China to a variable 
summarily labeled “Chinese culture”: The quote below – arguing that Chinese state-
society relations are more suitably labeled corporatist because of “Confucianism” – 
is representative of this line of essentialist reasoning:  
In the Confucianist teachings that pervaded all of East Asian cultures [sic], 
giving primacy to private interests had been viewed as equivalent to 
selfishness. The greater good as ideally manifested in a consensus 
overseen by the moral authority of the leadership, reflected in a 
moralistic father-knows-best paternalism.  
The notion that individual and sectoral interests should be compromised 
for the greater good, as represented by a higher leadership, was 
conducive in the modern age to patriotic appeals, and East Asian 
governments have not been slow to wrap themselves in the garb of 
nationalism and 'national interest' in their promotion of corporatist 
solutions. (Unger/Chan 1995: 33) 
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Instead, a more nuanced approach must again focus on the hybridity of socio-cultural 
configurations in China that have been shaped by the entanglement of East Asian 
societies with the global currents of cultural flows. 28  Indeed, the emergence of 
hybridity as an analytical concept is closely linked to the increasing attention scholars 
have been paying to these processes of cultural globalization. It is particularly the 
object of interest for authors who see globalization as a number of – more or less 
connected – processes occurring simultaneously, or what Pieterse calls 
“globalizations in the plural” (id. 1995: 45). Scholars from various disciplines are 
exploring its dynamics in the cultural realm (cultural globalization), and in particular 
its explanatory potential for a broad variety of issues such as ethnicity, identity, 
gender, and transnational communities. “Hybridity is a central term in post-
structuralist cultural theory and in some variants of globalization theory. It is, in fact, 
difficult to understand the importance given to notions of hybridity outside the debate 
on cultural globalization.” (Anthias 2001: 621) Broadly speaking, cultural 
globalization refers to the movement of cultural objects such as ideas, meanings, and 
values across national borders.29 Initial (often highly critical) approaches to cultural 
globalization often perceived cultural globalization as a process of mere global 
cultural homogenization, Westernization, or “McDonaldization”30 (a mocking term 
coined to describe the homogenization of global popular culture due to Western 
                                                 
28 The “flow” concept has not solely been used by one single discipline, but rather has been receiving 
attention from various academic disciplines. What they all have in common is that they focus on 
objects (be they physical, cultural, technological or else) in a state of movement as well as the dynamics 
of processes of exchange. For example, Lash and Urry hint at the great heterogeneity of these flows 
when they state that the late-twentieth century societies are characterized by flows and “these flows 
consist of capital, labor, commodities, information and images.” (Lash/Urry 1994: 12) Lee and 
LiPuma see the processes of circulation as a key constituting aspect of twenty-first century capitalism: 
“The contemporary processes of globalization demonstrate that capitalism, in its cycles of creative 
destruction and resurrection, has again reinvented itself. It is in transition from a production-centric 
system to one whose primary dynamic is circulation.” (Lee/LiPuma 2002: 209) For the field of market 
economics, an illustrative example of the sometimes confusing diversity of flows is Czarniawska and 
Sevon (2005) have traced the flow of a variety of objects ranging from managerial education to 
stockfish, and have studied incorporation into local sociocultural settings. Flows as a concept also 
play an important role in anthropology. Appadurai who is maybe the most prominent (certainly one 
of the most often-cited) theorist in this field is also co-founder of the journal Public Culture (strictly 
speaking a transdisciplinary journal but leaning towards anthropology), whose essays in its self-
description “have mapped the capital, human, and media flows drawing cities, peoples, and states 
into transnational relationships and political economies.” 
29 The term cultural globalization is highly complex and multi-facetted, and in the context of this book 
can only be addressed in a highly condensed fashion. Inda/Rosaldo 2002: 1-34; Pieterse 2001; Hopper 
2007: 30 ff. 
30 Coined by sociologist George Ritzer in 1993. 
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cultural dominance). 31  Such critique in hindsight proved all-too simplistic, and 
increasingly, it became clear that “globalization of culture is not the same as its 
homogenization” (Appadurai 1990: 307). Instead, theorists of cultural globalization 
increasingly recognized the highly complex, indeed chaotic, processes of exchange, 
adoption, negotiation and metamorphosis at the heart of cultural globalization, and 
the resulting hybrid state of social forms, concepts, and institutions. While authors 
do use the term hybridity in many different ways in varying contexts, and employ it 
a useful conceptual tool for different purposes, as for studies on topics such as e.g. 
ethnicity, identity, gender, space, etc. studies on cultural hybridity draw interest 
especially from postcolonial scholars who since have made impressive efforts to 
theorize and analyze the circumstances, conditions and dynamics of the emergence 
of cultural hybridities.32  
The recognition of the transnational dimension of the public sphere hence has strong 
implications for the way in which academic discourse views the issue of culture. It 
points to the fact that what has been called the environmental public sphere in China 
is not only transnational, but also transcultural33, hence not only challenging the notion 
of whether the boundaries of the nation state are the adequate analytical unit to 
approach the issue, but also whether the notion of “a green public sphere with 
Chinese characteristics” needs to overcome essentialist notions by taking into 
account the processes of global cultural exchange. In his introduction to the 1947 
                                                 
31 For example, Albrow states that cultural globalization “refers to all those processes by which the 
peoples of the world are incorporated into a single world society, global society” (id. 1990: 9). 
32 While the origin of the term hybridity is closely associated with the natural sciences, and especially 
with 19th century biologist Gregor Mendel, the term was soon appropriated by proponents of Social 
Darwinism in the form of discourses on racial purity, degeneracy, and theories on the intellectual, 
psychological and moral differences between certain “types” of Homo Sapiens. This discourse proved 
instrumental in perpetuating structures of colonial rule. For an exhaustive study on this topic, see: 
Young 1995, esp. chapter one. 
33 The term “transculturation” was arguably coined by Cuban scholar Fernando Ortiz in 1940, when 
he published a study titled Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar.33 In it, he painted a heterogeneous 
and complex picture of Cuban culture: not only were economic and technological determinants, 
namely the tobacco and sugar industry, in two quite different but predictable ways responsible for the 
shape of Cuban culture. Moreover, there was a puzzling intermingling of various cultural influences 
that all contributed to the condition of Cuban culture: it incorporated amongst others African, 
European, and American influences. Ortiz was fond of comparing this hybrid culture to ajiaco, a 
Creole stew that consists of many different ingredients that are boiled together. Cuban culture – 
Cubanidad –, then, was a product of this blending process for which he introduced the term 
transculturation. (Font/Quiroz 2005: 181) 
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English translation of Ortiz' Contrapunteo, Malinowski summarized transculturation 
as  
“a process in which something is always given in return for what one 
receives, a system of give and take [...] a term that does not contain the 
implication of one certain culture toward which the other must tend, but 
an exchange between two cultures, both of them active, both 
contributing their share, and both co-operating to bring about a new 
reality.” (cited in Cuban Counterpoints, p. xvi) 
In cultural anthropology, the term “transculturality”34 has been revised to describe 
“the many different processes of assimilation, adaptation, rejection, parody, 
resistance, loss, and ultimately transformation” (Spitta 1995: 24) that are 
characteristic for the highly intricate processes of cultural globalization.  
For example, some studies have explored the dynamics of transculturation in the 
context of the substantial global Chinese diaspora that despite its regional disparity 
maintains closely-knit networks of kinship and patronage, while at the same time 
struggling to maintain and re-negotiate a sense of cultural identity and “Chineseness” 
(Ong 2004): Ong has drawn attention to the transnational “flexible citizenship” 
overseas Chinese engage in by making use of family networks and job opportunities 
spanning various countries, while at the same time feeling a cultural affinity to their 
“Chineseness”, which is often accompanied by a sense of cultural nostalgia. Ong 
argues that her approach would avoid the usual paradigms of either conceptualizing 
the phenomenon of transnationalism in terms of the cultural-imaginary or the 
economic-political, and instead proposes to focus on “cultural specificities of global 
                                                 
34 Wolfang Welsch is – among others – credited with revising the term transculturality to employ it in 
a larger field of study. He does not completely follow Ortiz' procedural understanding of the term, but 
uses it to occupy a new understanding of culture free from the traps posed by essentialism. His 1995 
essay which established Welsch as one of the proponents of transculturality (“Transkulturalität. Die 
veränderte Verfassung heutiger Kulturen” [english title: “Transculturality – the puzzling form of 
cultures today”]) begins by expressing his unease over the dominant concept (or concepts) of culture 
as they exist in academia while his paper is written: In his view, this concept does not fit the ontological 
state of cultures around the globe anymore, and therefore, he proposes a new concept (which he calls 
transculturality) that is better fit to describe this new state of cultures. Against this perspective, Welsch 
positions his own concept, which he calls 'transculturality' [Transkulturalität], which he first 
distinguishes from the concept of “interculturality”: The latter, he states, still carried with the notion 
of separate cultures, between which exchange (the “inter”) was occurring. Since the word still 
connoted this in Welsch's view outdated model, one should abandon in favor of transculturality 
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processes”. (Ong 2004: 4) The maintenance and spread of these transnational 
linkages has been greatly helped and facilitated by the rise of new information 
technology, most importantly the internet. (Sima 2011; Wong 2003; Yang 2003a, 
2003b, and 2003c) In a 2009 book on Chinese citizen online activism, Yang (2009) 
points to the “persistence of traditional rituals” in Chinese cyberspace. Chinese 
netizens, according to Yang, engage in a variety of various “contentious rituals”, 
both verbal and non-verbal, readily available from what Yang calls “a cultural 
toolkit”, while at the same time using the chances and interconnectivity offered by 
new information technology to elaborate on and create new rituals, resulting new 
forms of civic online participation “with Chinese characteristics”: “China's time-
honored culture of contention endures in the Internet age. Many long-established 
practices are replicated online. Yet even as traditional forms persist, people create 
new ones. Some new forms are creative adaptations of traditional practices to the 
new media; others are expansions made possible by the new media.” (Yang 2009: 69)  
Similarly, Choy (2005) in an insightful article analyzes the various framing strategies 
employed in transnational environmental negotiations between Hongkongese 
ENGO members, experts, officials, and citizens. He shows how actors chose from a 
wide repertoire of framing devices, such as claims to scientific expertise (‘universalist 
claims’), cultural heritage, or local ancestry (‘particular claims’) to advance their own 
agenda. These findings lead Choy to proclaim that the transcultural character of 
environmental politics has led to “universality’s demise” in anthropological studies 
and suggests “that a different mode of anthropological engagement is necessary. Our 
concepts of ‘universality’ and ‘particularity’ – so crucial not only to anthropology but 
also to political theory and critical science studies – reach a point of analytic failure 
when confronted with transnational environmental politics. In such environmental 
arenas, the very concepts of ‘universality’ and ‘particularity’ are in a constant process 
of self-conscious deployment, production, and articulation.” (Choy 2005: 6)  
Language seems to play a key role in this regard: Yang Guobin, one of the most 
prominent researchers on “the green public sphere” in China argues alongside Craig 
Calhoun that “one major indicator of the rise of a Chinese green public sphere is the 
proliferation of environmental discourse—a greenspeak. Contrary to an earlier 
Maoist and Marxist view of the human conquest of nature, this new discourse warns 
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about the dangers of irresponsible human behavior toward nature and calls for public 
action to protect the environment. “[…] the emerging green sphere consists of three 
basic elements: an environmental discourse or greenspeak; publics that produce or 
consume greenspeak; and media used for producing and circulating greenspeak.” 
(Yang/Calhoun 2007: 212) While the concept of “greenspeak”35 points in a right 
direction as far as it emphasizes the connection between language and sociopolitical 
aspects in the context of environmentalism in China, the idea that it relates 
exclusively to a “green public sphere” – i.e. non-state actors and media – again 
underestimates the importance of state agencies to participate and actively shape such 
discourses. As Williams has shown in his study on “desert discourse in China”, 
discourses on environmental issues in China are often conducted between 
government officials and scholarly “experts” without inclusion of the broader 
populace. Moreover, such discourse often is conducted within clearly defined 
ideological frameworks. 
There exists in China an operative ideological framework that is directly 
relevant to desert research and rangeland policy. It affects not only how 
scholars and officials gauge the scope and severity of degradation but 
also how they spin a national narrative about the causes and culprits, as 
well as how they direct public interpretation of the social significance of 
desert land. The reality of this official discourse and its power to construct 
knowledge on environmental issues too often lies hidden behind the 
authority of scientific pronouncements. (Williams 1997: 329)  
Hence, the term “greenspeak” as an essentially apolitical and issue-oriented mode of 
discourse seems rather problematic: In the context of Chinese political system, any 
mode of discourse that establishes itself as a legitimate alternative (or even challenge) 
to the officially sanctioned state policy will by the very nature of its existence have a 
political dimension. While it is true that most green activists in China do not express 
any political ambitions expressis verbis, and might actually not pursue a political 
agenda at all, I would argue that they cannot ignore the political implications of their 
                                                 
35 “Greenspeak here refers to the whole gamut of linguistic and other symbolic means used for raising 
awareness of environmental issues.” (Yang/Calhoun 2007: 214) My understanding of the term is 
based on: Harré/Brockmeier 1999; Heinz/Cheng et al. 2007. 
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work, and this will have to show in the framing of their “greenspeak” (if one wants 
to use this phrase). Hence, when addressing the discursive dimension of the green 
public sphere, special attention needs to be paid to the particular ways in which 
environmental activists frame their issues. 
In the framing of environmental issues, there is one noteworthy feature 
of Chinese green activism that we might term the "de-politicization of 
environmental politics." This sounds like a contradiction in terms because 
if there is one thing that the East and Central European experiences have 
proven, it is that the environmental question is inseparably linked to 
politics. However, in China's semi-authoritarian context the overall 
majority of green activists stays clear from any suggestion that any 
political objectives are involved even though inevitably there is a political 
aspect within each movement. (Ho/Edmonds 2008: 8) 
While this argument again operates under a false analytical dichotomy between 
“contentious” and “noncontentious” behavior, it nevertheless points towards a much 
more important question, that is the role of language in general, and particularly how 
Chinese environmental activists frame their issues in a way that legitimizes their 
existence politically vis-à-vis the state, while at the same time advancing their issue-
oriented goals. Ho and Edmonds observe that environmental activists in China are 
careful to frame their issues in a way that puts them in cooperative rather than an 
antagonistic relationship to government agencies. And Yang and Calhoun note on 
the growing importance of “greenspeak” in Chinese media and society as a key 
medium through which environmental activists not only address environmental 
issues but also discursively negotiate their own role with the Chinese state. 
(Yang/Calhoun 2007): They argue that these new green public sphere “engages 
politics and public policy without being primarily political. Carving out a space for 
‘nonpartisan’ advocacy is a new development in China. (ibid: 212).  
While “in terms of framing, it is interesting to look at the potential links between 
environmentalism and traditional Chinese religion and culture” (Ho/Edmonds 2008: 
8), and several studies have endeavored to do so, the concrete mechanisms of such 
discursive framing strategies (nonconfrontational or otherwise), the cultural 
vocabulary they rely upon, as well as the discursive dimension of the “mixture of 
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traditional and new collective action repertoires” still remain notably understudied 
when it comes to environmentalism in the People’s Republic of China. Moreover, 
these studies fail to account for the question how cultural repertoires of public 
contention within the environmental sector differ from other issue areas. It is this gap 
in the research that forces some observers to resort to rather imprecise 
circumscriptions, such as when it is asserted that “Chinese green activists profess a 
‘female mildness’ – a greening without conflict, an environmentalism with a safe 
distance from direct political action.” (Ho 2001: 916)  
The present thesis represents a modest effort to contribute to a deeper understanding 
of Chinese environmentalism. The previous discussion suggests that this social 
phenomenon has to be considered in a “thick” context, in which the dynamics of 
cultural globalization and the particular socio-cultural and political configurations of 
the People’s Republic of China interact in complex ways. In order to draw on a 
manageable yet representative body of source material, I will focus on the role of a 
number of key representatives of China’s environmental movement, while expanding 
the field of analysis beyond their institutional entanglements to the literary 
production of these individuals. I focus particularly on the linguistic strategies, 
imaginaries, and framing devices of Chinese environmental discourses. The last part 
of this chapter will flesh out the approach. 
II.3  A cosmopolitan perspective on Chinese environmentalism 
Previous scholarship on Chinese environmentalism has hinted at (yet seldom 
elaborated on) the pivotal importance of a small number of highly committed, 
globally connected, and locally prominent individuals that serve as the driving force, 
mediators, and information nodes around which environmental activism in China is 
organized. Such a prominent role in the processes of social transformation in the 
PRC is not only limited to environmental issues. The existing body of research on 
the long (and troubled) history of the relationship between Chinese intellectuals and 
the state (see e.g. Cheek 1992; Gu 1999; Goldman 2002; Gu and Goldman 2004) has 
often emphasized the complex dynamics of mutual distrust and collaboration 
between China’s intellectual elite and the powers that be. Intellectuals have thus 
always operated within an uncertain framework of constraints and liberities often 
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subject to the political winds of the day. An example illustrating both the importance 
of public intellectuals within the political framework of the PRC, as well as the 
dangers of being counted in this club might be the 2004 discussion on public 
intellectuals that reached the PRC after the 2002 publication of Richard A. Posner's 
book Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline (Harvard University Press, 2001; 
(Gonggong zhishifenzi: shuailuo zhi yanjiu 公共知识分子：衰落之研究 . Beijing: 
Zhongguo zhengfa daxue chubanshe).  
In a special issue cover-dated Sept. 8, 2004, Nanfang renwu zhoukan [南
方人物周刊] presented a list of fifty intellectuals and public personages it 
considered essential in shaping public discourse in the PRC (in fact, the 
list adds up to fifty-six if a "honorary list" is added, the latter comprising 
the names of six intellectuals deceased in recent years, but whose 
contributions continue to influence current debates). The list was 
accompanied by short biographies of each individual, as well as several 
articles discussing the concept of "public intellectuals."36 
Eventually, within the discussion a consensus began to appear for the need of a 
stronger, more independent position of Chinese intellectuals to speak on behalf of the 
public good. It was then when the government intervened and ordered an end to the 
debate: “A November 15 editorial in the Shanghai Jiefang ribao 解放日报 criticized 
the concept of "public intellectuals" for its foreign origins and alleged that the debate 
was designed to lead to the estrangement between the intellectuals and the CCP. The 
editorial was consequently reprinted by Renmin ribao in Beijing, and newspapers, 
magazines, and other media outlets were ordered to discontinue the use the term 
"public intellectuals" and bring the debate to an end” (ibid). 
An annotated list of these fifty individuals has been reproduced by The Digital 
Archive for Chinese Studies (DACHS) at Heidelberg University (see n36). It 
subsumes Chinese public intellectuals into a number of different categories, such as 
Economists 经济学家, Lawyers and Legal Specialists 法学家, or Historians 历史学家. 
                                                 
36 A full introduction to the debate by Nicolai Volland, alongside the full list of the fifty intellectuals, 
can be found here: http://www.zo.uni-
heidelberg.de/boa/digital_resources/dachs/special_collections/fipi.html#zhengzhixuejia [accessed: 
2014-06-06]. I am grateful to Prof. Wagner for pointing me to this material. 
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Intellectuals engaged in environmental activism are not on the list with the exception 
of the aforementioned Liang Congjie who is described as “b. 1932; historian and 
environmental activist. Liang Congjie is the son of architect Liang Sicheng 梁思成 
and the grandson of Liang Qichao. In 1994, he founded ‘Friends of Nature’, the 
earliest Chinese environmental pressure group and one of the first Non-
Governmental Organizations in the PRC.” (ibid) 
II.3.1   Public Intellectuals and Issue Entrepreneurs within Chinese 
environmentalism 
Intellectuals in China not only have to navigate political restrictions imposed by the 
Chinese state and the CCP. Other socio-political factors exert influence as well, in 
this context Yang (2010) points to the sociological structure that shapes Chinese 
environmentalism:  
For the most part, Chinese environmentalists are well-educated urban 
professionals. On the spectrum of the burgeoning middle class, they 
represent the more intellectually-oriented elements and are 
distinguished from the business and political elites. The membership 
survey of a Beijing -based ENGO […] provides a rough picture of the 
demographics of Chinese environmentalists. Of 607 respondents (out of 
a total membership of about 1,500 at the time of the survey), 95% have 
a college or post-graduate education. In terms of occupational 
composition, college students make up 34% of the membership, teachers 
about 15%, and journalists and editors about 6%. In other words, at least 
55% of the members of this organization belong to what conventionally 
would be considered the intellectual stratum. The membership also 
includes scientists, accountants, management personnel, doctors, 
lawyers, engineers, salespeople, and office clerks. Only 13 (2%) of the 618 
respondents identify themselves as workers. The sociological 
characteristics of Chinese ENGOs influence the kind of issues they are 
engaged in. The largely urban and middle-class character of Chinese 
ENGOs is a source of both weaknesses and strengths. On the one hand, 
the middle class background of Chinese environmentalists and their 
strong educational and professional credentials and experiences are 
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essential cultural and social resources. These resources enable them to 
reach out to Chinese and international media. On the other hand, it partly 
explains why ENGOs tend to focus on urban environmental concerns 
rather than the more challenging issues of rural pollution. Their physical 
location shapes their social location and their scope of action. (Yang 2010: 
115-116) 
Yang in his study hence focuses on the work of several what he calls “issue 
entrepreneurs” in China who broker interests between government bureaucracies and 
local citizens affected by governmental policy. He shows how only a relatively small 
number of key leaders have the necessary connections, prestige, and training to serve 
as arbiters in cases of “issue creation” (ibid: 103): “[The research] indicates that there 
is a major gap on the agenda of environmental protection in China today may be an 
information gap. This gap exists at multiple levels – between the rural and the urban 
population, between local and central governments, between citizens and 
governments, and between media and citizens.” (Yang 2010: 118) Hence, it falls onto 
a relatively small number of activist leaders to bridge these gaps. Yet at the same time, 
this particular structure of advocacy necessarily influences the outcomes: “Because 
of the resources of issue entrepreneurs and China’s political context, politically safe 
and innocuous issues and issues of concern to the urban population are more likely 
to enter the public sphere.” (ibid. 103) These issue entrepreneurs wield an even more 
important role in the context of the specific character of social interactions in the 
People's Republic, where personal connections (guanxi 关系) often are more important 
than institutionalized avenues.   
Many studies argue that these issue entrepreneurs are taking advantage of the gradual 
retreat of the Chinese state after the enactment of the reform and opening policy in 
the early 1980s that has resulted in a diminishing state capacity to address 
environmental issues. The Chinese state increasingly depends on citizen action to 
address, monitor, or otherwise deal with environmental issues: 
[China’s] structural reforms of the government apparatus and the state's 
withdrawal from many of its former service-provision functions have 
created new social spaces for various forms of auto-organization outside 
the realm of the state. In this context, the Chinese state has welcomed 
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the contributions of social organizations to economic growth, poverty 
alleviation, environmental conservation and social service delivery. 
(Büsgen 2006: 2) 
It seems to be especially environmental groups that are at the forefront of these 
developments. Often, they are among first and the most prominent to receive 
international aid from international organizations such as the Ford Foundation 
(Morton 2005b), and they also have the benefit of capacity building measures, 
technology and knowledge transfer, and international awards and recognition, often 
by virtue of their charismatic and well-connected leaders (Chen 2010). 
Economy (2004) in her analysis of the “New politics of the environment in China” 
introduces several “pioneering environmental activists” and provides short portrays 
of some important representatives: Tang Xiyang 唐锡阳, He Bochuan 何博传, and Dai 
Qing 戴晴, along with “conservationists” such as Liang Congjie 梁从诫, Liao Xiaoyi 
廖晓义, and Yang Xin 杨欣. The author again takes an institutionalist perspective, 
focusing on their situatedness within Chinese society, and their extensive 
connections to officials and citizens alike, making them pivotal nodes of mitigation 
between various interests and groups “They possess the full complement of skills 
necessary to organize effectively: technical expertise on the environment, strong 
backgrounds in journalism and media, and extensive ties to environmental activists 
both throughout China and abroad.” (Economy 2004: 173) 
Büsgen (2006) in his study of the campaign against the damming of the Nujiang (the 
Salween river) in Yunnan province describes the interplay between sympathetic 
officials within the local and central state bureaucracy with prominent NGO leaders 
such as Wang Yongchen 汪 永 晨  in order to lobby for the position of the 
conservationists, as well as their role in coordination grass-roots activities such as 
petition-signing to put additional pressure on state agencies and “linking up” 
[chuanlian 串联 ] with critical hydropower within the system to appropriate the 
necessary expertise. (ibid: 29 ff.) Again, the personal component of single, well-
connected individuals emerges as one crucial factor for the success of the campaign. 
(ibid: 32) The campaign “relied upon the dedication of individual members, rather 
than the collectively approve strategy of an entire organization or network.” (ibid: 28) 
Important figures such as NGO leaders hence become indispensable power brokers 
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and mediators for “negotiating with the state” in the context of Chinese 
environmentalism.  
Mertha (2008) in his portrayal of “China’s Water Warriors”, environmental activists 
in the field of hydropower projects, pays attention to the role well-connected activist 
leaders are playing in organizing grass-root campaigns and lobbying media outlets. 
According to the author, their position is where “a lot of the power of China’s NGOs 
comes from.” (ibid: 60) For example, he shows how “policy entrepreneurs” (ibid: 
101) such as journalists Zhang Kejia and Wang Yongcheng – nationally and 
internationally renowned and connected journalists and activists that often insert 
their political clout into individual campaigns – help drive the (initially local) 
campaign to save the historic Dujiangyan dam. “Environmental  groups have very  
limited formal, institutionalized  channels  to  impact  on  environmental  policies  
and  decisions.  Informal channels such as  social networks and personal ties are then 
becoming  an  alternative  route  of access  to  policy-making  and  a  way  to organize 
collective actions in Chinese society.  The complex connections or ‘guanxi' that 
widely permeate Chinese culture and society prove to be also essential in 
environmental activism. Individual connections and relations among friends, 
relatives, colleagues, neighbors, and so forth are key building stones in the 
construction of the Chinese environmental movement.” (Xie/Mol 2006: 272) Tang 
and Zhan in a 2008 survey find a similar gap asymmetry in the social dispersion of 
what they consider a Chinese green public sphere: 
From more or less developed regions of the country, however, almost all 
the NGO officials we have interviewed can be considered as social and 
political elites – some are college professors; some started environmental 
work while they were students on university campuses. In addition, most 
of the leaders of non-Beijing NGOs have strong political connection with 
the local party-state system. These facts, however, do not imply that 
Chinese civic environmental NGOs have a solid middle class foundation. 
In our sample we find only two civic NGOs in which membership fee is 
among the major financial sources. The vast majority of civic NGOs are 
highly reliant on either personal funding of the NGO founders (leaders) 
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or international funding. Overall, civic environmental NGOs in China still 
lack widespread middle class support. (Tang/Zhan 2008: 434) 
II.3.2   Cosmopolitan environmentalists 
The sociopolitical importance of China’s environmental civic leaders finds parallels 
in their equally pivotal role as cultural brokers for the dissemination of cultural flows, 
a status I propose to analyze within the framework of cosmopolitanism. Simply put, 
cosmopolitanism proposes that a number of individuals – sometimes referred to as 
cosmopolitans, travelers, or intercultural brokers – are entangled with global cultural 
trends, and these global linkages constitute a major factor for social transformation 
on the local level. Cosmopolitanism is hence characterized by “in-betweenness”, a 
status of mediation and negotiation in which notions of home and abroad, the self 
and the other are in constant (often uneasy) deliberation. 
“Cosmopolitanism refers to the multiplicity of ways in which the social 
world is constructed in different modernities. Rather than see 
cosmopolitanism as a particular or singular condition that either exists or 
does not, a state or goal to be realized, it should instead be seen as a 
cultural medium of societal transformation [emphasis added, M.L.] that 
is based on the principle of world openness, which is associated with the 
notion of global publics.” (Delanty 2006: 27). 
Breckenridge, Pollock at al. (2002) in this context argue that there is not one 
“cosmopolitanism”, but rather different types or “cosmopolitanisms”37 which are 
characterized by their cultural idiosyncrasies. (ibid: 8) As such, cosmopolitanism as 
a conceptual framework lends itself as a methodological tool to study the highly 
complex processes of cultural globalization, identify the actors driving it, and 
exploring their intrinsic positionalities within larger political and sociocultural 
frameworks. In this perspective, cosmopolitan individuals become the main motor of 
for what Robertson 1992 has called “glocalization”, the adoption of globally moving 
cultural objects into particular socio-cultural environments: 
                                                 
37 For a typogragpy of cosmopolitanism variants, see: Delanty 2006: 28-36. 
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Cosmopolitanism thus concerns the multiple ways the local and the 
national is redefined as a result of interaction with the global. The 
resulting situation will vary depending on the precise nature of the 
interaction. Hybridization, créolization, indigenization may be the result 
of interactions in which the local appropriates the global or in the case of 
global diaspora communities where the local is transformed into a new 
cosmopolitan global flow. (Delanty 2006: 36) 
Cosmopolitanism offers a methodological tool to substantiate the very complex38 
processes of cultural flows that are at the heart of transculturation by “putting a 
human face” on them, focusing on a select number of individuals, their situatedness 
within particular sociocultural and institutional arrangements, and their agency 
within these structures as far as preferences, actions, and strategies are concerned.. 
Hannerz, for example, comments on the importance of individual agency when he 
proposes a procedural understanding of the genesis of cultural complexity. He sees 
culture as an object that is constantly waxing and waning in the stream of time, and 
in the process constantly subjected to formulation, interpretation, and negotiation 
which is largely driven by individual agency (Hannerz 1992: 221).  “The cultural flow 
                                                 
38 Already in 1983, Edward Said attempted to conceptualize the concept of flows in an article on 
“traveling theories”, but failed to provide a satisfying answer for precisely the most crucial question: 
What motivates theories to travel? What causes the flow of flows? Studying literary development and 
cultural appropriations in the cases of Lucien Goldmann, Georg Lucács and Raymond Williams, he 
argued that the process of a theory traveling takes place in four distinct stages: “First, there is the point 
of origin, or what seems like one, a set of initial circumstances in which the idea came to birth and 
entered discourse. Second, there is a distance transferred, a passage through the pressure of various 
contexts as the idea moves from an earlier point to another time and place where it will come into a 
new prominence.  Third, there is a set of conditions – call them conditions of acceptance or, as an 
inevitable part of acceptance, resistances – which then confronts the transplanted theory or idea, 
making possible its introduction or toleration, however alien it might appear to be. Fourth, the now 
full (or partly) accommodated (or incorporated) idea is to some extend transformed by its new uses, 
its new position in a new time and place.” (Said 1983: 157-58) However, there seems to be an 
analytical disconnect between Said's points one and two. Why would motivate a theory to leave its 
“point of origin” and “transfer distance” to begin with? Who or what initializes this movement, what 
is the agens movens behind a flow of ideas? And maybe even more importantly, why do some ideas 
travel and find their way into a new context, while others do not? In his text, Said does not provide 
an answer for this, his vision is too mechanistic, and does in no way reflect the extraordinarily 
complicated processes of transcultural flows: “Such a linear path cannot do justice to the feedback 
loops, the ambivalent appropriations and resistances that characterize the travels of theories, and 
theorists, between places in the ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds.” (Clifford 1989) Liu, when discussing the 
merits of Said's theory for her own work on Translingual Practice, remarks that “his [Said's] discussion 
does not go beyond the usual argument that theory is always a response to changing social and 
historical circumstances, and the traveling aspect of his theory is abandoned along the way”, while 
speculating “that perhaps the notion itself lacked the kind of intellectual rigor needed for its own 
fulfillment.” (Liu 1995: 21)   
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thus consists of the externalizations of meaning which individuals produce through 
arrangements of overt forms, and the interpretations which individuals make of such 
displays – those of others as well as their own. […] In one way or other, also, the flow 
is everywhere, for as soon as people make themselves accessible to the senses of 
others, through physical co-presence or artefactual extensions, they render 
themselves interpretable. (ibid: 4) Hannerz sees cosmopolitan individuals in 
particular as having a special importance in this interpretative circle, since they 
possess certain personal characteristics such as education that allow them to access 
sets of meaning from various sociocultural environments: “There is, first of all, a 
willingness to engage with the Other, and intellectual and aesthetic stance of 
openness toward divergent cultural experiences. There can be no cosmopolitans 
without locals, representatives of more circumscribed territorial cultures. But apart 
from this appreciative orientation, cosmopolitanism tends also to be a matter of 
competence, of both a generalized, of both generalized and a more specialized kind.” 
(Hannerz 1992: 252-253)  
II.3.3   “Ecocosmopolitanism” in Chinese nature writing 
China’s environmental leaders are not only cosmopolitans in the sense outlined 
above, engaged in environmental activism as reporters, environmental educators, 
social critics, or NGO leaders, but often also as authors whose collective literary 
efforts have by now resulted in a considerable body of literature in which they address 
specific environmental issues, propagated their values, or more generally theorize on 
the relationship between nature and humankind. NGO leaders such as Liang 
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Congjie39 梁从诫, Liao Xiaoyi40 廖晓义, Ma Jun41 马军, Tang Xiyang42 唐锡阳, Wang 
Yongchen 43  汪永晨, Yang Xin 44  杨欣 have all published books which have been 
receiving considerable attention within China’s environmental community and 
sometimes beyond. While the social and politiccal activism of these individuals has 
received considerable attention as outlined above, their literary efforts have largely 
not only gone virtually unnoticed, but so far no study has addressed the sociopolitical 
relevance of their writings in the larger context of Chinese environmentalism in 
general. With one exception, none of these works that form of basis of my analysis 
have been translated into a Western language.45 
Their literary efforts have to be understood in the context of an increasingly 
globalized awareness of environmental conditions that form the basis of their literary 
expression. Thornber (2012) in a recent extensive volume explores the highly 
intricate perspectives in which relationships between man and nature are represented 
                                                 
39 Liang Congjie is the founder of the NGO Friends of Nature. His publications include: Liang Congjie 
(2002). Bu zhonghe de quan [The unclosed circle]; Tianjin: Baihua wenyi chubanshe; Liang Congjie and 
Kang Xue 康雪, eds. (2005). Zou xiang lüse wenming [Marching towards a green civilization]. Tianjin: 
Baihua wenyi chubanshe; Liang Congjie and Liang Xiaoyan 梁晓燕, eds. (2000). Wei wugao de daziran 
[Speaking on behalf of nature]. Tianjin: Baihua wenyi chubanshe.  
40 Liao Xiaoyi is the founder of the NGO Global Village Beijing. Her publications include: Liao 
Xiaoyi (2010). Dong zhang xi wang. Liao Xiaoyi yu Zhongwai zhexueren liao huanbao yaofang 
[Environmental Remedies: Sheri Liao’s Talks with Eastern & Western Thinkers]. Beijing: 
Chenyingku yinxiang chubanshe. 
41 Ma Jun is the director of Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs which developed the China 
Water Pollution Map (Zhongguo shuiwuran ditu 中国水污染地图), the first public database of water 
pollution information in China. He is the author of “China’s Water Crisis. Id. (1999). Zhongguo shui 
weiji. Beijing: Zhongguo huanjing kexue chubanshe. 
42 Tang Xiyang is the founder of the educational Green Camp organization. Publications include: Tang 
Xiyang. (2007). Lüse Ying [Green Camp]. Wuhan: Hubei renmin chubanshe; Tang Xiyang and Ma 
Xia 马霞  [Marcia B. Marks] (1993). Huanqiu Lüsexing [A Green World Tour]. Guilin: Lijiang 
chubanshe; Tang Xiyang et al. (2004). Cuo! Cuo! Cuo! Tang Xiyang lüse chensi yu baijia pingdian [Wrong! 
Wrong! Wrong! – Tang Xiyang’s green thoughts and critical suggestions from one-hundred authors]. 
Shenyang: Shenyang chubanshe. 
43 Wang Yongchen is a journalist who organizes the Green Salons (lüse shalong 绿色沙龙), a discussion 
forum for environmental journalists. Publications:  Wang Yongchen (2004). Lü jingtou. Daziran de 
zuotian yu jintian [Green lens. Nature’s yesterday and today]. Beijing: Sanlian shudian. 
44  Yang Xin is the founder of the NGO Green Rivers and he also runs the “Sonam Dargye 
Environmental Protection Station” located on the Kekexili high plateau. His writings include Yang 
Xin (1997). Changjiang hun [Soul of the Yangtze]. Guangzhou: Lingnan meishu chubanshe; and Id. 
(2007). Qinli Kekexili 10 nian [10 years in Kekexili]. Beijing: Sanlian shudian. 
45 One exception in this regard is Ma Jun’s Water Crisis: Ma Jun (2004). China’s Water Crisis. Norwalk: 
East Bridge. 
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in modern East Asian fiction. She points out that East Asian literature addressing 
ecological issues is “environmentally cosmopolitan”. This form of 
“ecocosmopolitanism” “implicitly or explicitly [takes] up ecodegradation beyond a 
single time or place.” (id. 2012: 14) Literary expressions of environmental 
cosmopolitanism are self-consciously situating themselves into a global framework 
that not only reflects the global reality of transnational environmental issues, but also 
draws artistic inspiration from the global exchange of literary exchange. “Ecological 
globalization has arguably facilitated its literary counterpart, and literary 
globalization has brought increased attention to its ecological counterpart” (ibid: 14-
15) Thornber bases her notion of ecocosmopolitanism of a series of other studies that 
only recently have begun to explore the global dimension of the environmental 
imagination in nature writing. Heise in this context refers to “the environmental 
imagination of the global” and writes that  
Ecocosmopolitanism is an attempt to envision individuals and groups as 
part of planetary ‘imagined communities’ of both human and nonhuman 
kinds. Ecocritcism has only begun to explore the cultural means by which 
ties to the natural world are produced and perpetuated, and how the 
perception of such ties fosters or impedes regional, national, and 
transnational forms of identification.” (Heise 2008: 61) 
Modern Chinese nature writing46 has only recently become the focus of academic 
attention but has already been the object of a limited number of studies on the subject. 
Within Chinese academic discourse, such works of literature are generally labeled as 
“ecological literature” (shengtai wenxue 生态文学). According to Zhang and Wu,  
Ecological literature denotes works of literature on natural ecology and 
environmental protection, they that are based on bioethics and earth 
ethics as their guiding principle, and [with the purpose of] raising 
awareness and concern for the ecological environment. They regard the 
relationship between man and nature as harmonious, as a song whose 
melody is jointly written by the two sides. Ecological literature is closely 
related to ecological problems and environmental protection; it usually 
                                                 
46 I am consciously using the phrase proposed by Lawrence Buell (1995) here. 
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condemns and criticizes the destruction of the ecological balance, and 
promotes the protection of the environment. Generally speaking, the 
author of ecological literature presents a perspective that is more 
tolerant, loves nature, and respects life. [Ecological literature] reflects on 
the position of humankind on the Earth through discourse that is both 
global and cultural. (Zhang/Wu 2007: 10) 
This quote is indicative of the fact that the concept of shengtai wenxue as a category is 
rather vague; it does not distinguish between different discursive modes, for example 
scientific fact-stating and activist agenda, nor does it sufficiently distinguish between 
genres, especially between ecological fiction and ecological nonfiction. This 
conceptual fuzziness is not confined to Chinese scholarship on nature writing alone; 
the differentiation between environmental fiction and nonfiction is often addressed 
in Western scholarship as well, especially in studies in ecocriticism. The label “fiction” 
and “nonfiction” is delusive in this context since works of environmental fiction often 
employ scientific data to a considerable degree, while in turn works of environmental 
nonfiction often employ deliberate embellishments and other literary devices in order 
to enhance the cohesiveness of their narrative. Murphy (2000), commenting on the 
difficulty of differentiating between the two literary modes, suggests a categorization 
that considers the relationship between narrative, aesthetics, and information:  
When narrative and its various aesthetic dimensions drive the writing of 
a text, I would prefer to label the text fiction, regardless of the quantity 
of information that constructs the message. Hence, I would label 
Thoreau’s Walden fiction because of the aesthetically driven narrative 
strategy and rearranging more than two years of experience into a single 
year. (Murphy 200: 7) 
When [...] the narrative and its various aesthetic dimensions are placed 
in the service of the provision of information, so that the narrative is 
broken and its aesthetic quality downplayed in order to foreground facts 
and verifiable information, then I prefer to label the text a nonfiction, 
regardless of the degree of afactual - that is, nonverifiable or abstract -
detail and language to be found in. (ibid: 8) 
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Many of the works that would appear on any list of nonfiction nature 
writing are actually fictions, if someone uses the distinction between 
narrative as drive and narrative as service in terms of how decisions are 
made between aesthetic emphasis and factual reportage. Such a 
recognition enables readers to better appreciate the vision, concern, and 
zeal of writers they admire. (ibid: 9) 
The point at which a work ceases to be nonfiction - because ot the 
amount of tinkering with the facts, the inclusion of things that happened 
to someone else but not to the author or narrator, or the degree to which 
the actually occurring events have been arranged and rearranged, with 
some events being omitted and others being foregrounded for the 
benefit of the plot - remains a highly contested yet very dimly perceived 
swamp of presuppositions, biases, and unstated agendas.  (ibid: 9-10) 
Chinese scholars studying the development of “ecological awareness” (shengtai yishi 
生态意识) in modern Chinese literature agree that the late 1970s and early 1980s have 
to be regarded as the initial incubation period of environmental writing in China.47 
“Chinese literature of the 1980s experienced a nature worship unprecedented in the 
history of new [socialist] literature.” (Cao 1988: 61) This scholarship also supports 
the notion of literary “ecocosmopolitanism” that the development of this body of 
ecoliterature from its outset was strongly influenced by the introduction of Western 
writing on the subject; translated foreign works of fiction in which environmental 
issues played a key role, as well as environmental nonfiction writing that either 
represented a critique of Western developmentalism (Silent Spring), and later also 
Ecocriticism (especially the work of Buell).48 In this context, the development of 
                                                 
47 See: Wang Shudong (2008); Wang Shudong and Zhou Xufeng (2009); Wu Jingming and Liu 
Zhongshu (2009); Zhang Yanmei and Wu Jingming (2007); Wu Jingming (2007b). 
48 Prof. Wang Nuo 王诺 of the Department for Chinese Literature at Xiamen University is one of the 
most authoritative and prolific Chinese scholars on the issue of Ecocriticism. As such, he has not only 
introduced key works and theoretical approaches of European and American Ecocriticism to a 
Chinese readership, but has also made considerable strides towards establishing the discipline within 
China’s academic landscape in its own right. See: Wang Nuo 王诺 2007; id. 2008; i. 2011. For a very 
detailed account of the translation history of Western ecoliterature into Chinese, see especially “Fulu: 
Shengtai piping zai Zhongguo [Appendix: Ecocriticism in China]”, in WANG 2008: 237-252. 
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Chinese ecoliterature is generally divided into several phases that roughly span the 
three decades since the early 1980s in China.  
Modern ecological literature in China stands on the shoulders of literary works that 
emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, especially the zhiqing 知青 literature49, and 
                                                 
49 During the Great Leap Forward, the government initiated a "Campaign to Mobilize Youth to 
Participate in Socialist Construction in Minority Areas", aimed at sending up to 5.7 Million youths 
into China's less developed interior areas between 1958-1963. (Pan 2003: 41) However, the mass 
mobilization of young Chinese "volunteers" – and especially educated urban youth, referred to as 
zhiqing 知青 - to "go up the mountains and down to the countryside" (shangshan xiaxiang 上山下乡) 
reached unprecedented levels starting within the early years of the Cultural Revolution. It is estimated 
that between 1968/69 and 1980, up to 17 Million youths were dislocated. (For a discussion of the 
concrete numbers and the difficulties of statistical accuracy, see: Bernstein 1977: 21-32.) Upon their 
return after the end of high Maoism in the late 1970s and early 1980s, many participants of the 
movement set out to put down the experiences of these frontier years into writing, which has produced 
a large number of memoirs, novels and other forms of literary accounts, a rich literary field of memoirs, 
fiction, poetry, reportages, etc. now labeled as zhiqing 知青 literature (zhiqing wenxue 知青文学，for 
general surveys over the genre, see: Liu 1994: 269-287;  Shi/He 1996: 431-441.). For our purposes 
here, zhiqing writers that were sent down into the remote territories of China and in whose accounts 
the experience of nature plays a certain role are of special relevance since their writings contributed to 
the emergence of ecological reporting literature or ecoliterature in general in China in the 1980s. 
Among these writers are literary figures such as Kong Jiesheng 孔捷生 ("On the Other Side of the 
Stream" Zai xiaohe nabian 在小河那边 1979; "The Southern Shore" Nanfang de an 南方的岸 1982; "The 
Jungle" Da Linmang 大林芒 1984), Zhang Chengzhi 张承志 ("Green Night" Lü Ye 绿夜 1982; “River to 
the North” Beifang de he 北方的河 1984)，Liang Xiaosheng 梁晓声 ("A Land of Wonder and Mystery" 
Zhe shi yipian shenqi de tudi  这是一片神奇的土地 1982), Zhu Lin 竹林 ("The Path of Life" Shenghuo de 
lu 生活的路  1979), Lao Gui 老鬼   ("Blood-Red Sunset" Xuese huanghun 血色黄昏 , written 1978, 
published in 1987), or Deng Xian’s 邓贤 piece of reportage literature “Dream of a Chinese Educated 
Youth” Zhongguo zhiqing meng 中国知青梦  1996) , some of which over the years have acquired 
considerable literary fame. (see also: Bonnin 2004: 22; Leung 1994: xxxvii-xliii) These and other 
examples of zhiqing literature for the most part do not explicitly deal with ecological or 
environmentalist issues; however the experience of wilderness, of untamed pristine nature, does play 
an important part in these writings. Even in Mo Yan’s early novel “Red Sorghum” (Hong gaoliang 红
高粱 1986), which established his national and international fame, the natural environment of his 
native home village in Gaomi county, especially the vast oceans of reed fields surrounding the human 
settlements, do play an important part in the narrative structure of the book. As Wang Shudong 汪树
东 remarks, the literal description of nature within many of these texts oscillate between two distinct 
perspectives: one concentrates on the beauty and majesty of the natural surroundings the 
impressionable youths are thrusts into. The other perspective perceives the natural world as cruel, 
harsh, unforgiving and dangerous. (id. 2008: 136) Often, the two perspectives can be found together 
within the same text, recreating the deeply ambivalent attitude carried by the zhiqing towards the 
natural world. While they carry within themselves the strong indoctrination to “struggle against 
heaven” (yu tian dou 与天斗), as Mao Zedong once put it, they simultaneously are deeply impressed 
by nature’s unyieldingness and the sense of futility of their own actions in respect to vast nature. 
However, as I would argue, the main point here is that these literary works are not driven primarily 
by a concern for environmental issues. In most instances, the natural environment merely serves as 
the background for the human dramas that unfold in the harsh environments the inexperienced and 
often naive young people are thrown into, while often, the harsh environmental conditions of the 
locations serves as a literary device to further amplify the difficulties the human protagonists have in 
respect to their social, not ecological, environment. “At times, writes transplant their expressions towards 
society that are considered illegitimate onto their literary descriptions of nature.” (Xu/Gao 2009: 69)  
In other words: it can be argued that zhiqing literature often has the main purpose the express political 
or social grievances. Often, the destruction visited upon the land by ignorant or fanatical youths 
parallels the experiences of suffering endured by the very same people.   
  
52 
 
 
A cosmopolitan perspective on Chinese environmentalism 
 
  
the root-searching xungen 寻根 literature.50 During this phase, which coincides with 
the beginning of the “Opening and Reform Period”, only a relatively limited number 
of key Western environmental works were introduced into China via translation; 
most notably, Rachel Carson’s 1962 classic Silent Spring in 1979, translated by Lü 
Duanlan 吕端兰  and Li Changsheng 李长生 , and The Limits of Growth in 1983, 
originally commissioned by the Club of Rome in 1972, translated by Li Baoheng 李
宝恒 (Wang Nuo 2008: 225). The next phase, labeled the “spontaneous” (zifa 自发) 
phase by Wu and Liu (id. 2009: 257), ranged from the mid-80s to mid-90s. Western 
theories on environmental issues were just in the process of being introduced in China 
and had not yet settled in or been systematically absorbed into a theoretical 
framework. Authors writing on ecological topics did so not yet with a notion that 
they were producing “ecological literature”. In the center of attention of most works 
in this context stood the increasingly apparent environmental crisis in China, which 
had already begun under Maoism and was aggravated by the economic take-off 
following the Dengist reforms. Most commonly, such accounts took the form of 
“Ecological Reportage Literature”, written by intellectuals and reporters such as Sha 
Qing 沙青 or Xu Gang 徐刚 (see chapter 4) Moreover, these years saw the rise of what 
could be called “Chinese eco-journalism”. The “China Environmental News” 
(Zhongguo huanjing bao 中国环境报) published its first edition in 1984, and official 
papers such as the People’s Daily (Renmin ribao 人民日报) or the China Youth Daily 
(Zhongguo qingnian bao 中国青年报) payed increasing attention to environmental issues 
(Zhang Wei 2007: 13). In 1991, the “Society for Environmental Literature” (Huanjing 
wenxue yanjiuhui 环境文学研究会) was founded with the intent to address China’s 
continuing ecological malaise. (Thornber 2012: 53) In 1992, the periodical “Green 
Leaves” (Lüye 绿叶) began to exclusively publish environmental literature penned by 
authors such as Feng Mu 冯牧, Yang Mo 杨沫, Yuan Ying 袁鹰, Xu Chi 徐迟, and 
others. (ibid: 14).51 Meanwhile, works of environmental fiction, such as Zhang Wei’s 
张炜 “Yearning for the blackfish from the black pond” (Huainian heitan zhongde heiyu 
                                                 
50 Wu Jingming includes pieces of zhiqing literature as the earliest examples of ecological literature in 
the appendix: “Chronology of contemporary Chinese eco-literature works” (Zhongguo dangdai shengtai 
wenxue zuopin nianbiao 中国当代生态文学作品年表) of his dissertation, one of the few comprehensive 
accounts on the development of nature writing in China. Wu Jingming 2007b. See also: id. 2007b. 
51 For a detailed account of the development of environmental reporting in China, see: Zhang Wei 
2007: 13-17; Thornber 2012: 51-55. 
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怀念黑谭中的黑鱼) expressed a longing for cultural ancestry and simple joys that 
continued to coincide with the topoi of xungen writers. The third phase (mid-1990s to 
the end of the millennium) is labeled the “age of self-discovery” (zijueqi 自觉期) by Wu 
and Liu (id. 2009: 257). Authors’ voices were becoming more assertive, as they now 
consciously began to produce “ecological literature”. (Wang 2008: 253) The growing 
diversity in environmental issues addressed by authors during this phase was reflected 
by an equally more diversified body of Western translations on environmental issues 
that also addressed theoretical issues in a more comprehensive form.52 In 2001, the 
Chinese term for Ecocriticism, shengtai piping 生态批评 was employed for the first time. 
(Wang 2008: 226) 
However, what is largely missing from these scholarly accounts on shengtai wenxue 
(in both Western and Chinese academia) is a recognition of the importance (indeed, 
the existence) of environmental nonfiction produced by Chinese environmental 
activists and its role in the larger context of China’s environmental movement. Such 
academic disregard echoes the marginalization of environmental nonfiction in 
American literature studies; according to Buell, environmental nonfiction still is 
considered a mere medium through which scientific facts can be obtained, but has 
not been subjected to an in-depth meta-analysis of its inherent values, biases, 
discursive mechanisms, and positionalities. 
American nature poetry and fiction about the wilderness experience have 
been studied much more intensively than environmental nonfiction. 
Apart from Walden and a few other works by Thoureau, for practical 
purposes nonfictional writing about nature scarcely exists from the 
standpoint of American literature studies even though by any measure it 
has flourished for more than a century and has burgeoned vigorously in 
the nuclear age. […] Environmental nonfiction, however, gets studied 
chiefly in expository writing programs and in 'special topics' courses 
                                                 
52 Examples include: Hans Sachsse (1967): Einführung in die Naturphilosophie, translated by Wen Tao
文韬 et al. in 1991; Donald Worster’s Nature's Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas (1977), translated 
by Hou Wenhui 侯文蕙  in 1999; Roderick Nash (1989): The Rights of Nature: A History of 
Environmental Ethics, translated by Yang Tongjin 杨通进 in 1999; Carolyn Merchant (1990): The 
Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution, translated by Wu Guosheng 吴国盛 et al; 
the complete works of Holmes Rolston III; for a comprehensive list, see: Wang 2008: 225-226. 
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offered as the humanities' tithe to environmental studies programs or to 
indulge a colleague's idiosyncrasies, rather than as bona fide additions to 
the literature curriculum. (Buell 1995: 8-9) 
As the basis of its analysis, the present thesis focuses on a select number of works of 
environmental nonfiction produced by environmental activists during the 1980s and 
1990s, since many of the books that were written during this period have become 
“green classics” (lüse jingdian 绿色经典), as will be discussed in greater detail later.  
Taking an anthropocentric resp. a sociocentric perspective, I aim to eschew the 
ecocentric dimension of Chinese environmental nonfiction as well as its 
preservationist message, and it primarily interested in the discursive modes by which 
sociopolitical relationships within the Chinese environmental public sphere are 
established, negotiated, and maintained. Hence, the analytical thrust with which the 
thesis approaches these texts primarily aims to satisfy an interest in the particular 
discursive modes, framing strategies, and imaginaries that contribute to the 
sociocultural idiosyncrasies that characterize Chinese environmentalism. I am aware 
of the fact that such a meta-reading might do injustice to the original intent of these 
texts, which is primarily concerned with environmental and ecological issues. “No 
intellectual vice is more crippling than defiantly self-indulgent anthropocentrism.” 
(Wilson 1978: 17) Hence, this study should not be understood as an exercise in 
Ecocriticism, since such an endeavor would be defined, as Buell puts it in his seminal 
The Environmental Imagination, as “study of the relation between literature and 
environment conducted in a spirit of commitment to environmentalist praxis”. (Buell 
1995: 430; n20).53 In contrast, I will focus on the point where the dimension of 
literature, politics, and nature intersect.   
                                                 
53 That is not to say that this thesis does not draw valuable insights from works of Ecocriticism. An 
obvious point of intersection is the argument - raised mainly by early accounts of ecocriticism - that 
literary representations of nature can and mostly do have implications that transcend the mere natural 
but rather reach into the social realm. Leo Marx's The Machine in the Garden (1964) advises us that 
what Thoureau says about the location of meaning and value is “that it does not reside in the natural 
facts or in social institutions or in anything ‘out there’, but in consciousness,” in the “mythopoeic 
power of the human mind.” In short, Thoureau was not really that interested in nature as such; nature 
was a screen for something else. (Marx 1964: 11) And ecocritic Jonathan Bate remarks concerning 
British romantic studies, “some of the most eminent literary critics of our time have believed that 
Wordsworth was not a nature poet, or that there is no such thing and Wordsworth was interested in 
it then that interest was very suspect on political grounds.” (cited in Marx 1964: 11)  
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II.3.4   The confluence of two imaginaries 
Thus, the present thesis focuses on the confluence of environmental cosmopolitanism 
as a social force, and ecocosmopolitanism as a literary phenomenon, in the context 
of ongoing processes of cultural globalization and transculturation. The central 
screen onto which this analysis is projected is formed by the concept of the 
imagination or the imaginary, the ideological and sociocultural superstructure that 
lends meaning and guidance to social action.  
The central defining characteristic of a cosmopolitan perspective is the 
‘dialogic imagination’. By this I mean the clash of cultures and rationalities 
within one’s own life, the ‘internalized other’. The dialogic imagination 
corresponds to the coexistence of rival ways of life in the individual 
experience. Which makes it a matter of fate to compare, reflect, criticize, 
understand, combine contradictory certainties. (Beck 2002: 18) 
This approach is supported by theoretical arguments on cultural globalization: for 
Appadurai, cultural practices have moved into the realm of collective psychology – 
Benedict Anderson (1991) would speak of imagination – intrinsically tying culture 
and imagination together, mainly through the role of mass media and new IT 
technology: 
The world we live in today is characterized by a new role for the 
imagination in social life. [...] The image, the imagined, the imaginary – 
these are all terms that direct us to something critical and new in global 
cultural processes. The imagination as a social practice [emphasis in the 
original; M.L.]. (Appadurai 1996: 31)  
Appadurai in this context speaks of an “unleashing of the imagination”, which “is 
now central to all form of agency, is itself a social fact, and is the key component of 
the new global order.” (ibid: 31) As an analytical framework, he proposes the 
introduction of five dimensions of global cultural flow – “scapes” – which he terms 
(a) ethnoscapes (b) mediascapes (c) technoscapes (d) finanscapes (e) ideoscapes 
(Appadurai 1990: 296, also: 1996: 33), which he (in reference to Anderson) calls 
“imaginary worlds”, that is, the multiple worlds that are constituted by the 
historically situated imaginations of persons and groups spread around the globe.” 
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(id. 1996: 33) It is in these imaginaries that Appadurai sees the dynamics of flow take 
place (id. 1990: 296) These imaginary “landscapes” are the coagulated manifestations 
of processes of collective imagination that form the main locus for cultural 
globalization.  
The suffix -scape allows us to point to the fluid, irregular shapes of these 
landscapes, shapes that characterize international capital as deeply as 
they do international clothing styles. These terms with the common suffix 
-scape also indicate that these are not objectively given relations that 
look the same from every angle of vision but, rather, that they are deeply 
perspectival constructs, inflected by the historical, linguistic, and political 
situatedness of different sorts of actors. [...] These landscapes thus are 
the building blocks of what (extending Benedict Anderson) I would like to 
call imagined worlds, that is, the multiple worlds that are constituted by 
the historically situated imagination of persons and groups around the 
globe. (Appadurai 1996: 33) 
Adopting Appadurai’s argument, two “–scapes” are of crucial importance in our 
context: the social imaginary, and the naturescape. 
Social imaginary 
The social imaginary is a concept developed by Castoriadis in The Imaginary 
Institution of Society.54 In traditional Marxist thought, it is the material basis of a 
society that produces the (ideological) superstructure – it is man's (material) being 
that determines his consciousness. Castoriadis inverses this thought and argues that 
quite to the contrary it is the “superstructure” (which he calls the “social imaginary”) 
that provides the structural framework in which any meaningful social agency is 
eventually possible: 
This element—which gives a speciﬁc orientation to every institutional 
system, which overdetermines the choice and the connections of 
symbolic networks, which is the creation of each historical period, its 
singular manner of living, of seeing and of conducting its own existence, 
                                                 
54 Originally published as L'Institution Imaginaire de la Société in 1975, Paris: Ed. du Seuil. 
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its world, and its relations with this world, this originary structuring 
component, this central signifying-signiﬁed, the source of that which 
presents itself in every instance as an indisputable and undisputed 
meaning, the basis for articulating what does matter and what does not, 
the origin of the surplus of being of the objects of practical, affective, and 
intellectual investment, whether individual or collective—is nothing 
other than the imaginary of the society or of the period considered. 
(Castoriadis 1987: 145) 
We can therefore see that in this theory, any notion of change, alteration, exchange 
– essentially: dynamic process – will have to occur within the social imaginary. In 
this procedural understanding, the term “social imaginary” is an important tool to 
account for the plurality of modernity as it presents itself today.  
The imaginary hereby provides actors with an understanding of where 
they are in time, space and society. It helps them to make sense of the 
world they find themselves in, and through norms and beliefs gives them 
guidance for how to behave appropriately. (Gaonkar 2002: 10) 
For Charles Taylor, changes in the social imaginary are a key to understand the roots 
of multiple modernities, since it is within the imaginary that changes first gain hold:  
What exactly is involved when a theory penetrates and transforms the 
social imaginary? For the most part, people take up, improvise, or are 
inducted into new practices. These practices are made sense of by the 
new outlook, the one first articulated in the theory; this outlook is the 
context that gives sense to the practices. And hence the new 
understanding comes to be accessible to the participants in a way it 
wasn’t before. It begins to define the contours of their world and may 
eventually become the taken-for-granted shape of things, too obvious to 
mention. (Taylor 2002: 111) 
The social imaginary as an analytical concept appears to be rather vague. Yet in our 
context it is its very fuzziness that allows the exploration of the various means, 
cultural tropes, rhetoric devices, and framing by which social action is endowed with 
meaning. 
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Naturescape 
The concept of “naturescape” follows examples of previous studies on literary 
representations that have emphasized the aesthetic setting of its subject matter, the 
“scape”, as a crucial analytical point. Laughlin, for example, in his very insightful 
study on the history of Chinese labor reportage, employs the term “factoryscape” to 
show how the physical environment that provides the background for labor 
journalism, such as the factories, machines, brick walls, and other aspects of 
industrial reality, provide the basis for an imaginary landscape that is heavily 
endowed with connotations which transcend the merely physical, especially when 
considered in the context of Socialist literary production:  
Chinese labor reportage is literary insofar as it constructs a vivid 
factoryscape symbolic of capitalist exploitation and class struggle. The 
factoryscape includes not only the physical factory environment but the 
extension of the factory's spatial logic into other social spaces [...] that 
manifest the industrial transformation of the modern social environment 
in general. [...] Thus, the factoryscape is the basis of the symbolic 
structure of labor reportage as a form of literature as well as the basis of 
the expression of consciousness in these works. (Laughlin 2002:142)  
I consciously refer to “naturescapes” in the plural, since it emphasizes the great 
ambiguity concerning the relationship between man and nature prevalent in pre-
modern as well as modern nature writing. In this conceptualization, I can rely on a 
number of excellent recent studies on Chinese conceptions of nature that have all 
emphasized the great heterogeneity and ambiguity that characterize attitudes 
towards nature in China. Mark Elvin, for example, in his Retreat of the Elephants has 
remarked that 
Through more than three thousand years, the Chinese refashioned China. 
They  cleared  the  forests  and  the  original  vegetation  cover, terraced  
its  hill-slopes, and partitioned its valley ﬂoors into ﬁelds. They diked, 
dammed, and diverted its rivers and lakes. They  hunted  or  domesticated  
its  animals  and birds; or  else  destroyed  their  habitats  as  a  by-product  
of the  pursuit  of economic improvements. By late-imperial times there 
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was little that could be called ‘natural’ left untouched by this process of 
exploitation and adaptation. 
At  the  same  time  there  developed  among  the  elite  an  artistic  and  
philosophical attitude toward the landscape that saw it as the 
exempliﬁcation of the workings  of the  deepest  forces  in  the  cosmos. 
(Elvin 2004: 321) 
A paradox thus lay at the heart of Chinese attitudes to the landscape. On 
the one  hand  it  was  seen, not  as  an  image  or  reﬂection  of some  
transcendent being, but as a part of the supreme numinous power itself. 
Wisdom required that one put oneself into its rhythms and be conscious 
of one’s inability to reshape it. On the other hand the landscape was in 
fact tamed, transformed, and  exploited  to  a  degree  that  had  few  
parallels  in  the  premodern  world. (ibid:  325) 
Another important study addressing notions of and attitudes towards nature in pre-
modern China is the edited volume Concepts of Nature published by Vogel and Dux in 
2010 which explores these issues from an intercultural perspectives. In his 
contribution to this volume, Roetz points to the conflicting attitudes towards nature 
found in the Confucian and Daoist traditions and attacks the “cliché of ‘harmony’ 
between man and nature in China” (Roetz 2010: 200) prevalent in earlier Western 
conceptions and popularized by scholars such as Joseph Needham and Max Weber.  
In contrast to these doctrines, which enjoy wide dissemination and are 
well established even in China itself, it is precisely a differentiating and 
not a generalizing approach to the relationship of nature and culture that 
is the starting point for an understanding of Confucianism and Daoism, 
and thus of the two competing, fundamental directions of Chinese 
philosophy. The emergerence of the two schools is an expression of 
precisely the break of culture with nature, whereby they themselves 
come to stand in a modus of difference, not unity. This does not exclude 
'sympathetic' thinking - but only sympathetic in the sense of a consciously 
chosen philosophical position with an awareness of the problem, not in 
the sense of a 'substantial' mode of thought. The background of this 
problem consciousness is a destructive practice that views nature 
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primarily as the raw material for the realization of human purposes and 
one that is not even slightly characterized by empathy. The ever so 
appealing image of an empathetic Chinese approach to nature 
completely different from that of the West belongs in the romantic realm 
of counter-images. (ibid: 200-201) 
Such premodern conflicting attitudes towards nature continued with China’s entry 
onto the world stage by the 19th century. Transcultural flows were sweeping new 
concepts, understandings, and imaginaries with regards to nature into China. Weller 
remarks on the new spectrum of possible attitudes towards nature in the context of 
early globalization when he writes that 
Unequal globalization from the middle of the nineteenth century offered 
China a new palette of options for thinking about how people relate to 
environments. In contrast to simple theories of globalization that see the 
flow of one set of ideas from a single center […], this flow contained 
multiple and interacting streams that changed character at various nodes 
along the way. (Weller 2006: 60) 
Proceeding from there, Weller details the transformations which have taken place in 
Chinese and Taiwanese literary responses to the environment across the twentieth 
century. He focuses on issues such as nature tourism, anti-pollution campaigns, and 
policy implementation to show how the global dissemination of Western ideas 
concerning the natural environment has interacted with Chinese traditions. Different 
understandings across groups have caused problems in administering environmental 
reforms.  
In another insightful study of relevance here, Thornber shows in her Ecoambiguity 
(2012) the often contradictory complexities with which the natural world is 
approached in East Asian literatures. 
Environmental ambiguity manifests itself in multiple, intertwined ways, 
including ambivalent attitudes towards nature; confusion about the 
actual condition of the nonhuman, often a consequence of ambiguous 
information; contradictory behaviors towards ecosystems; and 
discrepancies among attitudes, conditions, and behaviors that lead to 
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actively downplaying and acquiescing to nonhuman degradation, as well 
as to inadvertently harming the very environments one is attempting to 
protect. My readings of hundreds of creative works from diverse cultures 
reveal these imbricated forms of ecoambiguity as fundamental attributes 
of literary works that discuss relationships between people and the 
nonhuman world. Most interesting is how creative texts articulate the 
permutations and implications of these discrepancies vertically in time 
and horizontally in physical and social space. (Thornber 2012: 6) 
The subsequent four chapters will explore four distinct domains in which Chinese 
authors of environmental non-fiction have employed the confluence of the social 
imaginary with the naturescape to establish discursive modes that provide meaning, 
legitimacy, and purpose to their role in the context of Chinese environmentalism. 
These domains are  
civil society and governance, 
morality and environmental consciousness, 
environmentalism as an agent of progress, 
nonconformity and alternative lifestyles.  
 
 
  
III. “Woodcutter, wake up”: 
Governance in Chinese ecological 
reportage literature 
This chapter discusses the issue of environmental governance, and the role of non-
state actors within the Chinese social imaginary in this context. In a recent volume 
dedicated to questions of global governance, Armstrong and Gilson (2011: 3) point 
out that civil society involvement is widely believed to augment governance capacity. 
This chapter is primarily concerned with the ways in which way ideas of citizen 
participation in environmental governance have been framed within Chinese 
environmental nonfiction to fit into established sociocultural frameworks.  
The chapter explores this issue through an analysis of Xu Gang’s 徐刚 1987 eco-
reportage “Woodcutter, wake up!” (Famuzhe, xinglai! 伐木者, 醒来!) The piece belongs 
to a body of textual material referred to in China as “ecological reportage literature” 
(shengtai baogao wenxue 生态报告文学). There are a few works that may be said to have 
become canonical as they have been widely read in the activist community and 
beyond and have come to form a shared framework of reference. Within this canon, 
Xu Gang’s Woodcutter is repeatedly cited as amongst the most influential examples 
of Chinese ecological literature in general. (Zeng/He 2010: 120, Thornber 2012: 52). 
Written in September and October of 1987, it was originally published in the second 
issue of the 1988 edition of Xin Guancha (“New Observer”), a popular biweekly 
magazine of national circulation, where it received considerable attention. Later, in 
1997, a collection of Xu Gang’s ecological reportages was published by the Jilin 
People’s Publishing House, amongst which Woodcutter was the first and also the title-
giving reportage. This volume is part of a “Green Classics Library” (Lüse jingdian 
wenku 绿色经典文库) published by the same company that comprises mostly important 
Western environmental books in Chinese translation, such as Carson’s Silent Spring 
(1962), Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac (1949), or The Limits of Growth 
(commissioned by the Club of Rome in 1972). Among the eleven titles featured in 
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the 1997 collection, Xu Gang’s Woodcutter is one of the only three volumes from 
Chinese authors.55  
Xu Gang was born in 1945 in Tianjin, and joined the People's Liberation Army in 
1962 as a soldier (he began to write in 1963) before enrolling as a student at Peking 
University in 1970. Upon graduation, he worked as an editor within the literature 
and arts department of People's Daily, and also held jobs as deputy director of the 
editorial department of Zhongguo Zuojia 中国作家 (Chinese Writers), a prestigious 
literary periodical, and deputy editor-in-chief of Xiandairen Bao 现代人报. He also held 
various official posts, such as the head of the Chinese Writers’ Association of 
Chongming county (Shanghai).  
Ecological Reportage Literature constitutes a sub-category of the much wider genre 
of baogao wenxue 报告文学 , which has been translated as “Literary Reportage”, 
“Reportage Literature” or simply “Reportage”. The name established itself in the 
1930s, although some of the roots of this genre stretch back to literary traditions that 
well predate the Chinese modern era (which will be addressed later). There exist 
several fine academic accounts that focus on the formation and development of the 
genre, in Western as well as in the Chinese language(s). 56  Given this scholarly 
scrutiny, it is not my intention to provide yet another comprehensive account on its 
overall development in this chapter, or once again re-tell the story of the creation of 
a canon of Reportage Literature.57  
What this chapter will focus on is the fact that Reportage Literature holds a specific 
sociopolitical relevance58 within the Chinese social imaginaire, and moreover how its 
                                                 
55 The two other works are Qu Geping’s 曲格平 “We need a transformation” (Women xuyao yichang 
geming 我们需要一场变革), and Ma Yinchu’s 马寅初 “New Population Theory” (Xin renkou lun 新人
口论). These two works are not part of the “ecological reportage literature” genre and will be addressed 
in a subsequent chapter. 
56 See Wagner 1992; Klaschka 1998 for an extensive German-language account; or Laughlin 2002 
which focuses on Chinese pre-war and war reportage; for Chinese secondary literature, see e.g.: Zhao 
Xiaqiu 赵遐秋 1987, the first monograph on the subject in the Chinese language; or Ding Xiaoyuan 
丁晓原 1999.   
57 See Laughlin 2002: 1-37, for a very informative account on the development of a canon of Baogao 
Wenxue. 
58 This self-understanding should not so much be understood in terms of a specific program dictated 
by one single political or ideological agenda (although there can be detected a clear pro-communist, 
anti-imperialist streak amongst its practitioners), but more in the sense that Reportage Literature was 
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message, its sociopolitical role, and its cultural recognizability is amplified through 
the subject matter it deals with, the natural environment. From its very beginnings, 
inherent in the self-conception of the pioneers and authors of baogao wenxue there 
existed an awareness of the latter’s sociopolitical relevance that exceeded the frame 
of mere literary production. Moreover, authors of Ecological Reportage Literature 
specifically employ the naturescape to amplify certain sociocultural connotations of 
Chinese nature writing that are heavily endowed with notions relating to good 
governance, such as remonstrance against corruption, and seclusion from political 
office within nature.  
III.1  Background: Economic Reform and Environmental 
Destruction in the 1980s 
In December 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee of 
the CCP under Deng Xiaoping’s 邓 小 平  leadership agreed to implement a 
comprehensive and ambitious program of economic change, a program which would 
become known as the Reform and Opening Policy of post-Mao China. Deng – who 
is said to have uttered the phrase “To be rich is glorious!” (Zhifu guangrong 致富光荣!) 
– threw open the door to what is now known as China’s path to “Socialist Market 
Economy” which resulted in to date unprecedented economic growth. The reform of 
the country’s economic system created what was essentially a hybrid system 
illustratively described by Chen Yun 陈云 as “bird cage economics”: Freedom for 
private entrepreneurial initiative within the framework of a planned economy. The 
nation-wide introduction of the “household responsibility system” relieved the 
population of the commune system, as land was de-collectivized and opened for 
private farming. Additionally, a dual-price system was established that split 
commodity prices into a plan and a market component: After fulfillment of plan 
quotas for which the state would pay a guaranteed price, enterprises were allowed to 
sell any post-plan surplus goods at market prices (which often were higher). This dual 
system encouraged innovation and rewarded entrepreneurial spirit, as businesses 
now had incentives to boost production above quota and work more efficiently. 
                                                 
created, perceived, and practiced as a useful governance within China. 
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These combined policies resulted in a veritable explosion of small-scale rural (later 
also urban) private enterprises throughout China that soon began to constitute a 
major proportion of the overall industrial output of the Chinese economy.  
While these reforms, combined with the unleashing of the Chinese population’s 
entrepreneurial spirit, created an economic dynamism previously undreamt of in 
China, they also proved devastating for the country’s environment, as literary 
millions of peasants descended on whatever natural resources promised quick profit, 
and local private enterprises set up shop with little knowledge of or regard for 
environmental protection. The nation’s forests were among the first natural resources 
to bear the impact of China’s economic take-off. Thus, the issue of deforestation was 
amongst the earliest and foremost to gain national attention during the 1980s. 
Modern China’s struggle with deforestation did not originate in the reform policies 
enacted in the 1980s, and references to this issue can be traced back to centuries 
before the founding of the People’s Republic of China: Widespread deforestation was 
a problem that had been known to occur throughout the Imperial era, and with the 
Ming dynasty (1403) started what Qu and Li call an era of “escalated degradation” 
(id. 1992: 23). Responsible for this development was especially the population 
explosion under the Ming and subsequently the Qing dynasties, as well as the 
introduction of new crops that opened up previously non-arable regions to farming. 
For example, Chen Qiaoze documents the deforestation of the mountainous regions 
of Zhejiang province under the reigns of the Kangxi and the Qianlong emperor (1661-
1795). The PRC inherited much of this legacy of environmental destruction that had 
occurred over centuries, and after 1949, the situation of China’s forests continued to 
deteriorate. He Bochuan estimates that between 1949 and 1981, 164.7 million acres 
of forests were destroyed in China (id. 1991: 29) Three waves of major deforestation 
can be identified in this respect, which peeked in “the three big cuts” (san da fa 三大
伐) (Shapiro 2001: 10): the first during the Great Leap Forward 1958-1961, the second 
during the Cultural Revolution 1966-1976, the last one during the early 1980s.59 Yet, 
after the start of the Reform and Opening policy, forest destruction which had 
continued throughout much of the 19th and 20th century accelerated at breakneck pace: 
                                                 
59 For an extensive account on environmental destruction during the first two waves, see Shapiro 2001: 
67-94. 
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He Bochuan reports that by 1985, Heilongjiang province’s annual lumber production 
exceeded state plans by 39%, and that “eight of the 40 bureaus under the 
administration of the Heilongjiang Forest Industry Bureau had run out of forest to 
administer.” (id. 1991: 25) The situation was just as bleak in the southwest. In 
Xishuangbanna Autonomous region forest cover had vanished from previously 60% 
in the early 1950s to about 30%, and in Guizhou province only 14.5% of the once 
proverbially lush forests of the province remained. (ibid. 26) Qu and Li compared 
national forest covers and concluded that China with 12.98 % of total forest cover 
now ranks far behind Japan (68%), Sweden (53%) and the USA (32%). (Qu and Li 
1992: 58)  
What is noticeable is the fact that these developments did not occur due to a lack but 
rather despite an existing legal and institutional framework meant to ensure forest 
protection in the People’s Republic. Even beginning with the 1970s, the central 
government had acknowledged environmental destruction as a major problem, and 
had taken significant steps towards establishing a legal framework to address the 
issue.60 Jahiel notes that “[b]y the mid to late 1980s China could boast of a host of 
environmental laws, regulations and standards, and a nation-wide organizational 
structure including environmental protection units at the central, provincial, city, 
district, county and, in some places, township levels.” (id. 1997: 82) However, the 
Chinese leadership at the time perceived environmental protection as an issue that 
required a bureaucratic approach, and it thus established a legal framework and 
political institutions that were to implement protectionist policies in the top-down 
fashion the center had grown accustomed to over decades. Paradoxically,  while the 
Chinese central government in the 1980s adamantly upheld a top-down approach 
towards the implementation of  its reform agenda, it at the same time enacted policies 
that shifted not only economic but also political power away from the center towards 
the localities: These very reforms actually resulted in a significant decline of the 
regulatory capacity of the Center and made it ever more difficult to force local 
governments to comply with laws and regulations passed on the national level: Zhao 
                                                 
60 For comprehensive accounts on China’s early protectionist legal framework refer to: Jahiel (1998); 
also Economy 2004: 96-117. For Chinese language sources, see Zhongguo huanjing nianjian [China 
Environmental Yearbook]; Beijing: Huanjing kexue chubanshe, particularly the 1990 and 1995 
editions. 
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Suisheng (1994: 21-31) argues that by the early 1980s, virtually all the institutional 
instruments through which the center used to exercise its control over local 
governments had seen a significant decline in efficiency. 
Decreasing capacity of the central state, however, is just one of the systemic factors 
that caused environmental degradation in China: Edin (2003) draws attention to the 
fact that that the Chinese central government’s priorities are often contradictory in 
themselves, and that at times, local governments disregarded certain requirements by 
the government so as to pursue other priorities imposed on them by the very same 
authorities: “the reason behind the failure to implement some policies, such as 
burden reduction, is not so much inadequate control over local leaders as the centre’s 
own priorities and conflicting policies. The Chinese party-state maintains the ability 
to be selectively effective in the beginning of 2000s.” (Edin 2003: 36, my emphasis) Even 
more importantly, this argument is closely tied to the way in which China’s state 
bureaucracy incentivizes certain policy choices at the expense of others. Edin 
suggests “that this inability [of the center to have its way; M.L.] is not primarily 
because of the centre’s lack of control over its local agents but because the centre’s 
actions are constrained by its other policy priorities. […] The cadre responsibility 
system transmits the goals of higher levels to local agents, but the system cannot cope 
with more than a few state goals simultaneously, especially when those goals conflict.” 
(ibid: 51) 
Thus, the environmental crisis on the local level was caused not only by systemic 
disfunctionalities within, but also by the very logic of, the structure of the Chinese 
one-party state. Local officials – by the very nature of the demands the party 
bureaucracy places on them – have every incentive to pursue economic development 
at the expense of environmental protection.  
Economic decentralization has given officials at the provincial level and 
below the means and incentives to develop their local economies. The 
pervasive emphasis on development, consumerism and profit in 
government proclamations and through-out society has further provided 
local governments with the justification to intervene against regulations 
- such as environmental protection - deemed unfavourable to growth. 
(Jahiel 1998: 757) 
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At the same time, local cadres had every incentive to muzzle voices of caution, 
silence popular unrest caused by environmental destruction, and prevent any 
information from the local level to leak out, in order to maintain “social stability”. 
Thus, the central government was often left in the dark as to the true size of local 
environmental problems. Mol refers to this as “information-poor environments”:  
Information-poor environments can arise from political constraints on 
information collection, processing, spreading, access and use – whether 
from conditions of nondemocratic government, the quashing of 
opportunities for independent voices and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) to circulate countervailing evidence, manipulating 
search machines on the Internet, or limitations placed on information 
disclosure (such as occurred in the US following 9/11). (Mol 2009: 115) 
The same is true for the issue of reforestation in which triumphant reports in the 
Chinese press about “great victories” in reforestation efforts were largely exaggerated: 
“False reporting, ineptitude, and bad management are the main causes for the huge 
discrepancy between the impressive claims and the meager results of China’s 
reforestation campaign.” (He Bochuan 1991: 27)  
The institutional disfunctionalities inside China’s protectionist framework were the 
reason behind a major ecological catastrophe that took place in Northeast China in 
1987, and its aftermath provided the incentive for Xu Gang to take an active interest 
in forest protection and eventually pen Woodcutter, wake up!.  
III.2  The narrative: Woodcutter, wake up! – A tale of two 
mountains, and one problem  
On May 6th 1987, a wildfire broke out in the forests of Daxing’anling 大兴安岭 
prefecture in Heilongjiang Province, Northeast China. After local emergency 
respond forces lost control over the situation, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
had to be mobilized, but the fire raged on and was eventually defeated only one 
month later on June 2nd. By then, the blaze had consumed a vast area of over one 
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million hectares of land, 70% of which had been forestry. 193 people had been killed, 
263 injured, and over 50,000 people had lost their homes.61  
An article in People’s Daily from June 6th, four days after the fire had effectively been 
brought under control, reported that the State Council had addressed the matter in 
general assembly. Wan Li 万里, then first-ranking Vice Premier of the PRC, was 
quoted saying that the fire had “exposed the severe bureaucratism of several leading 
cadres in the Ministry for Forestry”, and hence had become a question of “improving 
the Party’s conduct”: Every state or party official had to serve the people 
wholeheartedly, “and must not abuse their power for own selfish gains once they 
held power and office.”62 In a subsequent “Decision of the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress concerning the Great Wildfire Incident of 
Daxing’anling” (Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu 
Daxing’anling teda huozai shigu de jueding 全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于大兴安岭特大森
林火灾事故的决议) from June 23rd 1987, the central government reiterated its position: 
The council holds the view that the occurrence for the fire catastrophe 
has to be attributed mainly to disorderly management practices, eroding 
discipline, violating of legal requirements, illegal business practices and 
severe bureaucratism by those in charge. The council approves of the 
decision to remove Yang Zhong, head of the Ministry of Forestry, from his 
post.  
The council stresses that the protection of the valuable forest reserves, 
as well as the appreciation, protection and creation of forests is the 
honorable duty of all people and of the state institutions on all levels.。
Ministerial departments on all levels as well as all prefectures and 
districts concerned with forestry must seriously take this lesson to heart 
and in a practical manner improve their work and working style. They 
must strictly enforce the legal regulations of forest protection and fire 
prevention as stipulated in the "Forest Law of the People's Republic of 
                                                 
61 These numbers are based on an article in the People’s Daily from June 6th 1987, entitled: “State 
Council Discusses Consequences of Daxing'anling Wildfires”; accessible online under: 
http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/146570/198299/199543/199558/12464006.html (2010/12/20) 
62 All three quotes are found in the article quoted above. 
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China" and the "Fire Prevention Regulations of the People's Republic of 
China".  
The Council of the opinion that this incident should serve as a profound 
lesson that all national ministries, all regional prefectures and all danweis 
should take to heart very seriously. [They] must firmly reject and redress 
the seriously irresponsible bureaucratism that makes them act as 
overlords and grand-seigneurs, as well as the evil working style that leads 
to dereliction of duty and break of regulations. They have to adopt every 
conceivable measure to avoid a similar incident in the future. 63 
It is crucial in our context to fully appreciate the use of the term “bureaucratism” 
which is identified as the main culprit for the catastrophe: The Western 
understanding of the expression bureaucracy is largely neutral, and merely connotes 
a complex administrative structure. In contrast, the Chinese term for bureaucracy 
(guanliao 官僚) and the respectively derived “bureaucratism” (guanliao zhuyi 官僚主义) 
not only has a decisively pejorative meaning, but it is also a political term pointing to 
a specific set of institutional dysfunctions.64 The entry on “bureaucratism” in the 1979 
edition of the official encyclopedia Cihai (“Ocean of Words”) almost verbatim echoes 
the language provided in the 1987 Decision: Bureaucratism is characterized by 
“separation from reality65 and from the masses” (tuoli shiji、tuoli qunzhong 脱离实际、
脱离群众), and “adopting a work and leadership style of acting like overlords and 
grand-seigneurs” (zuoguan dang laoye de lingdao zuofeng 做官当老爷的领导作风). “To be 
out of touch with the grassroots units and the masses, to not understand the real 
conditions on the ground, [...] to not face responsibility.” (bu shenru jiceng yu qunzhong, 
bu liaojie shiji qingkuang, [...] yushi bu fu zeren 不深入基层和群众, 不了解实际情况,[...] 遇事不
负责任 .) Thus, the main problem with bureaucratism is that it prevents the 
information input from outside necessary for effective governance, due to the 
increasing self-encapsulation of administrative organs.66 As this chapter will show, 
                                                 
63 The Chinese text of the document is accessible at the website of the National People’s Congress 
under: http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/26/content_1950.htm [2011/09/14] 
64 See: Burns 1983. 
65 The term shiji 实际 in Chinese can mean both reality and practice, and is a political term. A more 
accurate translation would be “correct practice based on a true perception of reality”. 
66  66 Unlike their Western counterparts, Chinese government institutions are not referred to as 
“bureaucracies” but rather as “organs” (jigou 机构) or “agencies” (jiguan 机关). 
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the dysfunction in China’s governmental framework is a key factor in understanding 
the framing of Xu Gang’s Woodcutter: 
The narrative of Woodcutter, Wake Up! (FMXL) is constructed in form of a travel 
account that retells the experiences of the author, Xu Gang, during his journeys to 
various locations in China in between September and October 1987. The wildfire at 
Daxing’anling having occurred only month before, Xu Gang sets out to investigate 
the condition at several of China’s famous forest regions. 
His first trip takes Xu Gang to Wuyishan 武夷山, a mountainous region in Fujian 
province. The author’s intent is to acquire a first-hand impression of the 
environmental situation on the ground after having followed the Daxing’anling news 
coverage with increasing frustration. Wuyishan is famous in China for representing 
an aesthetic ideal often emulated in Chinese traditional landscape painting (shanshui 
hua 山水画): Green trees cling to bizarre rock formations, and with the passing of the 
centuries the mountain slopes have become covered with a net of tangled roots which 
protect it from erosion through wind and water. But, as Xu Gang informs the reader, 
“the discrepancy between the imagined and the real [Wuyishan] is too great” (FMXL: 
4): The forests have almost completely fallen prey to extensive logging: King’s Peak 
(dawang feng 大王峰), the crown of the mountain range which used to boast “old trees 
that reach up to heaven” (gumu can tian 古木参天; FMXL: 6) and impenetrable brush 
that provided a haven for bird life, has been nearly stripped of any forest cover:  
“Until 1974, all but 300 trees had been cut down, which might be a small 
number, but it was still enough to somewhat cover King’s Peak and not 
make it seem too naked. But now, at this late hour, the axes have cut away 
another 298 of them, and all that remains are but two trees.”  
 […] In 1984, farmers from to Ji’an county (belonging to Wuyishan) kept 
felling and felling trees until Jade Maiden’s Peak (Yunü feng) – yes, that 
very same Jade Maiden’s Peak that appears on the television screens 
every evening as the symbol of Fujian province – until even this maiden’s 
skirt had been pulled down! […] I would kindly like to warn the reader: If 
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this continues for any longer, will not the whole of Wuyi Mountains then 
become ‘the mountains without clothes’?”67 (FMXL: 6) 
What are the reasons for this calamity? On the one hand, the local villagers 
themselves are to blame. Once trapped in bitter poverty, Deng Xiaoping’s “To be rich 
is glorious!” resonates; the Zeitgeist of the economic reform era has unleashed the 
local population’s entrepreneurial spirit. The fastest and most convenient way the 
villagers know to make money is just to cut a tree and sell the timber. “Want to make 
a buck? – Cut trees!” (yao fu? kan shu! 要富? 砍树!). The reason why this behavior goes 
unchecked is not a lack of rules, since a legislative framework actually exists on the 
national level in form of the “Forestry Law” (senlin fa 森林法). Rather, the problem is 
that the law is not enforced by the local cadres in charge: “The people living in the 
mountains have all but one rule: ‘Heaven is high, and the Emperor is far.” (FMXL: 
8)  
The second problem is the corrupt and immoral behavior of the local cadres 
themselves whose duty it would be to carry out the central government’s orders: 
“They [the villagers] only fear the cadres actually in charge on the village and on the 
county level; the real power is in the hands of these lower officials, who will always 
grant protection to the people of their own native villages. What good is a law in this 
situation?” (FMXL: 8) But the cadres not only do nothing to prevent illegal logging, 
often they themselves are the first ones to actively lead the way in this illegal activity: 
As Xu Gang wanders around the endangered forests, he meets a villager who just 
comes back from cutting trees up in the mountains: 
Xu Gang: “Are there no forest rangers in your village?” 
Villager: “Those are the first ones to cut trees! Whether it’s the forest 
officers, or party cadres, they’re all the cousin of some village head, or 
the nephew of some party secretary: They pocket 40 Yuan a month for 
‘forest protection’, and continue logging as before. Why should we 
common folk not also cut some trees ourselves then?” 
                                                 
67 The last remark is an untranslatable pun, based on the homophonous pronunciation of the name 
“Wuyi” 武夷 and two similar characters, wuyi 无衣, meaning “without clothes.” 
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XG: “But what about the higher-ranking cadres?” 
V: “Oh, they all do it. But for them, it doesn’t matter, because they can 
have [the timber] delivered right to their doorstep, isn’t that even 
better?” (FMXL: 16) 
Increasingly distressed, the author leaves the scenery at Wuyishan and heads on. 
However, the writer finds the local ecosystem at his second destination, Tianmushan 
天目山, largely intact, the region's subtropical primeval forest unspoilt. The striking 
contrast piques the author's curiosity, as he starts to investigate the causes: It is not 
as if, as Xu Gang remarks, “the local peasants at Tianmushan do not own axes, and 
do not know how to cut trees.” (FMXL: 25) Indeed, the conditions given at 
Tianmushan would suggest that its forests would have fallen prey to logging much 
more easily: “[Nearby] Hangzhou city's cafés, dancing halls, night clubs and discos 
attract many young people. And Tianmushan - other than Wuyishan - is far more 
accessible to traffic. Tianmushan's natural resources promise much more wealth than 
Wuyishan's.” (ibid) Yet here, nature is intact. What can be the cause for the different 
outcome of two areas of essentially the same political conditions: “Both are under 
the same blue sky, both are governed by the Communist Party, in both places CCP 
cadres are in charge, to both the same laws apply, and both fall under the national 
protection reserve [regulations].” (ibid)  
Xu Gang quickly discovers the answer: The strict enforcement of national law by the 
authorities in charge: Loggers, poachers and thieves are swiftly caught regardless of 
their status and severely punished. Regulations and quotas on what and how many 
trees can be cut annually are strictly enforced, and after the great fire catastrophe at 
Daxing’anling, the local authorities have taken effective fire prevention measures, 
even though this meant a decline in revenue for the district. Xu Gang salutes the 
cadres for their foresight and moral integrity: “Suppose that today's wealth is gained 
by robbing it from our sons and grandsons, by destroying our culture and 
civilization… Well then this wealth is a sin, and there is nothing dirtier! An 
illustrative example is this: In some places, the cadres grow fat, and the people get 
rich, but the green waters and clear mountains wither!” (FMXL: 25) 
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III.3  The form: Literary reportage, and its role within the Chinese 
social imaginary 
Woodcutter’s framing of the problem behind Wuyishan’s environmental calamities 
echoes the institutional failure discussed above: A breakdown in government 
capacity and a dysfunctional informational exchange system between the center and 
the localities have resulted in environmental catastrophe. The local government is 
corrupt, greedy, or ignorant, in any case does not enforce the enlightened regulations 
provided by the center. This diagnosis becomes even more poignant when contrasted 
with the author’s experiences at the second destination, where the central 
government’s policies have been successfully implemented by dutiful local officials. 
Drawing a parallel between his own experiences and the catastrophe at 
Daxing’anling, Xu Gang reminds his readers: 
The Daxing'anling Wildfire has been caused by a bunch of irresponsible 
and conniving people, the tinder that caused this fire blaze has been 
sown by these bureaucrats [guanliao zhuyizhe 官僚主义者] 68 who were 
derelict of their duty.  Amidst these green forest, where the sun shines 
bright and the air smells fresh, there are at least some black corners: The 
fire that devoured Mohe county did not devour the county secretary's 
villa; faced with raging flames that consumed the forests, the head of one 
fire department actually did not order the fire trucks to fight the blaze or 
rescue the civilians, but rather had his men save the county secretary's 
and his own villas, and to be more effective even bulldozered the 
surrounding houses of some ordinary people to create a fire barrier. It 
does not get more graphic than these examples! [FMXL: 37] 
The center, although having issued the correct policies, is not aware of the situation 
on the ground, and hence the problem is allowed to fester. The underlying 
implication is that if the center only knew what was going on, they would take the 
appropriate countermeasures.69  
                                                 
68 The term Xu Gang employs here strictly speaking translates to “bureaucratism-ists” and carries the 
decisively negative connotation discussed above. 
69On the issue of bureaucratism as an impediment to Socialist progress, and its relationship to literary 
production, see: Wagner 1992: 78 ff. 
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Framed in this way, it is precisely the weakness in China's administrative system in 
terms of informational exchange between center and localities that provides a breach 
for reporters such as Xu Gang to assert their role: Their work has to be considered 
inherently useful since it provides government agencies at the center with the 
information they need to adequately perform their tasks and enact the necessary 
supervision of lower-level institutions. The crucial connection between information 
and governance – and environmental governance in particular – has recently been 
receiving intensified attention within the wider framework of literature concerned 
with new modes of governance. (Esty 2004; Mol 2006; Treib et al. 2007): “Within 
the broader governance framework, the concept of informational governance 
emphasizes the key importance of information (together with informational 
processes and resources) in fundamentally restructuring the processes, institutions 
and practices of (environmental) governance. Information is increasingly regarded as 
a (re)source with transformative potential, not just an enabling condition for 
environmental policy formulation.” (Mol 2009: 114) 
III.3.1 The avenues of speech 
The situation described here, and the importance of information gathering to achieve 
good governance, is neither unique nor new in the context of China's political history. 
The idea that the ability of the central authority to gather information from the 
periphery is a key aspect to good governance has been an important topos in Chinese 
political philosophy for a very long time: Kuhn argues that the connection between 
information and governance has represented a continuing challenge to every Chinese 
administration throughout the ages: “One of the most enduring ones has been the 
question how the central government can effectively assess the people’s needs, and 
make local government comply with the orders issued from the center.” (Kuhn 2002: 
8 ff.) Given the vast territory of dynastic rule, and the inaccessibility of China’s 
topography, this concern is even more comprehensible. “Heaven is high, and the 
Emperor is far”, as the villagers say in Xu Gang’s reportage.  
Hence, as previously mentioned, local governments have often been reluctant to 
comply with orders issued from the center, or have had every incentive to quell any 
form of complaint to arise from below to reach the center’s ear. To alleviate this 
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problem, Chinese rulers from very early on developed what Burns calls “anti-
distortion devices” (Burns 1983: 694): The mystical Emperors Yao 尧 and Shun 舜 
were said to have made special arrangements for ensuring that information reached 
them and that the common people had possibilities to make their grievances heard: 
Sima Qian’s Records of the Grand Historian for example praises the establishment of a 
“drum hall” (gu tang 鼓堂) in front of the imperial palace. Any man with a petition 
could make himself heard and present his grievance to the emperor himself, a practice 
that was lauded as exemplary for the sublime skill in statecraft that the revered 
ancients possessed. (Li Qiuxue 2009: 32-35) Within the traditional Chinese social 
imaginary, these arrangements were referred to as the yanlu 言路, the “avenues of 
speech”: A good ruler was expected to keep open means of what Mittler calls 
“intercommunication between the ruler and the ruled 上下之通” (id. 2004: 28) that 
allowed information to flow upwards the Imperial hierarchy to bring problems on 
the local level to the attention of the Sovereign, his “sacred gaze” (shengjian), whilst 
Imperial decrees – for example in the form of public reading of “sacred edicts” during 
the Kangxi reign – traveled downward. Only if this communication was maintained 
would the central authority be able to pass the necessary and appropriate policies that 
corresponded to the needs of the people: “The ‘avenues of speech’ traditionally 
signify those channels at the emperor’s disposal that serve to inform him of what 
happens in his empire, in an allegedly objective manner, and outside of the regular 
channels of bureaucratic information flows; they are the means though which the 
ordinary people can turn with their views and complaints directly to the emperor.” 
(Volland 2003: 166) The importance of this concept is evident for example in the 
Dijian tushuo 帝键图说 (“Illustrated Mirror for the Emperor”), a volume compiled to 
serve in the education of the ten-year old prince who was to become the Wanli 
Emperor of the Ming Dynasty (1563–1620). It contains illustrative anecdotes of 
emperors of old, some cast as an example of how to engage in good governance, 
others proving a bad example. In many of these stories, one of the key concepts is 
that a good ruler keeps an open ear to popular grievances and needs to understand 
minxin 民心, lit. “the people’s heart”, and acts accordingly.70 Hence, in order to ensure 
a smooth flow of information, the Chinese imperial system from a very early stage 
                                                 
70 Reprinted in Zhang Juzheng (1993). 
  
77 
 
 
Woodcutter, wake up! 
 
  
on instituted several fixed procedures that allowed petitions, criticism and praise to 
reach the center: It was during the Qing dynasty, that the appeals system experienced 
its full extent: Ocko (1988) provides a comprehensive account on the judicial system 
that managed the complex bureaucratic processes of acceptance, rejection, and 
deliberation of written appeals, before turning to the main focus of his study, the 
capital appeal (jingkong). 
Having exhausted all the judicial remedies at the provincial level, 
appellants could bring their charges to Beijing and bang the “grievance 
drum” outside the offices of the censorate and the capital gendarmerie 
(bujun tongling yamen), both of which were authorized to accept capital 
appeals. As the emperor's judicial triage officers, they decided which 
cases warranted the emperor's personal attention, which could be 
remanded to the provinces for trial, and which could be dismissed. To 
circumvent this system and reach the emperor directly by either kneeling 
before the palace gate or along the way of an imperial procession 
(kouhun) was not impossible but was illegal and unusual, for in general 
petitioners were harshly punished regardless of the veracity of their 
charges […].  In every instance the aim of the capital appellant was the 
same-to enlist the interest of the emperor in one's cause. The hope was 
not farfetched since emperors seem to have been sympathetically 
predisposed to capital appeals. (Ocko 1988: 294) 
In the 20th century, the CCP followed these precedents and maintained its own 
information-gathering mechanisms, be it through the dispatching of “work-teams” 
(gongzuo dui 工作队) to the localities to circumvent mid-level bureaucracy, or the 
maintenance of a system of “Bureaus of Letters and Visits” (xinfangju 信访局)71 tasked 
solely with the revision of letters of complaints from the populace to the provincial 
and central governments. An illustrative example just how alive the imaginary is to 
this very day is provided by the following caricature, published in 2010 in Zhongguo 
Baogao [“ChinaReport”]: 
                                                 
71 For a comprehensive history of the Xinfang system, see: Li 2009.  
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The Grievance Drum is broken.72 
The article is headlined “The serious problem of clogged xinfang channels” (Xinfang 
liangdao de fang’ai nanti 信访渠道的妨碍难题). Illustrating the article’s argument that 
there are serious problems with the xinfang system that should allow ordinary citizens 
to level complaints against local and central government is a caricature which depicts 
an ordinary citizen who is ready to beat the grievance drum, drumstick already in 
hand, his papers and documents stashed neatly right next to him. In the background 
hangs a sign with the four-character expression ming jing gao xuan 明镜高悬. This 
phrase refers to the legend of a mystical magic mirror said to have been in the 
possession of Qin Shihuang, China’s first emperor: The mirror allegedly revealed the 
hearts and minds of those who came before it, and thus enabled its possessor to judge 
the impartiality and competence of his officials. Later, official hung up signs referring 
to the mirror in their court halls to profess their own fair-mindedness and the 
transparency of their decisions. In the case of this caricature, the sign is included as 
an ironic signifier: It boastfully promises transparent government (as envisioned 
within the Chinese social imaginary) but as the caricature shows, the means by which 
this is to be achieved, the drumhead, lies in tatters, leaving the citizen to wonder how 
he might make his issue known to the authorities. 
In the context of this imaginary, a clogging of the avenues of speech means an 
impediment to good governance, since it robs the center of its ability to accurately 
assess the situation on the ground. Arguably the most tragic incident of clogged 
                                                 
72 Source: “ChinaReport” (Zhonguo Baodao) No. 3, 20100/03/17, accessible under 
http://www.chinareports.org.cn/zgbd/Article/fmgs/201003/23237.html [2011/03/02] 
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communication channels in modern Chinese history occurred during the Great Leap 
Forward, when an already deeply flawed governmental policy was aggravated by 
widespread inaccurate and exaggerated reporting of local grain supplies. Without 
independent critical input, the central government was unable to accurately assess 
the situation on the ground, leading to the greatest famine catastrophe in Chinese 
history. This incident provides the background for Amartya Sen’s famous argument 
for the importance of independent civil society voices for achieving good governance:   
What was lacking when the famine threatened China was a political 
system of adversarial journalism and opposition. The Chinese famine 
raged on for three years without it being even admitted in public that 
such a thing was occurring, and without there being an adequate policy 
response to the threat. Not only was the world ignorant of the terrible 
state of affairs in China, even the population itself did not know about the 
extent of the national calamity and the extensive nature of the problem 
being faced in different parts of the country. Indeed, the lack of 
adversarial journalism and politics hit even the government, reinforcing 
the ignorance of local conditions because of politically motivated 
exaggeration of the crop size during the great leap forward and the fear 
of local cadres about communicating their own problems. (Dreze and Sen 
1989: 212-213) 
III.3.2 The role of literature  
Literature, from a very early time onward, played a crucial role in this regard, its task 
was thought to admonish the ruler and lend voice to the people’s grievances: The 
“Great Preface” of the Book of Odes (shijing 诗经), arguably the most important source 
for literary theory in pre-modern China, enunciates the role of literature to provide 
remonstrance to the ruler (Murck 2000: 2-3). Following this precedent, China’s men 
of letters have traditionally seen it as their obligation to admonish, advice, and guide 
China’s rulers through their writings.  
Literary speech is thus a part of the arsenal available to the literati to 
admonish and criticize the ruler and the imperial court, which both are 
considered responsible for the social conditions. (Wagner 2009: 598) 
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Thus, producing literature in China never has been an innocent endeavor, and it can 
be taken for granted that all sides concerned are acutely aware of its political 
implications. 
This is also the case with a second, equally important element of the discussion on 
public spheres in late Imperial China: The emergence of modern, Western-style 
newspapers, a topic that has been the subject of extensive research.73 As these studies 
have shown, early reception of the (previously unknown) institution of commercial 
newspapers in China heavily relied upon the traditional Chinese imaginary outlined 
above, for various strategical reasons: firstly, by linking critical newspaper reporting 
to the yanlu tradition, editors and publishers could at least partly escape government 
repression, since their task was essentially a patriotic contribution to enhance 
government efficiency and legitimacy. Liang Qichao 梁启超, arguably China’s most 
influential intellectual at the time, wrote an article in 1896 entitled “On the benefits 
of newspapers for state affairs” (Lun baoguan you yi yu guoshi 论报关有益于国事) in 
which he stated that “the greatness of a country depends on whether the avenues of 
speech are open or closed”. Mittler (2004: 28 n104) notes that “the need to open up 
channels of communication is perhaps the most frequently encountered trope in late 
Qing writings on the newspaper.” Secondly, by linking a new cultural object such as 
the newspaper to a framework with which the potential audience (China’s educated 
literati class) was already familiar, the publishers made the new medium much more 
acceptable, hence ensuring not only social embedment but also commercial success. 
If literature in general was a key vehicle through which good governance was to 
achieved, then Reportage Literature in particular was designed to fulfill this role. As 
Wagner (1982) points out in his essay on the functionalist approach towards literature 
under Chinese Socialist Political Culture, literature (and particularly reportage) 
followed the Leninist notion that art and literature had to be “cog and screw” in the 
revolutionary machinery (Wagner 1982: 336), an idea that was wholeheartedly 
embraced by Mao Zedong in his famous Yan’an Talks on Literature and Art. The 
                                                 
73 I am especially referring to the efforts of the Research Group “Struktur und Entwicklung der 
öffentlichen Sphäre in China [Structure and development of the public sphere in China]” at the 
Institute for Chinese Studies at Heidelberg University created by Professor Rudolf G. Wagner which 
has produced a substantial body of studies on this topic. See for example: Janku 2003; Mittler 2004 
and 2007; Vittinghoff 2001 and 2002; Wagner 1995 and 2007. 
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special role reportage was expected to fulfill in this regard was not only to be 
subservient to the Socialist leadership, but specifically to support the leadership in 
maintaining an accurate picture of what was going on on the local level. Chinese 
Reportage Literature in this regard was heavily influenced by Soviet models, in 
particular Ovechkin’s sketches (translated as texie 特写  in Chinese) 74  which cast 
socialist writers as “scouts” or as “the light cavalry” of literary production. Nimble 
and agile, socialist reporters were expected to be able to investigate the situation on 
the ground much more effectively (and discretely) than the state bureaucracies with 
their vested interests. Reportage writers were “scouts for the leadership, informing 
them both on these local activists and the problems they are facing. The internal 
channels of communication (party, state) being clogged by bureaucrats, literature 
establishes an independent outside link.” Moreover, Reportage Literature ensured 
itself against accusations of disloyalty by casting its protagonists “as an independent 
force in the stories, being neither bound to the (inarticulate) people nor to the 
institution or party. The writer is, however, endowed with a high degree of socialist 
idealism enabling him to see the obstacles to socialist progress and to support the 
forces trying to overcome them.” (Wagner 1982: 342) Liu Binyan’s “Inside News 
from our paper” (Benbao neibu xiaoxi 本报内部消息) from 1956 is the archetypical 
reportage in this regard: While the hero of the story is an enthusiastic journalist who 
wants shake things up and find an outlet for this revolutionary idealism, the villains 
are bureaucrats and pencil-pushers who due to their inflexibility and stubbornness 
stand in the way of progress.75 While fictional, Liu Binyan – just like the protagonist 
of his story – tries to circumvent the obstacles he encounters on location, and appear 
directly to the central authorities who have to be made aware of this situation. 
“Beijing has lost its balance” (Beijing Shiqu Pingheng 北京失去平衡) which is commonly 
considered to be the first piece of eco-reportage of mainland China (Yang/Zhou 2005; 
Luo 2002; Zhang 2008) follows the same pattern. It appeared in 1986 in Baogao 
                                                 
74 For a very detailed account on how and to which extent the Chinese version of reportage literature 
is indebted to non-Chinese literary models and forms, and particularly the close interactions of its 
most famous exponent Liu Binyan 刘宾雁 with Valentin Ovechkin and the process of the former’s 
adoption of the literary sketch (texie) from the model of the latter’s ocerk, see Wagner 1992: 243-376; 
also: Wagner 1982: 335 ff.  
75 For a detailed study of this reportage, see: Wagner 1992: 171-191.  
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Wenxue (Vol. 4), a periodical exclusively dedicated to the publication of literary 
reportage. The author, Li Shaqing 李沙青, better known under his pen name, Sha 
Qing, himself a Communist Party member, had worked as a journalist for the 
“Beijing Evening News” (Beijing Wanbao) and the “Beijing Daily” (Beijing Ribao) in 
the late 1970s. In this piece, he addresses the severe water crisis in and around the 
Chinese capital. The reportage was groundbreaking at the time because it identifies 
the problem as a man-made disaster, and not - as had been habitually asserted in 
Chinese media outlets - as a consequence of unfavorable natural conditions. Overuse 
and waste of water, pollution, outdated agricultural practices and heavily subsidized 
water prices had created a situation in which China's capital was increasingly feeling 
the impact of draughts, desertification, and sinking ground water tables. What lent 
additional weight to Sha Qing's reportage was the fact that he not only combined 
extensive usage of government statistics, interviews with affected locals, and 
haunting personal impressions from various locations he had visited in the course of 
his research, but that he also brought in statements of several high-ranking 
government officials who had been willing to go on the record to support his 
allegations. Amongst them were Guo Zhongqing 郭中庆, then the head of EPA 
(Environmental Protection Agency, the forerunner of the later Ministry of 
Environmental Protection), Huang Zhendong 黄震东 , the chief engineer of the 
national water-control bureau, and a leading functionary for water management. One 
point in particular crystallizes the relationship between literature and informational 
governance we have discussed so far: Guo Zhongqing had prepared an urgent report 
concerning the illegal construction activities of a water management bureau and a 
telecommunications company that threatened the water supply of a district at the 
outskirts of Beijing in favor of business interests that wanted to use the water for a 
resort for wealthy clients, reducing the now dried-out river bed to stinking mud. Guo 
is eager to pass his report up the command chain, yet is reprimanded and his report 
silently buried. (Li Shaqing 1896: 10-11) Li Shaqing’s piece created substantial 
impact not only in the media, but also in the literary scene and was awarded the 
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"Fourth National Award for Outstanding Reportage Literature" (Disi jie quanguo 
youxiu baogao wenxue jiang). (Zhang and Wu 2007: 11)76 
Hence, when framed in the context of this traditional imaginary, journalism not only 
serves as an avenue for the lone dissenter to voice grievances, but much more 
provides a crucial tool to achieve good governance, and thusly is something that the 
central authority must have an invested interest in. Often, the authors engaged in 
producing reportage literature simultaneously occupy several posts, or played 
multiple roles apart from their writing. They were state-employed journalists, not 
seldom officials, intellectuals or university employees who portray themselves as 
engaging in the messy business of journalism, investigating ecological and social 
wrongs in order to help their government to improve the situation.  
Such is also the case with the role of the writer. Xu Gang positions himself in a long 
tradition of remonstrating scholar officials willing to sacrifice their lifes in order to 
admonish the ruler. Qu Yuan 屈原 (340 BC–278 BC), a scholar of the Warring States 
period, is the archetype of the loyal official who falls victim to court intrigue and 
eventually drowns (i.e. martyrs) himself as a final dramatic act of remonstrance. 
Following the social imaginary of the upright official who offers remonstrance 
against social evil, writers of reportage literature emphasize moral righteousness 
together with a duty to voice unpopular grievances. Wagner (1992) in his discussion 
of Liu Binyan 刘宾雁 remarks that “Liu [Binyan] set up a behavioral model for young 
intellectuals. To them it appealed in its decided modernism, in its high moral pitch 
of social responsibility, and in its boldness, freedom, and promise of warm human 
relationships with like-minded peers.” (Wagner 1992: 311)  
                                                 
76 Its literary success, combined with the nation-wide attention it generated sparked a blossoming of 
the genre of the eco-reportage. Most examples of reportage literature feature a single topic of concern. 
Texts that featured topics on water pollution and water shortage during these years include “Rescue 
the Fen River!” (Wan Fenhe!)  by Mai Tianshu 麦天枢 (Baogao Wenxue 1989 (1)), Liu Guixian’s 刘贵
贤 “Our Life Source in Crisis” (Shengming zhi yuan de weiji) (published in 1989 by Kunlun chubanshe) 
and Chen Guili’s 陈桂棣 “Warning from the Huai River” (Huaihe de jinggao) (in Dangdai 1996 (2)). 
This last piece was a study conducted in Lujiang County, Anhui Province, in which the author alleged 
that mortality rates due to stomach and liver cancers were caused by the high levels of inorganic 
substances in surface water, especially fertilizers and industrial waste dumped unfiltered into the river 
Huai. Amongst other honors, it was awarded the Lu Xun Literary Prize in the category “Outstanding 
National Reportage Literature”. These authors represent merely a selection of a larger body of eco-
reportage produced from mid-1980s onward. For comprehensive surveys over the genre, see: 
Yang/Zeng 2010; and Zhang Xiaoqin 2008. 
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A similar self-understanding can be found with authors of eco-journalism: Chen 
Guidi 陈桂棣, himself a well-known environmental journalist, writes that “reportage 
literature has to foster an atmosphere of righteousness, and must not shy away from 
sensitive issues. Because some sensitive issues are problems and fractures caused by 
the reforms, and those are social focal points and popular hot topics. [...] One might 
say that courage and artistic skill are equally important for a writer. Without 
painstaking analysis and sufficient bravery, there will be neither real discovery nor 
literary works of the highest quality.” (cited in Wu Jingming 2007b: 202) An example 
of how this role model is applied in environmental reportage literature can be visited 
in a literary reportage on soil erosion penned by Wang Zhi'an 王治安, born 1936, also 
known under the pen name Anran 安然 or Xinran 欣然, similarly to Sha Qing an 
author of eco-reportage literature who has both official as well as journalistic 
credentials. (He is, for example, both a member of the Chinese Communist Party and 
of the Chinese Writer’s Association.) In 1992, he published the literary eco-reportage 
“Troubled Thoughts on Our Nation’s Soil” (Guotu yousi 国土忧思) in which he 
discusses the relationship between China’s growing population, the resulting increase 
in grain demand, and the simultaneous loss of arable soil due to erosion and 
pollution.77 For our purposes, it is very illustrative to take a closer look at the post-
script to the second edition of this very successful volume, composed by the Hong 
Kong based writer and poet Liu Jikun 刘济昆. He describes the author’s role in the 
following words: 
When professors in the 1960s taught classes on  the history of literature, 
they certainly to a large degree reviewed writers such as Qu Yuan, Du Fu, 
Xin Qiji or Lu Xun who had felt concern for the nation and worried about 
its people (you guo you min 忧国忧民).  But as soon as the topic turned to 
the achievements of contemporary literature, “concern” and “worry” 
were terms deemed to be no longer necessary anymore. Instead, they 
were turned into expressions such as “singing the praise of the 
                                                 
77 Originally published as “Ah, Mother Soil! – An Alarm Bell of Concern” (A, guotu! – Youhuan de 
jingzhong 阿国土. 忧患的警钟). The piece received numerous literary awards, and was later turned 
into a two-part TV program with the title “Blood Sacrifice of the Yellow Earth” (Xueji Huangtudi 血
祭黄土地). (Wu 2007: 201) The text was later, together with a collection of other reportages by the 
same other, published in a book-length “Trilogy on Human Existence” (Renlei Shengcun Sanbuqu 人类
生存三部曲). 
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fatherland”, and “extolling the people” (gesong zuguo, gesong renmin 歌
颂祖国, 歌颂人民). Because if one had for example mentioned how so-
called "rightist" men and women of letters had "felt concern for the 
nation and worried about its people" during the One-Hundred-Flowers 
campaign in 1957, one could have been charged with some sort of 
offense. But again, Chinese intellectuals love noting better than to 
trouble themselves with the well-being of the nation and the people; and 
even if their front lines may fall [in battle], others will step over their 
bloodied bodies [and advance], singing with solemn fervor. 
It has been over ten years since the beginning of the Reform and Opening 
Policy, and the voices of approval here and abroad still have not faded 
away. Yet still, there are intellectuals who do not want to be silent, who 
insist on staying concerned about the nation, and worry for its people. 
Recently, I read “Troubled Thoughts on Our Nation's Soil”, and it made my 
palms sweaty out of concern for its author, Wang Zhi'an. Because if that 
book had been published during the Anti-Rightist campaign, or during the 
Cultural Revolution, this gentleman would have been in big trouble. [...] 
This book talks about how China's soil is destroyed, abused. In the text, 
the reader will find neither fairy tales nor exercises in sycophantic praise; 
instead, it reveals to us a “dark side", and reminds us fellow countrymen 
that we should love and cherish our nation's soil! 
Intellectuals with concern for the nation and its people are China's 
backbone. Those in power (dang zhengzhe 当政者) would do well to ask 
this sort of “stinking number nine”78 for advice and guidance, because 
loyal advice has never been pleasant to the ear, and yet it is most 
beneficial for administering state affairs and ensuring national security 
(zhi guo an bang 治国安邦). […] (Wang Zhi'an 1993: 306-308) 
In the context of China’s rigid state-imposed controls over literary production, such 
high-temperature intensity of language, the confrontational stance, and the violent 
metaphors it employs (the idea that Chinese intellectuals are being slaughtered for 
performing their role) are remarkable. Yet it is made possible not only by the author’s 
                                                 
78 The expression “Stinking Number Nine” (chou lao jiu 臭老九) was a pejorative, officially used term 
for intellectuals during the  Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. 
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self-understanding as performing a necessary (albeit possible dangerous) role in the 
greater scheme of things, and his convictions are presented in the self-righteous 
language of total dedication to the higher public good. The last paragraph especially 
is noteworthy in this regard: “loyal advice” (zhong yan 忠言), given from intellectuals 
to those in power, is presented as an essential component to achieve good governance 
(as opposed to the chaos during the Cultural Revolution when intellectuals were 
despised, to which the mentioning of the “Stinking No. 9” refers). Dissent in this 
framework is thusly inherently patriotic, with the implications that good political 
leaders will accept the input provided to them by social actors outside the government 
apparatus. By framing the issues in terms of an ancient social imaginary, the text is 
rendered not only culturally but also politically more acceptable to the audience and 
somewhat ensures itself against accusations from official side. 
III.4  The subject matter: Naturescape and governance 
The social imaginary described so far is applicable not only to environmental 
reportage literature, but to reportage literature in general. The difference, however, is 
that the naturescape into which Xu Gang embeds his reportage serves as a crucial 
amplifier to the social imaginary the authors wants to convey. Through the 
naturescape, ecological reportage literature is able to tap into a rich pool of cultural 
connotations that lend its persuasive power to it sociopolitical message. 
Wuyishan in the context of the text represents more than just a physical locality or a 
natural phenomenon. Instead, we have to appreciate the fact that the destination of 
Xu Gang’s travel to a Chinese readership possesses a greater significance, both in 
aesthetic as well as in cultural terms, connotations that he author himself is quick to 
reinforce: His initial descriptions of the natural landscape unfold before the reader’s 
eye a scenery of great natural beauty, a naturalness that immediately reminds the 
reader of an aesthetic ideal which is often emulated in Chinese traditional art, 
especially landscape painting (shanshui hua 山水画): “At Wuyishan, the rocks are 
picturesque, the trees mysterious, and the water is beautiful and pristine” (Wuyishan 
shan guai, shu qi, shui xiu 武夷山山怪树奇水秀) (FXL: 4) As the author informs us, the 
bizarre shape of the rock formations of Wuyishan are called “bone rocks” (gu shan 骨
山), and they play an important role in Chinese landscaping and garden architecture 
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for their “natural” look. Hence, already in the introduction, Xu Gang makes it 
unequivocally clear that there is an inextricable connection between nature and 
Chinese culture, yes that the former is representative of the latter, at least in aesthetic 
terms. As Xu Gang declares, the natural beauty of Wuyishan is wholly attributable 
to its tree population: “The reason why the mountains are green and the water is 
beautiful is all owed to the green of the trees” (shan qing shui xiu yuanyu shu lü 山青水
秀源于树绿” (FMXL: 5)). The term shan qing shui xiu is actually reminiscent of a 
number of classical Chinese phrases meant to describe natural beauty, such as shan 
qing shui xiu 山清水秀, or shan ming shui xiu 山明水秀. Critics of Xu Gang’s have 
remarked on the “poem-like narrative” (shixing xushi 诗性叙事) that permeates his style 
of eco-reportage. (Zeng and Yang 2010). The repeated usage of Chinese loci classici to 
describe the natural scenery throughout the text not only serves as a further linguistic 
amplification of the connection between nature and culture, but establishes a 
particular naturescape that is charged with cultural connotations. 
The connotation in this case is points to the long and well-established relationship 
between nature, governance, and remonstrance in China: The world of men was 
thought to be a mirror of the heavenly order. The Daodejing states that “Man takes 
his law from Earth; Earth takes its law from Heaven; Heaven takes its law from the 
Tao. The law of the Tao is it being what it is (ziran 自然).” (in the Legge translation) 
Dynastic rule was legitimized by heaven through the Heavenly Mandate tianming 天
命, any disturbances in its legitimacy would manifest themselves in the natural world 
through natural catastrophes. The natural world (also one has to not that “nature” as 
concept in its Western sense did not exist in pre-modern China) was hence endowed 
with political implications and thus lent itself to political interpretations: Murck has 
shown how landscape painting and nature poetry in Song dynasty China, in this case 
artistic representations of the famous Eight Views of Xiao Xiang were employed to 
exercise the “Subtle Art of Dissent” (id. 2000: 203-227). 
Examples for the appropriation of nature by scholar officials to remonstrate against 
social ills are can be found for example in poems such as Encountering Sorrow (Li Sao 
离骚) by Qu Yuan who had been exiled from the court of Chu to the southern region 
of Xiao Xiang after losing a power struggle with a rival faction. The poem is written 
in form of a (fantastic) journey through an imaginary landscape undertaken by a 
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virtuous man who has been slandered by his political enemies at court and banished 
by the king of Chu. The poet laments the moral degeneration that has befallen the 
once powerful state of Chu, and proclaims that he nevertheless will adhere to his own 
high moral standards. Centuries later, Liu Zongyuan 柳宗元 (773-819), himself an 
admirer of Qu Yuan, met a similar fate: After having lost a power struggle with the 
palace eunuch faction he was banished to Yongzhou (on the territory of today’s 
Hunan province in Southwest China). There he spent the next ten years of his life in 
modest circumstances in the position of an assistant-prefect, having at times to life in 
an abandoned Buddhist temple. His prolific writing during the time in exile often 
employs descriptions of the remote natural scenery as a metaphor for his banishment 
from court. (Murck 2000: 25-27; also: Davis 1996) 
Specifically, I would like to address two points in Xu Gang’s Woodcutter in which the 
naturescape plays a significant role in this regard: nature as a space of reclusion for 
the morally superior man, and the appropriation of natural sights (mountains in this 
case) as places of political power. 
III.4.1 Nature as a refuge for the superior man 
As Xu Gang wanders around the endangered landscape of Wuyishan, he meets a 
remarkable person:  
 “I recognize him at once, skinny and dark, his hand holding a bamboo 
straw hat, and only his sparkling eyes set him apart from ordinary men. I 
think he must have absorbed some spiritual force of Mount Wuyi. Some 
say he is a strange man, an eccentric, an obnoxious troublemaker. The 
villagers say he protects the forests, repairs the roads. He is the 
management office’s section chief for capital construction […]. His name 
is Chen Jianlin.” (FMXL: 6-7) 
It is not entirely clear from the text whether the person is fictitious and serves as a 
plot devise to advance the narrative, or if Xu Gang actually encountered this person. 
The fact that some of his distinguishing features as described in the quote above seem 
to endow him with supernatural attributes point to the former possibility. It is likely 
that Xu Gang here draws on a rich literary tradition that portrays nature as the 
dwelling place for superior individuals who have voluntarily withdrawn from the 
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world of men only to re-emerge once the right time has arrived. As such, Chen Jianlin 
displays all feature of an archetype of noble recluse that Berkowitz labels “the wise 
rustic”:  
He [the wise rustic] is encountered fortuitously, standing by the road or 
just passing by on his way from one anywhere to another; he imparts his 
often homespun yet always profound notion, which has not necessarily 
been solicited nor is it always appreciated [...]. The Wise Rustic is a literary 
invention and lives only as the personification of a recurrent leitmotif and 
as a mouthpiece for someone else's views. Berkowitz 2000: 28-29) 
Soon it becomes clear that Mr. Chen is no ordinary man, and neither is he an 
ordinary bureaucrat. Although his rank as a cadre of the CCP would entitle him to 
be set above the ordinary village folk, he does not display the airs of grandeur that 
characterizes many of his fellow colleagues. To the contrary: Mr. Chen refers to 
himself as “the dog official” (gou guan’r 狗官儿), a rather unflattering name that no 
normal cadre would ever self-apply. Not so Chen Jianlin, who says about himself: “I 
am Wuyishan’s watchdog (kan shan gou 看山狗), I bite whoever tries to cut down trees, 
I am the dog official!” But it is not only his role as the guardian of the forests that 
makes him pick this humble name, it is also his attitude of serving the people. Mr. 
Chen, through Xu Gang’s description, is presented to us as the highest ideal of a 
Communist cadre, assigning to himself a subservient role towards the common 
people, and being utterly devoted to a higher cause. He detests the bad habit of 
feasting and drinking at the expense of the public purse that has become so common 
amongst cadres, and instead rides his humble bicycle home every noon to eat lunch 
there so to save the tax payer’s money. He patrols the mountains tirelessly to prevent 
illegal logging, and when he cannot persuade the villagers, he often pays them out of 
his own pocket to keep them from felling a tree for money. But it soon becomes clear 
that Chen Jianlin is fighting a lonely cause, even while he is writing letters of warning 
to other officials, and publishing articles in the local gazette: one man will not be able 
to stand against all the hungry axes eager to devour the forests to the last tree. 
For these fellow cadres Mr. Chen, the only committed protectionist in the area, 
reserves the bulk of his ire: he curses them as a bunch of hypocrites, pencil pushers, 
and kiss-ups (mapi): “These cadres, who lead the people on to cut trees, they should 
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all be put against a wall and shot! I will take care of their children and educate them 
as if they were my own.” (FMXL: 9) Aiming at a party leader from Chong’an county, 
he continues: “Corruption: wasn’t that supposed to be the Guomindang? With such 
people in power, the whole country is done for, and so is Wuyishan!” Xu Gang dryly 
comments: “His anger is directed at the right one, this party leader had succeeded his 
predecessor for not even a year, and already he went to Hong Kong, and when he 
came back, he happily played some pornographic videos he had brought with him 
for 13 days in a row, what did it matter to him that people were continue logging at 
Wuyishan?” (FMXL: 9) 
Just as Xu Gang meets an outstanding person at Wuyishan, he discovers another 
person at Tianmushan: Song Yongzeng 宋永增, another devoted protectionist of the 
mountains and the forests. Just as Chen Jianlin, “Old Song” is a man of impeccable 
revolutionary credentials, as well as unwavering moral convictions: A veteran of the 
World War as a militia member of the famous 8th Route Army (tu balu 土八路), in the 
1950s a cadre of significant status, he was assigned to guard the forest area at 
Tianmushan starting in the 1960s. Apart from protecting nature ever since then, he 
was also instrumental in several reforestation campaigns. Xu Gang descriptions 
endow him with almost saint-like features, as a Daoist hermit from the past: he has 
become an expert in herbalism, botanic lore and traditional healing methods while 
living on the mountains. Moreover, in order to protect the area, Old Song has teamed 
up with a group of Buddhist monks who inhabit the temple located on the mountain. 
The main difference to the situation at Wuyishan, however, is that here, the 
protectionist does not fight a lonely cause, but is helped by enlightened cadres who 
follow the guidelines set by the central government, and also are helped by Old Song's 
advice and guidance. 
Moreover, as for his own role, Xu Gang stresses that he is not the first, but only the 
latest in a line of travelling Chinese scholars to describe the natural majesty of 
Wuyishan: “In 1616 [Western calendar], Xu Xiake 79  徐霞客 entered Min [Fujian 
province; M.L.] for the first time to visit Wuyishan. In his “Travel Diary to Wuyishan” 
(You Wuyishan Riji), he recorded:  
                                                 
79 Xu Xiake was a famous Ming dynasty traveller and explorer.  
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The setting sun forms a semicircle 落日半规 
Ridges and peaks far and near 远近峰峦 
Shades of green and violet abound.  青紫万状 
Rocks loom majestically 岩既雄扩 
Outpouring springs from high above 泉亦高散  
In a thousand rills, a myriad threads 千条万缕 
High from the air water is streaming 悬空倾泻  
What a spectacle to behold! 亦大观也 
III.4.2 Mountains as a locus of political power and remonstrance 
The locality itself in which Woodcutter is situated is heavily endowed with 
sociopolitical meanings that play a crucial role in amplifying Xu Gang’s framing: 
Since mountains play a major part in Xu Gang’s narrative, let us briefly examine 
some connotations associated with them in the context of Chinese culture. 
While within Chinese cosmology, nature’s course was characterized by seasonality, 
nature itself was thought to be eternal. Mountains represented nature’s most visible 
physical manifestation, their (perceived) imperishability stood in contrast to the 
fleetingness of the world of men: “Nations may fall, but mountains and rivers remain.” 
(Guo po shan he zai. 国破山河在)80 Hence, from early times onward, mountains where 
an object of worship; the Shangshu 尚书 (Book of Documents, compiled between the 
6th and 4th centuries BC) for example records that the mythical emperor Shun 舜, 
after having ascended the throne, offered sacrifices to the mountains and to the rivers 
(Legge 1966: 33). Moreover, mountains served as an important cultic site at which 
rulers reaffirmed their power through enactment of dynastic rites:  “Mountains, the 
largest physical presence within the landscape, were best suited to fulfilling the role 
of facilitating communication between heaven and earth, serving as boundaries 
between the real and the imagined, the mundane and the sublime, and providing a 
link between the human world and a diverse mixture of religious and cosmological 
systems.” (Ward 2001: 187) Sima Qian’s 司马迁 Record of the Grand Historian (109-91 
                                                 
80 The quote is the first line from the poem Chunwang 春望 by Tang poet Du Fu 杜甫. 
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BC) states that Qin Shihuang 秦始皇, first emperor of China, ascended Mount Tai in 
219 BC during an inspection tour of his newly unified empire. Upon the mountain, 
he not only offered up sacrifices to Heaven and Earth, but also erected stone tablets 
espousing the moral superiority and legitimacy of the Qin dynasty. This ritual 
practice followed established precedent that was adhered to by most subsequent 
emperors throughout the dynasties: The inscription of a mountain with imperial 
edicts aimed at merging nature with the realm of men, and offered the opportunity 
to substantiate a dynasty’s claim for power through the appropriation of the 
permanence of the natural order. This symbolism was also often employed in 
traditional Chinese landscape painting and poetry, where “[M]ountains were read as 
enduring emblems of the state, and symbols of the hierarchy that was a defining 
element of life at court.” (Murck 2000: 122)  
Another relevant facet in this regard is the literary trope of climbing mountains to 
achieve foresight, both literary and metaphorically, something that in Chinese 
sometimes is referred to as “looking out far from above” (zhan de gao, kan de yuan 站
得高看得远).  
Under the claim of the literati to act on behalf of society and possibly 
under a good emperor, poems on ascending mountains or journeys 
cannot just be read as expressions of a turn towards nature, since they 
are at the same time metaphors for human life indicating the specific 
personal attitudes, and thus highlighting the author's position towards 
office and living in reclusion as well as towards friends and the 
contemporary political situation. (Schmidt-Glintzer 2010: 535) 
In his translation of Xu Xiake's travel writing, Ward points out that mountains in 
Xu's voluminous work often serve the purpose of ascending up high as to achieve a 
comprehensive view. This not only refers to the actually physical environment, but 
also more metaphorically to the achievement of an objective understanding of reality. 
“The theme of climbing on high in order to obtain a view over a great spatial distance 
is common in poems of many different eras: poets could, at the same time as doing 
so, look back over a great temporal distance, recalling past events associated with the 
particular site.” (Ward 2001: 61) 
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All of the above themes come into play in what can be considered a climax in the 
narrative of Woodcutter:  
After many fruitless efforts to bring his colleagues to commit themselves to action, 
Mr. Chen, the lone protectionist, by chance stumbles upon an ancient stone tablet 
(shibei 石碑) that a farmer has stowed away in his home: Upon examination, it 
becomes apparent that the tablet dates from the Qing Dynasty. It annunciates that in 
the 28th year of the Qianlong reign (1763 AD), Jianningfu district punished over ten 
local officials on charges of corruption and racketeering. They had failed to protect 
the temples and tea plantations of Wuyishan as mandated by law, and the tablet 
precisely lists their names, crimes and the sentence they received. Without hesitation, 
Mr. Chen purchases the stele, and re-erects it at a prominent spot in the mountains. 
Moreover, he composes a scathing denunciation of the present situation, using a 
similar style of classical Chinese as found on the tablet, and attaches it to the stone. 
 古时且尔!今者保护森林，政府有明令，凡我人民宜各有责遵守之，况性有自觉，
心有自尊，肥己损公被人鄙，非君子所为，砍毁迹敛，则名山胜概益增华美，记
事勒石，示告诫焉，幸勿自治伊戚。 
This has historical precedent. The government, nowadays, has issued 
explicit decrees to protect the woods; each citizen should responsibly 
obey the decree. Furthermore, one supposedly has self-awareness and 
self-esteem. Those who profit at the expense of the public good will be 
universally despised. It is not the behavior of a gentleman [junzi]. The 
mountains and the landscape will become all the more beautiful and 
magnificent when deforestation decreases. Therefore, this stone 
monument is inscribed with these statements and erected here to 
admonish us not to bring misery on ourselves. (FMXL: 11) 
This action manages to shame some of his mid-level colleagues into giving up the 
logging temporarily. However, the existence of the denunciatory stele quickly comes 
to the attention of the higher cadres on the county level. After an outside journalist 
from the city arrives with the intent to investigate the situation and interview Mr. 
Chen, the local party bosses summon the meddlesome protectionist to the party office 
in town and pressure him to put down the stele. When Chen refuses to comply, the 
local cadres detach a gang of hired ruffians who topple and smash the stone tablet, 
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thus erasing the compromising and embarrassing testimony. “The stele may be 
destroyed”, Xu Gang warns, “the evil tracks of deforestation covered up, yet the 
wicked conduct of the bureaucrats and their sole concern for themselves and for their 
superiors, but never for the people, persists! History will remember them! Their 
descendants will curse them!” (FMXL: 14) 
Mr. Chen’s action follows a well-established pattern of political dissent firmly rooted 
in a traditional imaginary: The erection of the stele serves not only as a tool to 
circumvent the dysfunctional alleys of political communication in an attempt to re-
open the “avenues of speech” and appeal directly to the center. It alludes to the 
imaginary of the loyal official offering honest yet unwelcome remonstrance by 
addressing grievances previously hidden from the center’s attention. Moreover, his 
action appropriates the very mountain, both location of the crime and its victim, thus 
touching upon all the connotations between good governance and nature within the 
Chinese social imaginary.  This pattern becomes even more tangible when we 
consider that the actions performed by Xu Gang's heroic protectionist follows 
precedent both historic and contemporary, as the following two anecdotes will 
illustrate:  
Yuan Qinglin 袁清林, in his Zhongguo huanjing baohu shihua (Historical discussion of 
the conservation of nature in China) mentions an incident81 dating from the middle 
of the 19th century in which also a stele is erected at a mountain site in order to accuse 
illegal loggers. (Yuan Qinglin 1990: 266-267) In Tongdao 通道, Hunan Province, an 
autonomous district inhabited by the national Dong 侗 minority, the village elders in 
1851 erected a stone stele on a mountain site named Baoshanzhai 保山寨 (“mountain 
protection camp”) that denounced the destruction of the previously lush forests in 
the area through excessive logging. The inscription read in part:  
Was the vegetation of the forests of these mountains always the way it is 
today? No. It was not. A phenomenon whose age is of many centuries has 
met with a disaster.  
                                                 
81 I am grateful to Prof. Mark Elvin for directing me towards this important source material. A longer 
translation of the stele's inscription alongside a brief interpretation can be found at: Elvin 1993: 28. 
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[…] The people of the present time are not of a quality comparable to 
those of more remote ages. They have acted in their personal interest in 
cutting down trees in an unreasonable fashion. The result has been that 
the beauty of the mountain trees has undergone a change, and the 
mountains shine as if they had been stripped naked. […]  
All the trees, on all sides of the Camp, must be cared for so that they can 
return to a good condition, and then surpass the past, flourishing, rich, 
and of a great age, and such that our children and our grandchildren may 
pass on their abundance from one to the other without end. 
We have decided that the trees around the source of the river at Camp 
Baoshan provide it with a comprehensive protection and that all of them 
must be cared for and placed under an interdict. It will not be allowed for 
them to be felled in an abusive fashion. Those who disobey will be 
punished. (Elvin 1993: 28) 
As Elvin points out in his commentary on this inscription, it is likely that it was used 
in the context of an inter-clan or kin-group conflict over precious resources that had 
become scarcer by the middle of the 19th century (Elvin 1993: 28-29). While anecdotal, 
the incident demonstrates that the practice of erecting accusatory or admonishing 
steles at prominent mountain sites was an established practice in the context of forest 
protection. Yuan in his comment on this anecdote – while not providing further 
incidents – speculates that the practice must have been widespread and was carried 
on even after the liberation of 1949. (Yuan Qinglin 1990: 267) 
The second anecdote dates from the 1980s, and is much more closely tied to the issue 
at hand: In the 1980s, and before he was eventually stripped of his post as general 
secretary of the Communist Party in January 1987, Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦 was one of 
the most prominent voices inside the CCP leadership in favor of social, not only 
economic, liberalization. He became an outspoken proponent of policies aimed to 
combat corruption within the CCP, and was also known as one of the very first high-
ranking officials who addressed environmental issues, especially re-forestation, 
stances that let him to be dubbed China’s “Mr. Clean” and “Mr. Green”. These 
positions, together with his year-long office as chairman of the Communist Youth 
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League of China made him an outstandingly popular figure especially amongst 
China’s youth.  
In July 1983, Hu Yaobang conducted an inspection tour of Gansu and Qinghai 
province and urged local officials to “drive economic development according to local 
conditions”.  Gansu province experienced severe environmental issues resulting from 
soil erosion and de-forestation, the result of decades-long efforts by the provincial 
government to boost the province’s grain output. Hu on his inspection tour urged 
officials to “play the lute upside down” (fan tan pipa 反弹琵琶) and take a more 
counterintuitive yet sustainable approach to agriculture: reforestation of the province 
would allow the province not only to address its environmental, but ultimately its 
economic problems. As Hu put it in the context of his inspection tour: “Plant shrubs 
and trees [in order to] address poverty and achieve wealth” (Zhong cao zhong shu, zhi 
qiong zhi fu 种草种树, 治穷致富) In August 1986, the Reforestation Committee of Gansu 
province, the provincial forestry office, and the Communist Youth League decided 
to commemorate Hu Yaobang’s visit as well as his message with the erection of a 
stone stele. It was erected in the forests at the eastern slope of Mount Xujia (Xujia 
shan 徐家山, lit. “Mountain of the Xu Clan”), inside a national park area near the city 
of Lanzhou. Hu’s eight-character phrase zhong cao zhong shu, zhi qiong zhi fu was 
prominently engraved in his own handwriting on the front of the stele, facing east, 
while on the back, an account was given of the “glorious achievements” in the cause 
of greening Gansu province through inspiring cadres and the common people alike 
(Zou 2006:4)82 
It seems plausible to argue that Xu Gang intends his eco-reportage to fulfill the same 
role as the stone tablet erected by the moral hero of his reportage. Moreover, the 
author can situate his argument within precedent provided both past as well as 
contemporary. Perry has argued that one of the established means of challenging 
authority in the People’s Repulic is the creative appropriation of state rituals and 
official rhetoric, alongside adherence to traditionally sanctioned modes of behavior 
                                                 
82 This stele was later, in 1998, referred to in the title of an officially published book entitled “The 
Green Stele – A Collection of Documents and Experiences Regarding the Greening Efforts of 
Lanzhou City’s Northern and Southern Mountains” (Lüse fengbei – Lanzhoushi nanbei liangshan lühua 
kaifa wenjian ji jingyan huibian 绿色丰碑 – 兰州市南北两山绿化开发文件及经验汇编), praising Hu 
Yaobang for his foresight and enlightened policies. (Zou 2006: 4) 
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through the use of remonstrance and presentation of petitions (Perry 2001: 312). Such 
contextualization lends additional forcefulness to his message, enhances the 
legitimacy of “loyal speech”, and raises the cultural recognizeablity of the played by 
reportage in the context of environmental governance.  
The chapter has argued that through an analysis of the framing of environmental 
reportage literature, we can not only come to a greater understanding of the 
discursive aspect of Chinese environmentalism, but also more generally of the 
relationship between environmentalists and the Chinese state. A consideration of the 
traditional Chinese social imaginary, which emphasizes the role of literature and of 
literati to exercise loyal remonstrance, has shed new light on the fact that Chinese 
environmentalists by no means are universally antagonistic towards the state as such. 
Far from displaying “female mildness”, the framing of Woodcutter suggests a 
cooperative approach towards environmental governance which invokes selective 
alignments between activists and central government actors against local corruption. 
As such, eco-reportages like Woodcutter represent the discursive dimension to a 
greater societal strategy that lets “NGOs seek central government support against 
local projects which they oppose but are powerless to stop” (Lu 2007: 60), and align 
themselves with key ally, people in the government who are sympathetic to their 
cause. The reason why Chinese civil society in general has so notably coalesced 
around environmental issues may partly be due to the fact that the issue of 
environment is uniquely qualified to facilitate political discourse due to its traditional 
cultural connotations.  
 
 
 
  
IV. Tang Xiyang and the creation of 
China’s green avant-garde 
Within the associational landscape of Chinese environmental NGOs, student 
environmental organizations (SEAs) comprise a significant portion. “The many 
committed student leaders of SEAs who participated during the early first step and 
reaching out phases of SEA development in China have become a new generation of 
decision-makers. They are working as officials, teachers, entrepreneurs, reporters and 
NGOs leaders—they possess environmental literacy and passion. [...] helping to be 
one of the growth of “green” decision-makers is likely to be one of the most influential 
impacts of SEAs in China.” (Lu 2003: 65) 
This chapter will analyze the writings of an important Chinese environmentalist, 
Tang Xiyang 唐锡阳 (born 1930). He is one of China’s best-known environmentalists 
of the first hour, and his work has had a significant impact on the Chinese 
environmental movement as a whole.83 He is also one of the few among a growing 
number of Chinese environmentalist authors who have won international acclaim, a 
fact that can be attributed to no small degree also to his literary collaboration with 
his late wife, US national Marcia B. Marks, with whom he co-authored a number of 
books that were either published in the English language or translated from Chinese. 
He has also been actively engaged in social activism for a long time. Tang became a 
leading member of the educational office of the Chinese Wildlife Conservation 
Association, a GONGO (government-organized non-governmental organization) 
founded with the purpose to educate the Chinese public on matters of wildlife 
conservation by the Ministry of Forestry in 1983, as well as an active member of 
                                                 
83 The information for his short biographical sketch I have stitched together from various sources, 
since it is not easy to find one comprehensive account on Mr. Tang’s life. Information about his life is 
scattered throughout his writings. He is at the moment engaged in writing an autobiography, which 
so far has not been published. For some reason, he is not included in the appendix to Wu Jingming’s 
吴景明  dissertation (走向和谐：人与自然的双重变奏 , p. 200-211) which is one of the few 
comprehensive monographs of Chinese eco-literature to date and features a list of biographical 
sketches from many Chinese ecowriters. This may indicate that Tang is perceived more in terms of an 
activist and educator than a writer. More on this point below. For brief accounts in English on Tang’s 
life, his work, and his role in the Chinese environmental public sphere see: Economy 2004: 138-141, 
also: Wu  Fengshi 2009: 2 and Yang Guobin 2005: 52-53. 
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Beijing-based NGO Friends of Nature.84 In 1995, Tang Xiyang in collaboration with 
Friends of Nature and various SEAs initiated a campaign to save the habitat of the 
golden monkey in Yunnan province, an effort that received significant attention. (Lu 
2003: 57) Tang's efforts have also received international recognition; he was, for 
example, awarded the Ramon Magsaysay Award for Peace and International 
Understanding in 2007.85  
Tang’s work is important in our context because of his role not only as a reporter, 
author or activist, but much more as one of China’s most eminent and well-respected 
educators on environmental issues.86 In this context, he and his wife are known for 
the organization of “Green Camps” (lüse ying 绿色营), extensive nature excursions 
that Tang and Marks undertook with Chinese students for educational purposes. 
Tang Xiyang carried on alone when his wife had passed away due to illness in 1996.87 
Many participants of the early Green Camps went on to become important actors in 
the green Chinese movement themselves, amongst them prominent personalities 
such as Liao Xiaoyi 廖晓义 (now leader of the influential Chinese NGO Global Village 
Beijing), Wen Bo, Co-Director of Pacific Environment’s China Program and Time 
Magazine’s “Eco-Hero” of 2006, or renowned environmental journalists such as Feng 
Yongfeng 冯永锋, Shen Xiaohui 沈孝辉 or Wang Yongchen 汪永晨. In a book titled 
“Green Camps” (Lüse ying 绿色营) edited by Tang Xiyang and dedicated to his wife’s 
memory, former participants, fellow activists, journalists and writers recount their 
experiences and address various environmental issues in China.  
                                                 
84 For the role of GONGOs in China in general, as well as their educational functions in particular, 
see: Wu Fengshi (2002): 45-58. 
85 A brief laudatio can be found on the organization’s website at: 
http://www.rmaf.org.ph/Awardees/Citation/CitationXiyangTan.htm [2011/07/11] 
86 For Tang’s importance, see e.g. Wu 2004: 2; Economy 2004: 138-141; also: Compare e.g. the title 
of an article in the popular Southern Weekend from Jan. 13th 2010 entitled 绿色袖 · 教育 -- 唐锡阳 
[Green Leader (Education) – Tang Xiyang], accessible at http://www.infzm.com/content/40120 
(2011/07/01)  He is often respectfully referred to as “Teacher Tang” (Tang Laoshi 唐老师), or with the 
even more respectful term Tang lao 唐老 by fellow environmentalists, journalists and activists. 
87 In fact, Marcia Bliss Marks’ name remains largely unknown to Western audiences, but in China her 
role as an environmental educator is well acknowledged, as can be concluded e.g. from the many, 
often very personal, posthumous dedications to her. See below. 
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IV.1  Beginnings: What nature? What man? 
Tang Xiyang was born in 1930 in Miluo County, Hunan Province. After graduating 
from Beijing Normal University in the early 1950s, he worked as a newspaper editor 
and journalist for the Beijing Daily in between 1953 and 1956. However, during the 
One-Hundred-Flowers Campaign, he was labeled a rightist, dismissed from his job, 
and sent off to perform manual labor in farms and factories around the Beijing area. 
His first wife, Beijing Middle School No.52 teacher Zheng Zhaonan 郑兆南, suffered 
repeated abuse at the hands of Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, because 
of her husband’s political background and her refusal to denounce their marriage. 
She eventually died from injuries suffered during “struggle sessions”, on the way to 
a hospital. Their two daughters experienced harassment and social discrimination for 
years, and were sent into the countryside. 
In 1979, Tang was rehabilitated and allowed to take up a post at the Beijing Museum 
for Natural History, where he became editor (later editor-in-chief) of the Great Nature 
magazine (Daziran Zazhi 大自然杂志), one of China’s earliest ecologically-themed 
periodicals, where he worked from 1980 to 1990. He also began extensive journalistic 
trips through China’s remote natural reserves. Later in life, Tang stated that nature 
“reclaimed” him after having spent decades as a social outcast (in which, as he says, 
only the duty of having to care for his two daughters prevented him from committing 
suicide like so many of his peers), and that the immersion in nature provided a deeply 
personal, emotional, in a sense therapeutic experience: In an interview originally 
broadcast Dec. 9, 2003 on the program “Green Space” on CCTV (China Central 
Television), he reflected on his early nature experiences 
When I came in touch with nature, I immediately felt at home. Once, my 
tour guide and I set up a shack on the top of a hill where we stayed for 
several days. We were free from any kind of outside interference. We 
hung our watches on the branches of a tree, and placed our toothpaste 
and toothbrushes by a creek. Monkeys were our only visitors. I feel that 
in Mother Nature one can find the most beautiful painting, the most 
touching melody and the most sophisticated philosophy. That is, nature 
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can give me everything. That sounds a little abstract, but I did begin to 
fall deeply in love with nature.88 
Tang’s biography suggests a comparison with that of other post-Mao writers whose 
life was shaped by the upheavals of Maoism, including contemporaries who share 
Tang’s experience of persecution and suffering, or the younger Zhiqing generation 
who were sent into the villages and up the mountains. As we have discussed in the 
introduction, literary representations of nature in these accounts play an important 
role. They are, however, by no means homogenous, but multi-facetted, depending 
on the author, and almost always serve as a literary device to address social, not 
environmental, dimensions: Some accounts, such as The Jungle, depict nature as a 
hostile and dangerous wilderness that serves as an allegoric image for an equally 
harsh and brutal social environment. For others, the same wilderness serves as the 
battlefield whose harshness merely underlines the heroism of the human struggle 
against the elements. Yet others manage to reconcile several perspectives on nature 
altogether in one text. In the case of Lao Gui’s Blood Red Sunset, the narrative 
establishes a contrasting, multi-dimensional structure in which the individual finds 
freedom and peace within a pastoral landscape removed from society, while the 
collective coercion exerted by society and the brutality of socialist re-education 
occurs against the backdrop of a merciless wilderness.  
There are strong indications that the initial impetus for Tang Xiyang’s drift towards 
nature did not follow any conservationist impulse, but the result of his experience of 
persecution and suffering: “Originally I did not hold any particular love for nature. 
It was society that abandoned me, and forced me to enter nature.” (AGWT 299) 
When Japanese friend Matsuyoshi (松芳) asks about Tang’s personal history during 
the Cultural Revolution and asks “How did you fall in love with nature?” he 
answered 
I repeat again what I have said at Sally’s home, and naturally also mention 
the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the “Great Proletarian Cultural 
                                                 
88 An English translation of the interview can be found on the Webpage of Friends of Nature (Ziran zhi 
you 自然之友), URL: http://www.fon.org.cn/content.php?aid=8766 (2011/07/11). 
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Revolution”. It has been those political movements that have expelled me 
from “society”, and forced me to enter nature.” (AGWT 299) 
How did Tang Xiyang manage to evolve from what essentially has to be understood 
as an escape from society towards a pro-active role in shaping green civil society in 
China? His early writings provide significant insight in this regard. Tang’s earliest 
article, “At Wuyishan, science is blossoming” (Wuyishan kai kexuehua 武夷山开科学花), 
was published in Great Nature Magazine on Sept. 8th 1981. The article consists of a 
report by Tang Xiyang who travels to Fujian province to report on the conditions at 
the "Wuyishan natural protection reservation" (Wuyishan ziran baohuqu 武夷山自然保
护区). After a round trip, heavy rain forces Tang to seek shelter at a “Research Center 
for the Prevention and Treatment of Snake-Related Injuries” located in Dazhulan, a 
humble operation located deep in the mountains. While enjoying the hospitality of 
the staff (which includes Tang being treated to local specialties such as dried bamboo 
shoots served with fresh snake meat), he comments on the working conditions at this 
“peculiar” (qite 奇特) work unit, “which has noteworthy traits that unfortunately are 
in short supply in the rest of this country” (ibid: 5): 
The piece itself is written in a highly conventional style, its language imbued with the 
political jargon demanded by the prevailing political conditions of the early 1980s. 
The title's reference to the “blossoming of science” is in lockstep with the ideological 
requirement to “seek truth from facts” (shishi qiu shi 实事求是), Deng Xiaoping’s 
abandonment of the ideological furor of the Cultural Revolution in favor of 
scientifically based development since 1978. The text’s thematic focus on a dedicated 
(socialist) work unit whose “hard work has carried fruit within the masses” (qunzhong 
zhong kaihua jieguo le 群众中开花结果了, ibid. 5) follows the literary conventions of 
Socialist Realism, especially the principles of partiynost (“party spirit”) and narodnost 
(patriotic devotion to the common people).89  
Tang’s report paints the picture of a selfless and heroic collective who only exists to 
serve the people, and who dutifully implements the enlightened directives provided 
by the current political regime. The workers are, as Tang exalts, “red as well as 
                                                 
89 For the legacy of Soviet-style socialist realism in general, and the role of the Russian hero in 
particular for modern Chinese fiction, see: Ng 1988. 
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professional” (you hong you zhuan 又红又专), meaning the display both the correct 
socialist revolutionary consciousness as well as a professional skill set. 90  The 
professional quality only briefly merits Tang’s attention (“they [the staff members] 
are on the forefront of medical research” (gongzuo zai yiliao keyan diyixian 工作在医疗
科研第一线), but it is especially the collective’s moral code, manifested in its egalitarian 
and democratic working style, that catches the author’s eye: Staff consists of 40 
people, tasks and responsibilities rotate for everyone, so that everybody is involved 
in all aspects of the work, and “nobody is left behind, no worker is unwanted”. The 
result is a superior work moral; apart from the research facility’s director, all the 
members consist of 16-26 year old young people who have not yet started a family. 
The director himself is so dedicated to his work that his wife abandoned him, and so 
far he has not yet restarted a family household. “This objective situation has resulted 
in them leading a form of communal (tuanjie 团结), intimate (qinmi 亲密) and collective 
life (jiti shenghuo 集体生活)”, and Tang’s report goes to great lengths to praise the 
superior work ethics of the people involved.  
What is interesting in our context is not the conventionality of the article, but rather 
how the naturescape in which the narration is set reinforces its argument. The main 
focus of the text is the world of men, not nature or any related ecological issue. Tang 
adopts a highly anthropocentric perspective that is primarily concerned with “good” 
human society. Nature relates to this question only inasmuch as that it is the 
immersion in nature that brings out the best in every individual, so that society's 
ideals can be realized to its fullest. It is noteworthy in this context that Tang does not 
paint a coherent naturescape in his report. Instead, concepts of nature oscillate 
between different perspectives on nature, depending on the larger point the author is 
trying to make. On the one hand, depictions of a pristine pastoral environment serve 
as the mirror for a human community that is not only morally superior, but whose 
moral outlook also conforms with the ideological requirements of the current 
political regime.   
                                                 
90 It should be noted here that in the context of Chinese political discourse, the emphasis of hong or 
zhuan has often shifted according to the respective dominant political faction. While the political winds 
during the Cultural Revolution favored Redness over professionalism, Deng Xiaoping quickly 
changed course in the opposite direction in order to stimulate economic growth. To label a collective 
both red and professional as Tang does has a decidedly utopian connotation) 
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From getting up in the morning, eating breakfast, to working, holding 
meetings, self-study, […] they all obey the faintest of commands. In order 
to concentrate their energy on their work, they even have rules against 
playing chess or cards apart from Saturday nights and Sundays. [...] Under 
the leadership of the more seasoned comrades, this collective dearly 
loves the sick, loves science, loves work. Just like the natural environment 
they live in is nearly free from contamination or pollution, amongst them 
they do not tolerate anarchy, selfishness, or liberalism. (ibid: 5, my 
emphasis) 
On the other hand, however, references to the harsh, untamed or hostile side of 
nature (the “wilderness” perspective) are employed to illustrate the heroic struggles 
of man against impossible odds, a trope that is very well established in Chinese 
socialist writing: Tang has a first-hand chance to witness the “collective force” (jiti de 
liliang 集体的力量 , ibid. 5) when after three days of consecutive rain, “vicious” 
(xiongmeng 凶猛) mountain torrents and flooding water threatens to sweep away the 
confines of the institute’s snake compound, used to harvest snake poison for research 
purposes:  
“Without anybody having to give a command, the young staff members 
and the old director throw away their umbrellas, take off their clothes, 
and jump waste-deep into the mud. While some start digging ditches, 
others scoop out the accumulated water. After a full half day of hard 
battle (ku zhan 苦战) they finally manage to save the snake compound 
they so painstakingly built.” 
Albeit addressing the relationship between man and nature, the text is primarily 
concerned with highlighting a model for a good society. There is no demarcation line 
between nature and society, but between mainstream Chinese society – which is 
presented as corrupt, unenlightened and brutish – and the new, superior human 
community found embedded within nature. Nature, in this perspective, serves as a 
temporary refuge that offers the necessary space to cultivate virtue and skills. Tang 
refers to the locality as a “place that brings forth human talent” (chu rencai de difang 
出人才的地方, ibid. 6), a prominent topic in Chinese intellectual history (which will be 
discussed later in detail).  Moreover, there is an implicit elitist understanding that the 
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necessary changes Tang wants to see necessitate the forming of an elite which will 
then implement these changes within broader society.  
The article suggests itself as a starting point for an understanding for Tang Xiyang’s 
political ideas because it comprises the nucleus of the argument that will be developed 
more fully in his later writings, namely, the crucial connection between nature, 
morality, and political legitimacy. It is this argument that Tang will develop later in 
his most famous work, A Green World Tour. 
IV.2  A Green World Tour 
In 1981, Tang met Marcia Bliss Marks, an American national and Harvard graduate 
specializing in cultural education; she had come over from New York to tour China’s 
natural parks and to study its wildlife. The two of them met in Xishuangbanna, an 
autonomous prefecture in the south-west province of Yunnan (Xishuangbana Daizu 
Zizhizhou 西双版纳傣族自治州) renowned for its rich biodiversity. (Its remote location 
and geographical particularities have made the region the last habitat for the rare 
Asian elephant in China.) Tang and Marks fell in love and five years later they were 
married. Together they extensively toured China’s nature reservations, and published 
their experiences in a collaborative work titled Living Treasures. An Odyssey Through 
China's Extraordinary Nature Reserves. The richly illustrated book was co-published in 
1987 in New York by Bantam Books and the New World Press in Beijing.91 The Chinese 
version, Ziran baohuqu tansheng 自然保护区探胜, won the National Award for Outstanding 
Popular-Scientific Writing in China the same year.  
In between 1989 to 1992, Marks and Tang engaged in a series of extensive travel trips 
around the world. Out of the notes taken during these travels emerged a book of great 
importance for the Chinese environmentalist movement, entitled A Green World Tour 
(Huanqiu Lüsexing 环球绿色行), published in 1993. The book contains the couple’s 
account of their experiences (often on a surprisingly emotional and personal level), 
interviews conducted with a great number of environmentalists, government officials, 
                                                 
91 Marks, Marcia B. and Tang Xiyang (1987): Living Treasures. An Odyssey Through China's Extraordinary 
Nature Reserves; New York, Bantam Books. 
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nature enthusiasts and common citizens, along with considerations about how the 
learned relates to the Chinese situation.  
A Green World Tour exists in several editions: Following Marks’ death in 1996, the 
book was re-published in 1997, in a significantly re-worked version, and an English 
translation of the book was published 1999 in China by the Foreign Languages Press. 
The main difference between the 1993 and the 1997 version lies in the fact that, while 
the 1993 version contains chapters on the former Soviet Union, Germany, 
Switzerland, France, England, the United States, and Canada (in this order), the 1997 
revised edition has been significantly expanded to include extensive chapters on 
China and its environmental situation (the chapter addressing the former Soviet 
Union having been dropped). It is the 1997 revised edition that is repeatedly cited as 
one of the finest and most influential examples of Chinese environmental writing, 
sometimes as its “green bible” (Lüse shengjing 绿色圣经)92, and it played a big role in 
introducing global environmental ideas to a Chinese readership who before had had 
relatively little contact with such notions. Moreover, a selected compilation of essays, 
published in 2004 under the title Wrong! Wrong! Wrong! – Tang Xiyang’s green thinking 
and critical suggestions from one-hundred authors (Cuo! Cuo! Cuo! Tang Xiyang lüse chensi 
yu baijia pingdian 错! 错! 错! 唐锡阳绿色沉思与百家评点 [CCC]) features several (revised) 
chapters from the 1997 edition. Additionally, CCC features commentaries, 
annotations and brief remarks by other Chinese environmentalists, printed mostly at 
the margins alongside the main texts provided by Tang Xiyang. This analysis will 
pay closer attention to those chapters (and the changes made between editions), since 
it can be reasonably assumed that they contain content the author deems important.  
IV.2.1 Nature and Morality in “A Green World Tour” 
Let us continue to follow the relationship between nature and morality initially 
suggested by Tang’s earlier text and trace it through A Green World Tour. In order to 
avoid the following account venturing towards the descriptive or anecdotal, I will 
                                                 
92 This assessment is not only based on numerous written sources, but was expressed repeatedly to me 
while interacting with Chinese environmentalists while in Beijing in 2010-2011. 
  
107 
 
 
Tang Xiyang and the creation of China’s green avant-garde 
 
  
focus on the chapters dealing with the United States, with material on other countries 
woven in when they strike a chord with the general argument. 
Tang and Marks start off their tour when they are invited to give a talk at Principia 
College, a Christian Science Academy in Saint Louis, Missouri. America- As if I had 
walked into another world. (美国  -- 好像走进了另一个世界  (AGWT 1997 quote from 
1993:193) Tang takes the opportunity to contemplate the relation between nature and 
morals: 
After arriving at the academy, to tell the truth, I quite envied these people 
not only for the beautiful [natural] environment, but also for the 
wonderful world of communal spirit they were living in. [This world] is 
composed of the rivers, the forests, the flowers, the tolling of bells, the 
strive for academic achievement, humanity's love, and the God that exists 
inside one’s soul. When the [natural] environment is beautiful, then 
man's soul is even more beautiful.  (AGWT: 193) 
This passage invokes images we have encountered in the earlier article discussed 
above; it establishes the same reciprocal relationship between the intactness of the 
natural world and that of the social moral system. The border between the two realms, 
nature and society, vanishes in the passage quoted above, so that the natural world 
(flowers, rivers, forests) merges with the signs and activities of the human world to 
form a wonderful harmonious one. Pristine nature and good social life become 
inseparable, and it is hard to discern from this passage which element presupposes 
the other. As Tang’s stay continues, the connection between the two is fleshed out 
even more clearly. The visitor from China marvels at the accommodations provided 
for him and his wife (whose interior furniture and decorating have – as he stresses – 
not been bought, but have been donated by alumni and donors), and notices the 
absence of locks, which he takes as a sign of the superior ethics of his American hosts:  
As we arrive at the office and the teaching rooms, we discover that they 
are just like the rooms in our hostel: At night the doors are not locked, 
and at day everything is wide open. It seems as if there are no thieves 
around here, and nobody tries to profit at another's expense. As I put it, 
everything is up to God. I am not a religious man, but I do like religious 
people - devout and honest religious people; I do not believe in God or 
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any other deity, but I believe that in their hearts there is a God. Should 
this be the God embraced by hundreds of millions of people, then his 
origin would be mankind’s intuitive knowledge of morality (laizi renlei de 
liangzhi 来自人类的良知): that what calls man to perform charitable deeds, 
not to do evil. I am greatly distressed by some social phenomena in 
today's China: Confucius is gone, Lei Feng is gone, religious ethics and 
morals are gone; moreover the evil influence of the Cultural Revolution 
remains, mixed with the mold spread by the contemporary market 
economy, it has corroded the souls of so many people. The Chinese have 
an old saying: It takes 10 years for a tree to grow, but it takes a century to 
rear a generation of talented people (shinian shumu, bainian shuren 十年
树木, 百年树人). To cut down a forest is a distressing loss, but to destroy an 
entire generation's or several generations' spirit, that is truly horrible. 
The Christian religion of his hosts, for Tang, is hence merely a substitute concept for 
public morality in general. In his lament on the environmental as well as social 
situation in China, any ethical system would be better than the current state of affairs. 
Traditional values (Confucius), or the advocacy for selfless sacrifice in the name of 
Communism (Lei Feng), are all better than nothing. It is notable that Tang does not 
mention the negative environmental legacy of neither Christianity, or traditional 
China, or Maoism. Confucianism traditionally regarded untamed wilderness with 
suspicion and distrust, and Lei Feng as a cultural icon is maybe most associated with 
the ideological furor of high Maoism and its relentless assault on China’s natural 
environment. Tang apparently does not see any contradiction between a system of 
ethics and environmentalism. In his account, selflessness and communal spirit are 
either an automatic result of mankind living amidst pristine nature, or it will lead to 
such a pristine nature.  It is not always entirely clear in these passages whether it 
needs intact nature to create intact morality, or the other way around. A reading of 
all the texts of Tang suggests that the relationship is entirely mutual. 
In a later chapter of AGWT describing the couple’s trip to Canada93, Tang Xiyang 
takes the opportunity to discuss the relationship between natural habitat and morals, 
                                                 
93 In the 1993 version, this chapter is entitled “From a country with many people to one with few 
people (“从人多的国家到人少的国家”). In CCC it is reprinted under the title “Many people amounts 
to disaster and few people is bliss” (“人多成灾和人少是福”) (317-321). The CCC version has been 
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especially overpopulation. Tang elaborates this first basic observation into an 
argument that illustrates the  difference in population density for a society: “My first 
feeling: If there are fewer people, then that gives people the freedom to live up to the 
fullest of their abilities. Here I have become aware of how precious a human being is, 
and that it’s unacceptable to waste a human being’s potential.”(306) Tang expresses 
pleasant surprise not only about how friendly everybody treats him and his wife, but 
he cannot but remark on the leisurely, relaxed atmosphere that pervades the airport. 
He contrasts this with his experiences from China where (as certainly anybody who 
has visited China in this lifetime) for example bus drivers constantly are shouting and 
abusing the passengers, a behavior Tang can sympathize with due to the larger 
pressure that must weight upon one single man forced to deal with so many 
passengers at the same time. “With a small population, [the individual] human being 
receives respect.” Again, this is derived from personal observation on his treatment 
at the airport. He gives numerous examples how he and his wife (who lest we forget 
are both elderly people at the time of writing) are treated with much courtesy. Again, 
this positive experience is immediately foiled by a reference to the dire circumstances 
of public morality in China:  
“This sort of behavior might come natural to Canadians, but for a Chinese 
it is quite unusual. When I think about the situation at home, my heart 
bleeds. To be honest, I am not a man without national pride (minzu 
zizunxin 民族自尊心), but the real situation is quite painful: With so many 
people, there’s shoving, venting anger, quarrelling. China likes to think of 
itself as a land of propriety and righteousness, but nowadays there is no 
consideration for neither of the two, but only for getting ahead through 
guanxi and cunning. Other than that, it’s all about people bothering each 
other, making each other miserable, shoving, bullying, and cheating each 
other. How can someone give consolation so somebody if he or she 
                                                 
edited, although this is not noted, so that it is now shorter in some parts while other themes have been 
expanded on. Moreover, the text is now amended by short commentaries from other authors, printed 
at the margins of the main text. This has the effect of stressing certain themes of the text, as I will 
explain shortly. The text in the 2004 version reads more concisely because certain more mundane 
observations in the original versions have been deleted: In the 1993 original, Tang provides a lengthy 
account on the excellent service on the plane and the various entertainment features.  
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herself is not at ease? How can someone who finds no respect anywhere 
respect somebody else? 
At this point where the two versions deviate from each other in a rather small but 
rather meaningful way. In the original 1993 version, Tang in the following writes: 
“As the ancients say: He who respects others is constantly respected by them.” (古人
云: 敬人者, 人恒敬之.) To a reader with some knowledge on Chinese philosophy this 
quote, and especially the topic of the reciprocity of personal conduct, bears 
connotations with the writings of Mencius (372 – 289 BC), arguably the most famous 
Confucian after the master himself. Tang Xiyang here does not bother to provide the 
source for this quote, however. This is remedied in the 1997 (and the 2004) version 
where Tang re-states the argument much more forcefully supported by a more 
comprehensive quote. “Mencius said: ‘The benevolent man loves others. The man of 
propriety shows respect to others. He who loves others is constantly loved by them. 
He who respects others is constantly respected by them.’ (愛人者人恆愛之, 敬人者人恆敬
之 .) 94  By quoting Mencius, the author re-claims the ideals of propriety and 
righteousness for China, but not for today’s China, but that of antiquity. In Tang’s 
framing, it is now the Canadians in whose “proper” moral conduct the teaching of the 
revered sage are upheld, and it is the modern Chinese who are in defiance of their 
own heritage. This of course is a familiar argumentative strategy to evoke not only 
an emotional response from the audience, but also to show a way out of the dilemma 
by returning to long-established social patterns which are not foreign after all, but has 
been part of “the self” all along, albeit forgotten or disregarded.  
IV.2.2 The trope of the traveling scholar 
As it might have become apparent from these first introductory quotes, Tang’s Green 
World Tour is as much about China as it is about the Western countries he visits. 
Indeed, his writings strongly underline a theoretical argument advanced in Clifford’s 
seminal 1986 Writing Culture, in which he argues that all anthropology has to be read 
                                                 
94 The quote is fromMengzi 孟子 (離婁下 - Li Lou, Part B). The full quote in context runs: “Mencius 
said: That whereby the superior man is distinguished from other men is what he preserves in his heart 
- namely, benevolence and propriety. The benevolent man loves others. The man of propriety shows 
respect to others. He who loves others is constantly loved by them. He who respects others is 
constantly respected by them.” 
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as a commentary not on the Other, but of the Self. The construction of The Other in 
anthropological writing have hence less to do with objective descriptions of other 
cultural systems, but rather has a sociopolitical thrust aimed at the readership at 
home. 
Tang certainly is not the first Chinese intellectual traveling to distant lands in order 
to acquire knowledge, indeed one of the main modes by which foreign ideas have 
been introduced to China is through the means of cosmopolitan travel. Throughout 
the text, Tang Xiyang is quite self-conscious about the international as well as the 
historic context his work is set in: “If my trips abroad can be compared to The Journey 
of the West of the Tang dynasty priest Sanzang [Xuanzang, M.L.], whose mission was 
to bring back Buddhist sutras, then what I am after is ‘the green sutra’.” (AGWT 
1993: 221) In the foreword of the 1993 version he writers: 
China has a long history and a distinguished ancient culture, yet for the 
past century and a half she has been bullied and treated highhandedly. 
As a result, many Chinese, including me, are oversensitive and defensive. 
The mere mention of “learning from other countries” invites criticism of 
worshipping and putting blind faith in things foreign. To berate one’s own 
country is to run the risk of being accused of disloyalty to one’s ancestors. 
I must run the gauntlet of these attitudes, because my task is to study 
other people’s experiences honestly and sincerely, to see other people’s 
strong points. If I sometimes talk about other people’s shortcomings, it is 
to keep is from going down the same disastrous road. A Chinese moral 
principle is to see more good in others, more flaws in oneself. This 
principle can apply to countries as well. Of course, blind worship of things 
foreign and forgetting one’s ancestors do occur, and I detest them both, 
but they are not the same as this principle. One purpose of this book is 
to view the world from the standpoint of China and to view China from 
the standpoint of the outside world. 
Liang Congjie 梁从诫, grandson of Liang Qichao, founder of China’s first and most 
influential environmentalist NGO (Friends of Nature) and one of China’s most 
respected environmentalists, provides a foreword for the 1997 edition which states 
that 
  
112 
 
 
Tang Xiyang and the creation of China’s green avant-garde 
 
  
The new edition of A Green World Tour is an extremely special and rare 
piece of environmentalist literature. One can say that it combines the 
Chinese and the Western, the ancient and the contemporary (中、外、
古、今) as well as the graphic and the textual, emotion and knowledge (
图、文、情、知) each in well-balanced measure.95 
To fully appreciate the historic precedent in which Tang Xiyang is writing, it is 
helpful to look for a short moment at some of Tang’s literary predecessors and see 
not only what their impressions were but also how they present their experiences 
abroad rhetorically to a Chinese audience.  
We might consider Liang Qichao’s 梁启超 travel account to the United States. Liang 
Qichao (1873-1929) visited the United States in 1903. By that time, he had already 
made a name for himself as one of China’s most influential reform-minded 
intellectuals, journalists, and writers of his time. Associated with the reform 
movement of his mentor Kang Youwei 康有为, he had been forced to flee China and 
settle in Japan in 1898 after the Qing government had put a bounty on his head. He 
reached the United States in 1903, were he stayed for five months. He traveled the 
new world extensively by railroad, crossing the continent twice, and made it a point 
to meet as many persons as possible, among them President Theodore Roosevelt. 
Returning to China via Canada, he recorded what he had learned in his famous Notes 
From a Journey to the New Continent (Xin dalu ji 新大陆游记). His reportage provided a 
prime source of insight for Liang’s peers back at home on the way in which a 
powerful nation was politically structured.  
Liang’s main motivation for his travel was to learn the reasons behind America’s rise 
from a peripheral British colony to a powerful player on the world stage. Hence, his 
observations are mostly political in nature or at the least deal with socio-political 
differences between the United States and China under the Qing. Although “an 
undertone of marvel and awe” (Chang 1971: 245) pervades in Liang’s account, he 
did not perceive America through rose-colored lenses and was acutely aware of what 
he perceived as US society’s shortcomings. His writing expresses concern about the 
power of monetary trust funds, he remarks on the huge differences between the poor 
                                                 
95 Quote reprinted in Liang Congjie 2002: 243. 
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and the rich in New York City, and he is aware of the problem of America’s troubled 
racial relations when he gives an account of the lynching of a black man he read 
about in a newspaper. It speaks to Liang intelligence and analytical powers that he 
does not overly simplify American society or culture. In this preface, he 
acknowledges that the United States is “difficult to summarize” and that America 
was a “complex civilization”. It is maybe for that reason that Liang chose to focus 
his account on the conduct of American citizens, and to draw contrasts between 
American and Chinese national character: 
“From what has been discussed above, the weaknesses of the Chinese 
people can be listed as follows: 
1. Our character is that of clansmen rather than citizens. Chinese social 
organization is based on family and clan as the unit rather than on the 
individual, what is called “regulating one’s family before ruling the 
country”. [A quote from Daxue, M.L.] In my opinion, though the power of 
self-government of the Aryans of the West was developed earlier, our 
Chinese system of local self-government was just as good. Why is it that 
they could form a nation-state and we could not? The answer is that what 
they developed was the city system of self-government, while we 
developed a clan system of self-government. [...] That Chinese can be 
clansmen but cannot be citizens; I came to believe more strongly after 
traveling in North America.” 
2. We have a village mentality and not a national mentality. I heard 
Roosevelt’s speech to the effect that the most urgent task for the 
American people is to get rid of the village mentality, by which he meant 
people’s feelings of loyalty to their own town and state. From the point 
of view of history, however, America has been successful in exercising a 
republican form of government precisely because this local sentiment 
was there at the start, and so it cannot be completely faulted. But 
developed to excess it becomes an obstacle to nation-building… We 
Chinese have developed it too far. Who could it be just the San Francisco 
Chinese? It is true everywhere at home, too. 
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3. We can accept only despotism and cannot enjoy freedom. [...] When I 
look at all the societies of the world, none is so disorderly as the Chinese 
community in San Francisco. Why? The answer is freedom. The character 
of the Chinese in China is not superior to those of San Francisco, but at 
home they are governed by officials and restrained by fathers and elder 
brothers. […] 
With such countrymen, would it be possible to practice the election 
system? [...] To speak frankly, I have not observed the character of 
Chinese at home to be superior to those in San Francisco. On the contrary, 
I find their level of civilization far inferior to those in San Francisco. [...] 
Even if there are some Chinese superior to those in San Francisco, it is just 
a small matter of degree; their lack of qualification for enjoying freedom 
is just the same...” (Translation in: Arkush and Lee 1989: 92) 
The passage points to a important correlation between the focus of attention that 
characterizes both Liang Qichao's and Tang Xiyang's writing. Both contrast the 
quality of national character, ethical conduct, and individual bearing of the Chinese 
people with that of the people they visit. While in his case, Liang is infuriated by the 
lack of nationalist or patriotic sentiment displayed by his compatriots – personal 
qualities that Liang Qichao deems important for the political task most important to 
him, the building of a Chinese nation state, Tang is equally concerned with the 
discrepancies between the environmentally conscious Westerners and the Chinese 
whose disregard for nature equals their disregard for each other. 
Similarly, references to discrepancies in moral character permeate A Green World Tour: 
Tang and Marks head for one of the highlights of their American nature tour, the 
Yosemite National Park. As they engage on a bus tour through the reservation area, 
whose natural majesty immediately elicits a strong emotional response from Tang 
Xiyang, he takes the chance to strike up a conversation with bus driver who also 
functions as their tour guide. He is surprised to find the driver so knowledgeable 
about the geological and political history of Yosemite Park, and is even more 
surprised when he eventually learns that the man is a university professor called 
Richard D. Dodson who in his spare time volunteers to chauffeur visitors around the 
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park. “A university professor and a bus driver at the same time?” Tang wonders, 
“That is too big of a distance as far as Chinese is concerned.” 
One is that the attitude towards our profession is different: Chinese 
intellectuals have a traditional notion, called “Officialdom is the natural 
outlet for good scholars” (学而优则仕). Although I do not concur with this 
saying, I would have never thought that ‘good scholars’ could also 
become bus drivers; another one is that we express love for different 
things: we Chinese love reputation, social status, children, our families, 
our nation, but to love nature this is not something that comes 
passionately or naturally. (AGWT 1993: 237) 
This theme of humble and impeccable personal conduct in the service of the 
environment is a red thread which the reader encounters repeatedly in Tang Xiyang’s 
writing. In the CCC version of a chapter in which Tang details his trip to France, 
environmental writer Shen Xiaohui 沈孝辉 provides an anecdote attached as one of 
the many side captions printed alongside Tang’s own writings: Next to the article by 
Tang, the reader encounters a photo, taken from the inside of a car, showing an 
elegant Western man in a pinstripe business suit on a bicycle, dashing by the lens 
with a friendly and relaxed expression on his face. The caption by Shen reads: 
“France’s Minister of Environmental Protection, riding his bicycle to work.” [The 
photo is taken in July 2002, the man on the photo is Yves Cochet, minister for the 
environment 2001-2002 in the administration of Lionel Jospin]. The text next to the 
photo reads: “Although the angle [of the photo] is not perfect, it is very precious: It 
actually captures an environment protection official matching his words with deeds 
(yan xing yizhi 言行一致), and practicing what he preaches (shenti lixing 身体力行). […] 
This sort of environmental consciousness and behavior has elicited a lot of respect 
from the people.” (CCC 282) 
When Tang and Marks are being picked up by members of the American “National 
Audubon Society”96 to stay at their home in the state of Washington, they and their 
                                                 
96 The National Audubon Society is an US-American non-profit environmental organization dedicated 
to nature conservation. Incorporated in 1905, Audubon is one of the oldest of such organizations in 
the world and uses science, education and grassroots advocacy to advance its conservation mission. 
It is named in honor of John James Audubon, a Franco-American ornithologist and naturalist who 
painted, cataloged, and described the birds of North America in his famous book Birds of America 
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host begin a chat on the national character and differences between the Chinese and 
the Americans: In a passage that in its language very much echoes what Liang 
Qichao had to say almost one century earlier, Tang comments favorably on the 
national character of his American hosts: 
I even like the American people better: I like your spirit for democracy, for 
freedom, independence, and self-confidence. Americans are not 
bureaucratic, they are not afraid of doing something unconventional, 
they dare to open up new paths to success, hence America’s potential is 
inexhaustible. (AGWT 1993: 214) 
The relationship between morality and nature, resp. love for nature, is maybe most 
poignantly expressed by Marcia Barks. Just as she and her husband are about to leave 
Washington State, they receive farewell gifts from their hosts, a gesture that prompts 
Marks to say that “everyone who loves nature is a good person.” (Re'ai daziran de ren 
dou shi haoren 热爱大自然的人都是好人.) Tang’s reaction follows: 
Indeed, there is a philosophy behind this remark. If everyone dearly loved 
nature, everyone dearly loved the mountains and rivers, the birds and 
beasts, the flowers and weeds; if everyone pursued nature’s beauty, 
spiritual beauty, then everyone’s vision would be as if standing on a high 
mountain peak --- nothing but clouds and mountains up to the horizon, 
and everyone’s heart embracing this vast ocean – without bounds, and 
everyone would find his or her proper place in this grand, mysterious, 
beautiful natural world including all living creatures. Well then, not only 
would there be harmony and beauty between man and nature, but also 
amongst men themselves. For how could there still be indifference, 
selfishness, envy, discrimination, hatred, terror, or war? (CCC 153) 
In the CCC reprint of this chapter, this statement is framed by two side captions 
echoing Marks’ statement. They read as follows: ‘ 
“Everyone who loves nature is a good person.” When I read this 
statement by Marcia Marks, I had the feeling as if I was meeting an 
                                                 
published in sections between 1827 and 1838. 
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intimate friend. I think the same way, and that is the way I make friends. 
Nature will never betray a friend, she [她] will only give, and never 
demand anything in return. Anybody who loves nature will be gentle and 
kindhearted [心地善良]. (Zhong Anhe 钟安河, Beijing Institute for Surveying 
and Mapping)  (CCC 153) 
Marcia Marks’ “Everyone who loves nature is a good person” is a 
statement from experience, the language of a philosopher, the plain and 
simple truth, and it applies for China as well as the West, for the past as 
well as for today. Chen Taoming and Li Bai loved nature, they were good 
men. Cai Jing 蔡京 and Yan Song 严嵩 only lusted for power and money, 
they were bad men. (Yi Xian伊贤, former editor-in-chief of Gansu Poetry 
and Lyrics, Lanzhou) (CCC 153) 
To address the background of this statement: Cai Jing (1047–1126), was a 
government official who lived during the Northern Song Dynasty. He also features 
prominently as an antagonist and villain in one of China's Four Great Classical 
Novels, the Water Margin. In it, Cai Jing is depicted as a corrupt, treacherous and 
politically ambitious government official who oppresses the people and opposes the 
upright outlaws of Liangshan fighting the good cause. Yan Song (1480–1567) was a 
corrupt Ming Chinese Chief Grand Secretary. He served as the prime minister under 
Jiajing Emperor, a monarch who shirked his responsibilities as emperor and devoted 
much of his time to sensual pleasures and Taoist practices. Under Yan Song, the 
nation fell into an era of moral decadence and corruption, where righteous officers 
were sidelined and the Ming national strength fell rapidly. The fact that there exists 
a Chinese opera called “Beating Yan Song” (Da Yan Song 打嚴嵩) speaks to the level 
of his notoriety within Chinese history. The invocation of such historic examples 
points to the fact that within the Chinese social imaginary, morality hence is not just 
a matter of personal ethics; it is a crucial factor for achieving a functioning society 
and a government responsive to the demands of the people.  
This theme of responsiveness of government officials to citizen input is another 
important element. At Yosemite Park, Tang and Marks set up a meeting with a Mr. 
Dell, representative of the US Congress House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on 
National Parks and Environmental Protection [now the Subcommittee on National 
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Parks, Forests and Public Lands]. Tang asks him “The United States have so many 
grassroots organizations (minzhong zuzhi), criticizing the government for this, or for 
that, does this not bother you? He [the government official] cheerfully responds: ‘I 
like that actually! […] Precisely because I can listen to different voices I am able to 
avoid mistakes. They do not bother me, they are helping me.’ Tang: ‘Please describe 
the use of grassroots organizations from the government’s perspective.’ Without 
hesitation he responds: ‘Ah, their usefulness is really great, the government’s 
capabilities can by no means replace them.’” This reaction prompts Tang to reflect 
on his experience with Chinese officials: 
I have worked as a journalist for many years, and in China I have met many 
government officials, and among them were some hard working and 
plain living good officials, those who were unselfish, in touch with the 
realities of life, and who worked resolutely to get things done. But those 
magnanimous people who listen to both sides of an argument are hard 
to find. On the other hand, most officials still like to arrogate all power to 
themselves while shedding off all responsibility, engage in secretiveness, 
and are only interested in the prestige of public office. I have even 
encountered those sycophantic meetings were one person thought 
himself to be the most important person in the world, and – as they say 
– you cannot touch a tiger’s behind. [Chinese proverb: authority cannot 
be questioned]. Unfortunately, when I compare this situation in China 
with the demeanor of this US official, then the difference is all-too 
obvious. (CCC 301)  
We are now at the heart of the argument: Tang's writing establishes a connection 
between nature and morality, a morality which in turn again is the basis for political 
legitimacy. Nature plays a key role in this regard, not just as the object of political 
advocacy, but much more, it is also through the subjective, individual experience of 
nature in which a new avant-garde is to be developed. As Tang himself puts it in the 
introduction to CCC: “Be nature’s slave, be society’s ruler (dang ziran de nuli, dang 
shehui de zhuren 当自然的奴隶, 当社会的主人). (CCC: 004) 
There is a strong utilitarian current in Tang’s writing, one that views nature as a realm 
that enables to learn about oneself, as an individual’s opportunity to train one's 
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abilities, both in terms of physical fitness, but even more in terms of character; 
willpower, compassion, understanding, and respect. Indeed, reading A Green World 
Tour, one is struck how little it offers the reader in terms of concrete ecological, 
environmental, or technical expertise, and how strongly it focuses on human ethics.  
This call for a new morality receives its socio-political relevance from the fact that it 
is firmly based on long-established cultural patterns. Within the Chinese social 
imaginary, morality has never been just an end to itself, but has always been a key 
factor for the legitimacy to political rule of an elite in possession of this morality. So 
it is said in the Book of Rites, one of the five Confucian classics: 
Duke Ai asked about government. The Master said: 'The government of 
Wan and Wu is exhibited in the Records, the tablets of wood and bamboo. 
Let there be the men, and their government would again flourish; but 
without the men, their government must cease. With the right men the 
growth of government is rapid, Oust as in the earth the growth of 
vegetation is rapid. Government is like an easily-growing rush. Therefore 
the exercise of government depends on getting the proper men. Such 
men are to be got by the ruler's own character. That character is to be 
cultivated by his pursuing the right course. That course is to be cultivated 
by benevolence. Benevolence is the chief element in humanity, and the 
greatest exercise of it is in the love of relatives. Righteousness is the 
accordance of actions with what is right, and the greatest exercise of it is 
in the honour paid to the worthy. The decreasing measures in the love of 
relatives, and the steps in the honour paid to the worthy, are produced 
by the principle of propriety. When those in inferior situations do not 
obtain the confidence of their superiors, the people cannot be governed 
successfully. Therefore the wise ruler should not neglect the cultivation 
of his character. (Liji [The book of rites]: Book XXVIII, Gongyong Section II, 
in the 1885 Legge translation: 312-313) 
Within the Chinese imaginaire, the possession of moral authority is one of the key 
factors for the legitimacy of and access to political rule. Holcombe in “The Exemplar 
State” stresses the importance of moral authority as the base for political legitimacy 
for Imperial China. Ever since Confucianism had begun its rise as the prevalent 
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school of political philosophy in China, it had been the possession of the knowledge 
of the li 礼, the rites – and the moral authority that came with that knowledge – that 
endowed the literari class (shi 士) with legitimacy as the natural ruling class. Only this 
moral capital enabled the literati to hold higher status than any other group, despite 
their material and military weakness when compared to the generals and nobility: 
“The reason émigré aristocrats from the north were able to make the Eastern Chin 
Dynasty prosper in spite of their lack of means of material coercion is intimately 
connected to their fluency in the language of the li.”(Holcombe 1989: 106) 
At the dawn of China’s entry into modernity, it was again the national character of 
the Chinese people that drew the ire of Chinese patriots lamenting the demise of their 
country in the face of Western aggression. Hence, when Marxism and Leninism were 
introduced to China, its ideology could count on a firmly established social imaginary 
to advocate for the creation of The New Man (Cheng 2009). Now self-cultivation 
was advocated on behalf of the New Man to overcome the old order. Scholars (see 
e.g. Svensson 2002: 138) writing on the origins of modern China have pointed out 
that there is a certain irony in the fact that the emphasis for the cultivation of the New 
Socialist Man resembles so closely the Confucian concern for self-cultivation (zixiu 
自修) of the junzi 君子, the Confucian gentleman or superior man, but also note that it 
is precisely the Confucian heritage that enabled the Chinese communists to express 
their ideas in a familiar language and appeal to an long-established social imaginary.97 
“The Confucian belief in the ‘superior man’ dovetailed neatly with the Leninist 
concept of the ‘vanguard party’ and the Stalinist example of the ‘great leader’.” 
(Gittings 2005: 48)  
In the context of Chinese modernization discourse, the quality of a nation’s people 
became known as suzhi 素质 (“human quality”), the possession or lack of which 
would determine a people’s readiness to achieve its status as a “modern” society 
                                                 
97 This is not only true for the sinicized version of Communism known as Maoism. The idealistic 
youth movement who demanded to “Smash the black shop of Confucius” on May 4th 1919 dovetailed 
into various political movements, among which the nationalist Guomindang party employed the same 
strategy: In 1934, Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), advocated the "New Life Movement" which was to 
rally the Chinese people against the Communists and build up morale in a nation that was besieged 
with corruption, factionalism, and opium addiction. While he re-affirmed Confucian values through 
an emphasis on the Confucian notion of self-cultivation and correct living, both great political 
movements of China im- or explicitly employed the idea of creating a new Chinese citizen for their 
own political agenda.   
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based on Western models. Nyiri notes that the idea of "population quality" would 
include a wide range of attributes, including “manners, hygiene, discipline, education 
and competitive open-minded thinking, but which – depending on the context – can 
also include upright morality, a correct political stand and correct lifestyle and 
consumption choices.”98 
Chen Duxiu 陈独秀, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, in a 
"Warning to the Youth" (Jinggao Qingnian 敬告青年) published in New Youth on Sept. 
15th 1915 called upon the Chinese Youth to “Be independent, not servile!” (自主的而
非奴隶的 ). He stressed the need for China to emulate Europe's “History of 
Emancipation": “Emancipation means freeing oneself from the bondage of slavery 
and achieving a completely independent and free personality [my emphasis].” He 
contrasted this free personality with the "slavish morality" of the Chinese ancien 
régime, and called upon his peers to be “aggressive, not complacent.”  
The reference to the “vanguard” is significant in this respect since it points to the 
essentially elitist attitude of the New Man movement. Just as Confucianism strove to 
create a stratum of superior men for whom the cultivation of virtue formed the 
legitimacy base to be ruling class of Imperial China, the New Man was meant to be 
the spearhead of a new elite that found its organizational form in the Chinese 
Communist Party. Literature played an important example in the advocacy of the 
New Man. Among the many texts in this regard, hardly any one exceeds the 
importance of Ostrovsky’s How the Steel Was Tempered (published in the Soviet Union 
in 1934).99 Its protagonist is the young Ukrainian worker Pavel Korchagin who, bed-
ridden and diagnosed with tuberculosis, tells his life's story, and the arduous struggle 
of how he became a devoted Bolshevik. The book “serves as an important link in a 
socio-cultural project, binding the making of the socialist new person to the symbolic 
building of a new socialist state.” (He 2010: 394) The book was translated into 
Chinese under the title Gangtie shi zenyang liancheng de 钢铁是怎样炼成的. The character 
lian 炼 originally means “to temper” metal, but in the course of the development of 
                                                 
98 See: Nyiri 2006: 88. On the concept of suzhi, see also: Anagnost 2004. 
99 For a detailed reception history of this important book in China, see: HE Donghui 2010. 
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the modern Chinese vernacular took on a metaphoric sense as “to practice”, or “to 
train”, in no small measure due to the introduction of Soviet writing in China. 
In this context, Liu Shaoqi’s 刘少奇 “How to be a good Communist”, first delivered 
in 1939 as a series of lecture at the Institute for Marxism and Leninism in Yan’an, is 
maybe the best-known example for this form of “neo-Confucian” (de Bary/Lufrano 
1999: 427) socialist writing. Its original title translates as The Cultivation of Party 
Members, employing the same phrase (zixiu) as the Confucian tradition. The praxis of 
constant improvement through self-criticism within the CCP to no small degree 
developed under the influence of this idea.100  
For both the traditional Chinese as well as the Communist notion of self-cultivation, 
nature plays a key role, albeit with radical different perspective on the role of nature 
itself. Zhuge Liang 诸葛亮 is arguably one of the most famous examples of the genius 
developing his skills while hiding away from society within nature. He spent years in 
seclusion in a remote mountain site, developing his skills (cai 才) in statecraft and 
military strategy and cultivating his virtue (de 德). However, when the time arrives, 
he is ready to leave nature and re-enter the world of men: Being sought out by the 
rightful heir to the Han throne, Liu Bei 刘备, he lends his skill to the righteous cause, 
leading the armies of Shu to battle against the treacherous Cao Cao 曹操.101 The 
superiority of his character not only served Zhuge Liang well in war, but also as the 
prime minister after the establishment of the independent kingdom of Shu: 
He held absolute command but did not neglect the li, and conducted the 
affairs of the ruler without suspicion from the citizens. In this way I 
believe the lord, his ministers, and the people's hearts happily upheld 
him. He pursued the law with severity, but the people submitted with 
pleasure; and in his use of the people he exhausted their strength, yet 
there was no resentment below. (quote found in Holcombe 1989: 105) 
                                                 
100 Liu Shaoqi is said to have had a sign in his office quoting the Confucian saying Master yourself, 
reinstate the rites. (keji fuli 克己复礼 ), another often-quoted example of the continuity between 
Confucianism and Chinese Socialism.  
101 On Zhuge Liang as the recluse archetype of the “moral hero” who awaits the fortuitous time to 
claim high office, see: Berkowitz 2000: 22-35. 
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Communism, on the other hand, developed its notion of self-strengthening on the 
basis of an adversarial relationship between man and nature. In his youth, Mao 
Zedong himself used to wander into the mountains surrounding Changsha along 
with like-minded friends as a physical exercise, swim in icy rivers and ponds, abstain 
from eating, or sleep in the courtyard rather than a bed to toughen his body and 
strengthen his willpower: The biography on the Childhood and youth of comrade Mao 
Zedong by Emi Xiao (or Xiao San 肖三, 1896-1983), a childhood friend of Mao who 
later would go on to become an important member of China’s young Communist 
party, contains an entire chapter entitled “How he [Mao] diligently practiced self-
cultivation” (Ta shi zenzang keku zixiude 他是怎样刻苦自修的). In Emi Xiao’s memoirs, 
nature provides the main antagonist for physical challenges for him and his young 
friends, but also the main opportunity for youthful self-discovery and adventure: On 
their excursion into the mountains around Changsha, Mao and his co-students would 
expose their naked bodies to the elements, something that Mao used to call “sun 
baths”, “wind baths”, and “rain baths”. To train their voices, they would shout at 
trees, or climb onto mountain tops and scream Tang poems into the wind at the top 
of their lungs. (Xiao 1951: 62) One of Mao’s diary entries famously reflects his 
understanding of nature: To struggle against Heaven, what delight. To struggle against earth, 
what delight. To struggle against Man, what boundless delight. (Yu tian dou, yu di dou, yu 
ren dou –  le wu qiong 与天斗,与地斗,与人斗, 乐无穷) (ibid): The battle against nature 
(Heaven and Earth) equals, indeed is the necessary prerequisite, for the fight against 
man, the class struggle. In fact, Mao Zedong's first published article was an essay 
entitled “A Study of Physical Culture” which ran in 1927 in New Youth (Xin 
Qingnian). The first sentence read “Our nation is lacking strength”, and the article 
developed the argument that national strength followed from the individual strength 
of its citizens, and hence it was every Chinese patriot's duty to exercise. The goal was 
not so much as to be able to fight physically, but because physical exercise steeled the 
mind, willpower was the necessary requirement to develop a revolutionary fighting 
spirit.  
Tang Xiyang's outlook on his relationship to nature bears a striking resemblance in 
this regard:  
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Adverse circumstances can temper (duanlian 锻炼) plants, animals, and 
also humans. My past life imprinted in me the lesson that adversity is a 
furnace, it is nourishment, it is a catalyst. [...] How I eventually fell in love 
with nature, a son of nature captivated by ecology, that was very long, 
tortuous, blood-drenched, soul-tempering process of cognition, as well 
as it was a process of maturation in which I sifted through humanity’s 
literary achievements and inhaled the essence of nature. The suffering in 
life is like a stairway, it can help you enter a higher plane of life. In the 
course of this process, I paid a heavy price; I lost my human dignity, my 
feelings, my work, my wife, and the most precious twenty years of my life. 
But I also gained a great many things, an important one being the ability 
to endure suffering, and amidst this suffering to learn some sense, to 
understand man, to understand society, to understand nature, to 
understand history. [CCC 144] 
Just as the New Socialist Man was meant to be a vanguard for the then Socialist age, 
the creation of Tang’s new green consciousness displays an equally elitist attitude: 
Adversity can temper humans, but it cannot temper every one, just as it 
cannot temper every animal. Only those plants and animals who defy 
hardship, dare to endure suffering, and dare to confront all sorts of 
challenges will stand out of extreme environments and evolve into forms 
with a unique style, will bring fourth astonishing blossoms or fruits and 
produce strong descendants. The French giant of literature, Honoré de 
Balzac, once famously said that “Adversity is the stepping stone for the 
genius, for the able man it is a blessing, for the weak one it is a bottomless 
abyss.” In China, Mencius once said that “Thus, when Heaven is about to 
confer a great office on any man, it first exercises his mind with suffering, 
and his sinews and bones with toil. It exposes his body to hunger, and 
subjects him to extreme poverty. It confounds his undertakings. By all 
these methods is stimulates his mind, hardens his nature, and supplies 
his incompetencies.” (CCC: 145. The Mencius quote in Legge’s translation 
see Legge: 447) 
We re-encounter in this quote a long-standing trope within the Chinese social 
imaginary concerning the purpose of seclusion and the cultivation of moral quality. 
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Nature is not seen as a permanent seclusion from the world, but offers the necessary 
space for a temporal withdrawal that allows the build-up of spiritual strength and 
moral courage. Somewhat paradoxically, seclusion in this sense has to be understood 
as a pro-active step towards latter reengagement with the world. As Ban Gu 班固
writes in his biography of Liu Xiang 刘向, a famous Confucian scholar during the 
Han dynasty: “Even though the loyal official is in the wilderness, in his devoted duty 
he still does not forget his sovereign.”102  
Coming back full circle to the initial question of what Tang Xiyang’s retreat into 
nature means to accomplish, we now have a clear idea that within the Chinese social 
imaginary this act does not necessitate a permanent seclusion. Instead, it is a 
temporary retreat, in order to reemerge even stronger. Hence, from the initial 
subjective experience of nature, it was only a short step for Tang to take a more pro-
active approach, and voice his opinions about the state of China’s ecosystems to a 
Chinese audience: 
The problem is, the longer I am in a natural environment, the more of 
nature’s pain I can feel. When I am wronged, I can at least complain to 
my boss. But what can nature do? When it has had enough, it can only 
wreak revenge on the human race by means of natural calamities. So as 
time went on, I stopped complaining about my past sufferings. Instead, I 
began to complain on behalf of nature. (ibid) 
IV.2.3 Nature as a book for learning: Muir and Roosevelt 
Important clues that illustrate Tang’s understanding of nature as a learning-device 
are found in a chapter of A Green World Tour entitled “John Muir and Theodore 
Roosevelt”.103 The chapter constitutes the conclusion of the American travel account, 
and can be seen as the author’s final word on Yosemite National Park. It represents 
an intellectual portrait of John Muir and Theodore Roosevelt, in Tang Xiyang’s 
words two of America's “avant-garde of natural protection” (ziran baohu de xianqu 自
然保护的先驱). Tang first addresses John Muir (1838 – 1914), the American naturalist, 
                                                 
102 Ban Gu, biography of Liu Xiang, Han shu, juan 36, p.1932 Han shu [History of the Han dynasty], 
Ban Gu 12 vols., Beijing: Zhonghua, 1970. Translation, see: Murck 2000: 116. 
103 The chapter is reprinted in CCC, all subsequent quotes see: CCC 309-316. 
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author, and early advocate of wilderness preservation in the United States. His letters, 
essays, and books telling of his adventures in nature, especially in the Sierra Nevada 
of California, have enjoyed a readership counted in the millions, while it was partly 
his relentless efforts that helped create nature reservations such as Yosemite Valley, 
Sequoia National Park and others. The Sierra Club, which he founded, is now one 
of the most important conservation organizations in the United States. One of the 
most well-known hiking trails in the U.S., the 211-mile (340 km) John Muir Trail, 
was named in his honor.104  
His [Muir’s] excursions prove an old Chinese proverb: “One learns as 
much on a journey of ten-thousand li as from reading ten-thousand 
books.” (行万里路，读万卷书) Nature is the greatest book of them all. It 
contains everything we and the world will ever need. Only after we have 
extensively experienced hardships and dangers, have had firsthand 
experience, diligently spent time in contemplation, given it all our love, 
will we be able to understand this book. John Muir was such a person, 
and this is way he advanced many new thoughts that natural scientists, 
artists and philosophers had not advanced before. (CCC 309) 
This rather telling understanding of “nature as a book”, an idea that the author 
expresses repeatedly throughout the course of his text, provides insight into Tang’s 
understanding of nature, and of the understanding of nature and of its relationship to 
man. During his excursion of Yosemite National Park, for example, he writes that 
“Nature is a mighty book, a deep book, a book that one can never finish reading.” 
(The world’s greatest trees 世界最大的树, AGWT 1993: 244)   
It has to be noted that the idea of “nature as a book” originates in Judaeo-Christian 
theology. Although Christianity draws a sharp distinction between earthly, sinful 
nature and divine eternal nature (paradise), it was still assumed that God’s power 
manifested itself in His creation. Glacken argues that this understanding was 
expressed most vigorously in the teachings of Augustinus (354-430) who said: “Some 
people, in order to discover God, read books. But there is a great book: the very 
appearance of created things. Look above you! Look below you! Note it; read it. God, 
                                                 
104 On John Muir’s life, his writing, and his activism, see: Oelschlaeger 1991: 172-204; Gifford 2006; 
Worster 2008. 
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whom you want to discover, never wrote that book with ink; instead He set before 
your eyes the things that He had made. Can you ask for a louder voice than that? 
Why, heaven and earth shout to you: 'God made me!' (Glacken 1976: 204) Glacken 
concludes that “The book of nature becomes a commentary [to the book of revelation, 
the Bible], further substantiation of the truth of the revealed word.” (ibid: 203) With 
the rise of modernity, the modernist mindset, and the pivotal breakthroughs in 
astrophysics, biology and geology, the idea of nature as a book was increasingly 
replaced by the idea of nature as a machine whose inner workings could be measured, 
predicted and even changed.105 By the 20th century, the link between nature and 
metaphysics had been completely severed, so that for example David Bloor in 
Knowledge and Social Imaginary developed an understanding of science that regarded 
nature as morally empty and neutral, while Richard Rorty in Philosophy and the Mirror 
of Nature understands nature as inherently meaningless in itself and morally neutral.  
Already in 1981, Hans Blumenberg in his Die Lesbarkeit der Welt wrote that the notion 
of nature as a book was an idea now so alien to us, the contemporary reader, that 
only with great difficulty we could put ourselves in a meaningful context of 
understanding to such an idea. 106    
Hence, the notion of “nature as a book” was very much outdated by the time Tang 
wrote the first edition of his Green World Tour in 1993. What is important is that his 
view of nature as a book conceptualizes nature as an opportunity for learning. Nature 
is seen as something with a purpose, as opposed to something that just is. In this 
understanding, nature serves both as the stage as well as the mentor for a quest 
towards understanding and wisdom, a quest whose goal can be achieved through 
personal practice and subjective experience.  
It becomes clear then that the reason why Tang holds Muir in such high esteem is 
not just because he loved nature, but because through his immersion within nature 
and through his love for nature, Muir developed the necessary moral character to 
affect positive societal change, in his case the establishment of the US National Park 
                                                 
105 On the development of this thought, see for example: Taliaferro & Evans 2011: 4ff for Charles 
Darwin, generally. Pepper, David 1996: 135-148). 
106 For further information of the notion of “nature as a book”, see: Glacken 1976: 203 ff., Mortensen 
1998: 24ff. and Bulhof 1992: 170ff. 
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system. It has been mentioned that John Muir founded the Sierra Club, one of the 
most important conservation organizations in the United States. However, Tang’s 
chapter fails to address the very real conflict that arouse between John Muir and 
Gifford Pinchot, the first head of the United States Forest Service and a leading 
spokesman for the sustainable use of natural resources for economic purposes. His 
position eventually clashed with Muir's, highlighting two diverging views of the use 
of the country's natural resources. Pinchot saw conservation as a means of managing 
the nation's natural resources for long-term sustainable commercial use. (The 
“conservationist” position) Muir on the other hand valued nature for its spiritual and 
transcendental qualities. In one essay about the National Parks, he referred to them 
as “places for rest, inspiration, and prayers.” Muir often encouraged city dwellers to 
experience nature for its spiritual nourishment. (The “preservationist” position) In 
Tang’s account, the conflict exists only between preserving natural parks as a place 
to “love nature”, in his words, as an educational place, and as the object of greed to 
extract natural resources. In other words, the chapter juxtaposes Muir’s wisdom with 
the profane and base desires of mainstream American society. (CCC 311) 
The chapter places great emphasis on the interplay between John Muir and President 
Theodore Roosevelt, and re-tells the famous story of the meeting between John Muir 
Theodore Roosevelt. In 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt accompanied Muir on 
a visit to Yosemite. While traveling to the park, Muir informed the president about 
the state’s mismanagement of the valley and the rampant exploitation of the valley's 
resources. Even before they entered the park, he was able to convince Roosevelt that 
the best way to protect the valley was through federal control and management. After 
entering the park and being overwhelmed by its natural beauty, the president asked 
Muir to show him the real Yosemite. Muir and Roosevelt set off largely by 
themselves on horseback, and camped in the wild country. The duo talked late into 
the night, slept in the brisk open air of Glacier Point, and were dusted by a fresh 
snowfall in the morning. 107  Tang’s version of the historic event emphasizes the 
contrast between the sage-like yet slightly awkward Muir and the adventurous Rough 
Rider Roosevelt, a man of the world.  
                                                 
107 Nash 2001: 122-181 provides a vivid and detailed description of the relationship and interaction of 
Roosevelt and Muir. 
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Muir was an unrefined man of the wilds (cunyeren 村 野 人), not 
accustomed to live alongside such a great and famous statesman. Yet he 
knew that Roosevelt was a man of many talents, strong and courageous 
while at the same time amiable and approachable. (CCC 313) 
During their meeting, the US President grows so impressed with the sage-like Muir, 
his calm yet resolved personality and his deep understanding of the wilds, that by the 
end of their wanderings, he returns to Washington a convinced protectionist, ready 
to throw his political weight behind Muir’s cause, or in Tang’s words “to wrestle the 
mountain and valleys from the axes of the woodcutters, to save it from being 
trampled on by flocks of sheep.” (CCC 313)  What is noticeable is the reversal of 
authority that Tang aims for in his representation of this historic encounter. 
Roosevelt, the powerful ruler of a nation, is willing to let himself being guided by the 
man with superior character. It stands to reason that Tang Xiyang views himself, or 
at least his students – the future generation of leaders – as fulfilling the same role as 
Muir, as wise scholars who are able to lend loyal enlightened advice to the country’s 
rulers. This is indicated in a paragraph that can be read as a programmatic statement 
that points to Tang’s intentions to follow in Muir’s footsteps: 
Young friends may envy me, saying, “You have been to so many places, 
seen so many things and formed many ideas.” Actually, I am far from 
being satisfied; I have seen only a small part of the natural world. There 
are so many things I have not seen. Though I am very eager to see them 
with my own eyes and understand them, I am getting old. I have to leave 
this task to my young friends to finish. This book can guide only a short 
way; the rest of the journey you must take by yourselves. I believe that 
among you great travelers, adventures, scientists and pioneers in 
protecting nature, as well as Chinese John Muirs, Theodore Roosevelts 
and Peter Scotts, will appear.  
The world belongs to you. All that is rare and beautiful belongs to you. 
(ibid) 
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IV.3  Back in China: Green Camp, and China’s new green elite 
Back in China, Tang Xiyang proceeds to put his experience into practice, by 
educating a group of select university students about green issues and forming them 
into China’s new green elite.108 The important role of Tang’s Green Camp movement 
in grooming a new generation of young Chinese environmentalists new has been 
mentioned in several Western accounts on Chinese environmentalism, yet mostly 
only in brief passing. (see e.g.: Economy 2004: 138-141; Wu 2009: 6) According to 
Wu Fengshi, the Green Camp movement “has been the incubator of the younger 
generation of environmental activists and college student environmental groups in 
China.” (Wu 2009: 6) The means by which Tang aims to accomplish this goal (apart 
from publishing his books and writings) is the organization of Green Camps (lüse ying 
绿色营), educational field trips into China’s natural habitats. Just as nature has served 
Tang to educate and re-invent himself, he will now use nature as a class room to 
educate his students.(His experiences in this regard are put in writing in a book with 
the same name, Green Camp [GC], published in 2007). 
 
                                                 
108 Tang uses the word xianfeng 先锋, avant garde or elite, repeatedly in his writings when referring to 
Western environmentalists or his students. 
Example of the visual accentuation of the naturescape employed in Tang Xiyang’s writing: Tang Xiyang 
(center) educating his students during an excursion. The caption reads: “Nature is a class room” (daziran 
shi ketang 大自然是课堂) 
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According to Tang’s account, the idea to the Green Camp movement comes to him 
in November 1995 after he receives a letter from a environmental journalist in 
Kunming (Sichuan province) named Xiong Jianhua 熊建华 who after reading Tang’s 
A Green World Tour asks if he could send him more books so he can distribute them. 
(CCC: 324 ff.) Moreover, Xiong informs Tang about the decision of the local 
government in Dexian County to allow logging in the primeval forests of the Baima 
Xueshan Nature Reserve in order to raise funds. This would not only threaten the 
areas protected forests, but also the habitat of the extremely rare Sub-Nosed Golden 
Monkey of whom only ca. 200 specimen remain. The news greatly distresses Tang, 
and he starts looking into ways to address the situation and stop the local government 
of going through with its plan. Since he has no resources at his disposal to intervene 
directly with the local or provincial government, he writes a letter to a high-ranking 
official, Song Jian 宋健, a member of the State Council and head of the Committee 
for Environmental Protection under the State Council. Song has read Tang Xiyang’s 
A Green World Tour and ever since has maintained a friendly exchange of letters with 
its author. Tang informs Song Jian of the situation, expressing his hopes that the 
central government might look into the situation. Song’s office responds quickly, and 
promises to right the situation. Tang, however, is not satisfied with this answer. He 
prints Song’s sympathetic letter, and distributes it among the members of Beijing’s 
NGO “Friends of Nature”. By doing so, Tang creates a stir amongst the NGO’s 
young membership, and in a series of meetings they devise a plan to form an 
inspection committee that will travel to Yunnan province in order to investigate the 
situation of the primeval forests and the status of its monkey population. 
Tang faces the task to organize this “Green Camp”. In his account, he explains how 
he draws on the various connections he has already established with Chinese 
university student groups where he is often invited to speak on environmental issues. 
In order to reach a broader audience and coordinate, he establishes contacts with 
inter-university friendship associations (lianyi zuzhi 联谊组织), the university students 
green forums (daxue xuesheng lüse luntan 大学学生绿色论坛 ). While Tang invites 
members of these green forums to join Green Camp, participation is limited, and 
students interested in the experience have to submit an application form. The criteria 
based on which Tang fills the vacancies are quite strict, Tang himself describes the 
selection process as “not relaxed” (CCC 333), while students are not chosen based 
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on any particular expertise but on their determination to master the hardships of the 
road. This might be a slight overstatement on Tang's side, as the group travels in 
busses, and stays in hotels that provide accommodation and regular meals. The list 
of selection criteria, however, drives home the point that Green Camp participants 
are a sworn brotherhood who shares a commitment to the higher cause. Students 
have to 1) “dearly love nature and protect it”, 2) “they must have read A Green World 
Tour”, and 3) “they must be willing to develop their personal strength during Green 
Camp”. (CCC 333) Again, it becomes clear that technical expertise of his students is 
less important to Tang than their personal steadfastness and display impeccable 
moral character. When one student leader actually withholds the applications filled 
out by his group in order to get the coveted seat at Green Camp for himself, he is 
dismissed from the group after his scheme is revealed. Despite tearful pleads and a 
lengthy letter of self-criticism, Tang remains adamant and rejects the young man due 
to his dishonest character. (CCC 333) For him, only a new green elite of impeccable 
suzhi will eventually be able to take the lead in guiding the masses towards 
environmentalism: “What we need to train is the future green talent (lüse rencai 绿色
人才), and if they do not possess this kind of suzhi, it will be impossible for them to 
incite enthusiasm in millions for the cause of environmentalism.” (GC 29) 
IV.3.1 Martyrdom 
Just as official CCP historiography possesses revolutionary martyrs whose example 
the party urges young people to emulate109, the Green Camp movement possesses a 
martyr of its own in the person of Marcia B. Marks who passes away at the very eve 
of the departure of Tang Xiyang’s first Green Camp. The first chapter of the revised 
1997 edition of A Green World Tour dealing with Green Camp China, as well as the 
reprinted Green Camp chapters in CCC, is entitled “Ma Xia [Marks’ Chinese name] 
is walking beside us” (Ma Xia yu women tongxing 马霞与我们同行). In all three of Tang’s 
major writings (AGWT, CCC, GC), Marks is repeatedly eulogized and praised for 
her tireless commitment to the cause of Chinese environmentalism. The fact that she 
passes away from illness literally on the eve of the first Green Camp excursion in 
                                                 
109 The vow to sacrifice one’s life for his beliefs (and thus achieving martyrdom) is a practice that 
belongs into the “mixed cultural action repertoire” of the Chinese public sphere. It was especially 
prevalent during the Tiananmen Protests. See: Perry 2001: 316. 
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1996 endows the movement with a certain spiritual significance that underlines the 
themes discussed so far.  
Tang and Marks are busy organizing their first Green Camp when she begins to 
experience health issues, especially an increasing pain in her throat. A believer in 
Christian Science, Marks refuses to seek medical attention, and only after the 
repeated urging of her husband and his daughter, Hong Mei, eventually agrees to go 
to a hospital where she is diagnosed with esophageal cancer. Due to its late discovery, 
the tumor has already metastasized and the medical prognosis is dire. Yet, in Tang 
Xiyang’s account, the couple remains resolved to proceed with their cause, indeed it 
is Mark’s illness that serves as a catalyst for the couple’s desire to start as soon as 
possible with organizing the Green Camps. “Today, the entire planet is suffering 
from a cancer, and this cancer is originating from humankind, a fact that many 
people to this day have not yet realized. It is these two cancers that have stirred us to 
embark on this noble quest without turning back” (CCC 332). 
Soon, support comes pouring in, in form of donations, but also voices of 
encouragement. Well-wishers, amongst them officials and intellectuals, express hope 
not only for the health of Mr. Tang’s wife, but also for the success of the higher cause 
the two are fighting for. Tang’s account of his wife’s last weeks before she is 
eventually admitted to the hospital paint her as a tireless “model worker” who 
remains a modest and resolved posture, works with the team at all occasions, 
understands China way better than so-called China hands, and provides her husband 
with a loving and caring home. Although not shared by her husband, her Christian 
faith provides her with strength and moral conviction that help her manage a 
murderous workload. 
The chapter that describes Mark’s eventual death is entitled “Seeing us off on our 
journey with her own life” (yi shengming songxing 以生命送行 CCC 339), its narrative 
strikes a very personal indeed intimate note, creating a considerable emotional 
impact on the reader. As the date for their departure comes closer, Marks’ physical 
health deteriorates. Despite being terminally ill and against her husband’s objections, 
she insists that he lead the first Green Camp into Yunnan. (327-328) 
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Ma Xia’s spirit has moved me, and our actions have moved society. (Ma 
Xia de jingshen gandongle wo, women de xingdong gandongle shehui. 马
霞的精神感动了我, 我们的行动感动了社会). (CCC 335) 
Marcia B. Marks passes away at the Beijing Friendship Hospital in 1996, merely 
hours before the scheduled departure of Green Camp. The husband’s last words to 
his dying wife are “Now you can come with us to Yunnan”, indicating that her spirit 
will accompany the group on their journey. Some of the team members are admitted 
into the hospital room, carrying flowers with which they surround the dead woman’s 
body. Guo Yushi 郭玉石, a doctoral student from Beijing’s Forestry Academy, has 
prepared a speech: “For the sake of China’s natural protection, you have given all 
your energy and even your life. Thank you, Ma Xia! You will always be with us, we 
will always remember you!” (CCC 340) 
The departure Green Camp goes not unnoticed by the national media. While some 
reporters and supporters have brought flowers to send them off, Tang remarks: With 
her own life, my wife is seeing of the creation of China’s green movement, our initial 
spark, the Green Camp”. (339-340) The emotional high point of the journey occurs 
once the expedition arrives at its destination in Dexian county, Qinghai province. In 
a chapter entitled “Memorial Ceremony in the Mountains (gaoshan jidian 高山祭奠), 
Green Camp conducts a memorial ceremony for Marks high in the Himalayan. Tang 
calls for a minute of silence to commemorate his wife, and eventually starts collecting 
Marks’ favorite flowers, (“I have never before plucked flowers in my life. This flower 
I will take back to Beijing, and place it inside my wife's urn.” CCC 345) Moved, 
students begin to wander off to collect flowers by themselves and – creating an 
impromptu funeral service – incinerate them on a stone pyre.  
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I do not know who eventually says 
“Let us observe a minute of silence 
for aunty Ma Xia!” Earth falls even 
more silent than usual. Heaven 
does not speak. Earth does not 
speak. The birds, the insects do not 
speak. And of course we do not, 
either. We are all commemorating 
that woman from the other side of 
the world, that ordinary yet great 
woman. She gave her own life to 
sow green seeds in the hearts of 
these young people.  (CCC: 345) 
It is important to note that these descriptions are not mere indulgences in 
sentimentality, but rather serve as rhetorical devices to underline the sincerity and 
commitment of Green Camp: Once Tang and his team have concluded their 
investigation and have returned to Beijing, Tang writes a long letter to his protector 
Song Jian to report on their findings (Tang stresses that he takes half a year in order 
to produce an adequate report). The language he uses often follows the precedent of 
moral character and suzhi establisher earlier.110 “The youths of Green Camp indeed 
have displayed a spirit of not fearing hardships and enduring suffering (bupa kunnan、
bupa chiku de jingshen 不怕困难、不怕吃苦的精神). On the truck they carried tools and 
dynamite, and wherever they encountered obstacles on the road they repaired it. We 
faced huge landslides on our way home, and had to travel more than 200 kilometers 
before returning to Kunming.” The phrase “not fearing hardship and enduring 
suffering” (which lit. translates into “eating bitterness”) is often employed in Chinese 
socialist rhetoric as an expression of Maoist asceticism that was held up as a model 
in order to build Socialism. During the time Tang Xiyang is writing, slogans like "the 
spirit of fighting hardships” (jianku douzheng jingshen 艰苦奋斗精神) are very much in 
                                                 
110 The entire report can be found in Green Camp, pages 9-15. 
 
“Memorial ceremony on the mountain” (gaoshan jidian 高山
祭奠) Memorial for Marcia Marks during the first Green 
Camp 1996. Tang Xiyang, next to the funeral pyre, in the 
foreground. (CCC 345) 
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circulation and employed in speeches by prominent leaders, even Deng Xiaoping and 
Jiang Zemin himself.  
Our biggest shortcomings are in education where ideological and political 
work has weakened, and the development in education has not been 
sufficient. […] The most important point is that nobody has bothered to 
tell the people – and this includes the cadres – that despite the satisfying 
development of the economy and the improvement of people's living 
standards we need to maintain the tradition of struggling against 
adversity (jianku douzheng jingshen 艰苦奋斗精神). Only if we maintain 
this tradition will we be able to combat the phenomenon of corruption. 
– Deng Xiaoping 111 
To emancipate the mind, seeking truth from facts, to actively explore, be 
creative, work hard, struggle against adveristy (jianku douzheng艰苦奋斗
), learning from foreign countries, to practice  self-improvement without 
rest, to be modest and prudent, to guard against arrogance and 
impetuosity, being honest and clean, exercising good governance, and 
show selfless devotion; this spirit should vigorously be promoted 
amongst the majority of party members, cadres, and the masses, to make 
it become the normal way of doing things. – Jiang Zemin: “On the 
construction of socialist spiritual civilization”)  
Given such precedent, Tang’s formulation can be considered a creative appropriation 
of official rhetoric that ensures its speaker is firmly on legitimate grounds. Tang 
Xiyang’s framing of his issue is even more convincing since he can situate his writing 
within a naturescape that reinforces his assurance of the moral qualities of his 
students. Just like in his early writings on the selfless collective in the snake center in 
Fujian, the naturescape that is painted in his travel accounts oscillates between 
different colors, depending on what is demanded in the situation. Accounts of 
pristine natural beauty alternate with descriptions of harsh wilderness, the 
overcoming of which makes the eventual learning experience ever more rewarding, 
and the successes ever more hard-won: 
                                                 
111 Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping], Volume 3: 290. 
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Examples of these varying naturescapes are found in the descriptions of all Green 
Camp excursions. After the eventual success in protection Yunnan’s Sub-Nosed 
Golden Monkey, Tang organizes regular Green Camps which he leads into ever new 
territories. In August 1998, Green Camp heads into a protected wetlands area located 
in Dongbei Province (The associated chapter is entitled “Call of the marshlands” 
shidi de zhaohuan 湿地的召唤, CCC 365-383). The students are taken to look for lotus 
flowers in the wilds by the reservation’s department leader. After a difficult march 
through the inaccessible swamp, relentlessly attacked by mosquitoes and losing their 
boots in the thick mud, the team of students led by Tang happens upon a pond on 
whose still water surface lotus flowers bloom abundantly.  
One after another, the team members catch up. Who can claim to have 
seen such a place? Whoever has experienced such enchantment? In small 
groups, and ‘risking life and limb' (fen bu gu shen 奋不顾身) the students 
climb down into the pool. When some of the girls see the boys climb 
down, they form a human chain and make their way down holding each 
other's hands. Lotus leaves and water chestnuts floating on the water 
surface, their feet tread on tubers and mud with all sort of water weeds 
in between, all whilst the water reaching up to our chests. Before our 
eyes: lotus blossoms, hardship, beauty, happiness, we can't see enough, 
photograph enough, enjoy enough. Many students tell me 'Shame that 
we ran out of film to photograph’. Female student Zheng Peina proudly 
tells me ‘I didn't climb in to watch the flowers or make pictures, I climbed 
in there to experience myself. How often in life does one get this kind of 
experience?’ (GC: 23) 
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Later, in a speech commemorating 10 years of Green Camp, Tang Xiyang refers back 
to this excursion, evoking an experience growth through shared hardships, learning, 
camaraderie, and debate. 
I remember every generation of GC participants, especially from the first 
few generations: We climbed mountains together, we slept in tents 
together, we jumped into 150-mu big pools of lotus flowers, we were 
The Call of the Marshlands: An illustration of the chapter found in CCC. 
Notice that the activities of the students are at the center of the photo’s 
composition, while the lotus pond provides the background. 
 
Another photo illustrating the same chapter. Two female students are helping a 
fellow Green Camp member through the marshes. Notice the positioning of the 
helping gesture at the center of the photo, and the presence of the natural 
environment as a mere framing device around the ensemble of three persons. 
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pestered by mosquitoes in reef marshes, we crossed the 5300 meter 
altitude of the Tanguala mountains, we discussed and quarreled until our 
faces turned red. In the many years of its course, Green Camp has helped 
us to distil the human qualitys to deeply love nature, to endure hardships, 
and of democracy. (GC: 55) 
Such shared experiences, in Tang's eyes, serve as the crucial incubator for what he 
calls “practicing democracy”: His students will learn to develop not only personal 
maturity and fortitude of character, but also be introduced to critical social skills such 
as respectful discussions, accepting constructive criticism, and organizing social 
events within a group dynamic.    
I mostly acquired my ideas about democracy from my wife and from the 
West. This issue is very important to me, it is the key location to develop 
personal quality (suzhi), and also for maintaining the destiny of the 
nation, the country, humanity, and nature.  (ta jishi geren suzhi suyang, 
ye shi weixi minzu、guojia、renlei、ziran minyun de guanjian suozai 它
既是个人素质素 
养, 也是维系民族、国家、人类、自然
命运的关键所在). Because China 
had a tradition of several 
thousand years of autocracy, 
many people to this day do not 
understand, do not know how to 
practice, and are not accustomed 
to, democracy. This includes 
university students who one 
should assume have a higher 
cultural level, a keen thinking, and 
are ahead of trends, but yet they 
still are stuck in an inflexible rigid 
mentality: not able to go beyond a 
certain model, a certain thinking, 
because they are not aware of 
themselves, they do not respect others, they do not respect the 
 
Practicing communal spirit in nature: Green Camp members 
joining hands around a giant cedar tree. Illustration of a 
chapter entitled “Young people are maturing”. CCC 364 
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collective, they lack team spirit (quefa tuandui jingshen 缺乏团队精神). 
Hence, I emphasize that the Green Camp must develop a democratic 
spirit. Because what we want to nurture here are the future green 
persons of talent (peiyang weilai de lüse rencai 培养未来的绿色人才), if they 
do not possess this kind of suzhi, they will not be able to evoke 
enthusiasm for environmental protection amongst millions of other 
people. (GC: 29)  
 
The vehicles via which Tang Xiyang promotes these ideas bare visible resemblance 
to already well-established precedents of educational policies. There is, for example, 
the public discussion of diary entries amongst the members of Tang’s team: Green 
Camp features the reproduction of a diary entry by a Hongkongese participant named 
Zou Songhua 邹颂华. Far from being a mere tourist interested in a comfortable 
nature excursion, Zou sees her expedition with Green Camp as a chance for personal 
development, and is not satisfied because the experience is not demanding enough: 
August 2nd, 1999. Morning overcast, clear in the afternoon. 
Departing from Urumqi, it feels as if we are headed for exile on a hard 
road, yet this exile is not at all bitter, but we are all brothers-in-arms in 
luxury. We live in good-quality hotels, and have fish and meat for every 
meal. In the morning a car picks us up and in the evening brings us back 
[to the hotel], that's how we have spent one month. My god! Whoever 
said that we young people must endure hardships? Around here, we are 
not missing one single meal! (GC: 30) 
These are not the grievances of a tourist who is out to have a good time, but those of 
a young idealist who is eager to get involved in the action, and does not want to waste 
time with the amenities of modern city life. Later in her account, she expresses 
satisfaction once the journey proves more of a physical challenge, and the team 
eventually embarks on a day trip into difficult marsh terrain. She is pleased that she 
gets an opportunity to exchange views with Tang Xiyang who she admires for his 
willpower (yizhi 意志) and his child-like sense of appreciation for nature. 
  
141 
 
 
Tang Xiyang and the creation of China’s green avant-garde 
 
  
The publication of diary entries of Green Camp participants has its precedent in the 
publications of the diaries of New Youth participants, as well as of Communist 
youths. It aims to show progress in personal development and serve as a model to be 
emulated by later followers. As was mentioned earlier, the production of diaries for 
the sake of self-reflection and self-improvement for the higher cause has various 
precedents in socialist China. Ostrovsky’s hero Pavel Korchagin in How the Steel was 
Tempered relays his life’s story in form of a diary, presenting in meticulous detail his 
struggle to live up to the high revolutionary standards he demands of himself. In 
Communist China, arguably the most famous diary of this sort was that of Lei Feng 
雷锋, model worker extraordinaire, who during the Cultural Revolution became the 
model for an entire generation. (Bakken 2000) In their educational practice, the CCP 
even earlier had developed a regiment of painstaking self-examination, often 
produced in the form of diaries, whose purpose from the outset was not to remain 
private or personal, but to bare the self in front of the collective, through public 
discussion and critique sessions. Diaries of model workers, cadres, soldiers, and other 
exemplary members of China’s New Society were often published and distributed 
widely for propaganda purposes, which further underlines the fact that diaries in 
Communist China were a decisively public matter. This is also true for the diaries of 
members of the educated youths, zhiqing, who have been mentioned earlier, and 
whose diaries received considerable attention in the 1990s in China.112  
IV.3.2. Elitism 
There is a visible thread of elitism woven throughout the narrative of Tang Xiyang’s 
writings, an educational elitism that manifests itself as the author’s own 
understanding as being in possession of, or at least in pursuit of, a new superior form 
of knowledge that puts him at the very forefront of social development. Postures of 
                                                 
112 For samples and collections of Chinese zhiqing diaries, see for example: SHI Weimin 史卫民, ed. 
(1996). Zhiqing riji xuanbian [A selection of zhiqing diaries]. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue 
chubanshe; id., ed. (1996). Zhiqing shuxin xuanbian [A selection of zhiqing correspondence]. Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe; DENG Xian 邓贤 (1993). Zhongguo zhiqing meng [Dreams of the 
Chinese zhiqing]. Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe; For a general survey, see: YANG Jian 杨健 
(2002). Zhongguo zhiqing wenxue shi [History of zhiqing literature]. Beijing: Zhongguo gongren 
chubanshe. Also: See Bakken 2000: 205 n60 for a selection of related publications. 
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superiority by China’s educated elite towards the unwashed masses have a long 
history in China’s drive towards modernity. Togersen remarks that “notions of 
superiority based on education have strong links to the traditional Chinese civil 
service examination system, but in their present form, they are linked particularly to 
post-May 4th ideas of peasant backwardness. (id. 2003: 215) Cohen mentions how 
in the early decades of the 20th century “the notion of the peasantry as a culturally 
distinct and alien ‘other’ […] desperately in need of education and cultural reform, 
and […] totally dependent on the leadership and efforts of rational and informed 
outsiders, became fixed in the outlook of China’s modern intellectual and political 
elites.” (Cohen 1994: 151–70) The result is a highly ambivalent relationship towards 
the common people on whose behalf China’s intellectuals claim to engage in their 
activism for. How long such attitudes have been prevalent among Chinese 
intellectuals can be glimpsed from another of Liang Qichao’s cultural observations  
that aim to demonstrate the general cultural inferiority of the Chinese population he 
encounters in the United States, an experience from which he draws broader cultural 
conclusions:  
There are many other ways in which the Chinese character is inferior to 
that of Westerners; some happened to impress me so I recorded them, 
but others I have forgotten. Let me now list several that I noted down, in 
no particular order: 
[…]  
When more than a hundred Chinese are gathered in one place, even if 
they are solemn and quite, there are bound to be four kinds of noise: the 
most frequent is coughing, next come yawning, sneezing, and blowing 
the nose. During speeches I have tried to listen unobtrusively, and these 
four noises are constant and ceaseless. I have also listened in Western 
lecture halls and theaters; although thousands of people were there, I 
heard no sound. 
On the sidewalks on both sides of the streets in San Francisco, spitting 
and littering are not allowed, and violators are fined five dollars. On New 
York trolleys, spitting is prohibited and violators are fined five hundred 
dollars. They value cleanliness so much as to interfere and restrict 
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freedom. Since Chinese are such messy and filthy citizens, no wonder 
they are despised. 
When Westerners walk, their bodies are erect and their heads up. We 
Chinese bow at one command, stoop at a second, and prostrate ourselves 
at a third. The comparison should make us ashamed. [...] 
When Westerners converse, if A has not finished, B does not interrupt. 
With a group of Chinese, on the other hand, the voices are all disorderly; 
some famous scholars in Peking consider interrupting to be a sign of 
masterfulness - this is disorderliness in the extreme. Confucius said, 
“Without having studied the Book of Poetry one cannot speak; without 
having studied the rites, one cannot behave.” My friend Xu Jianmian also 
said, “Chinese have not learned to walk and have not learned to speak.” 
This is no exaggeration. Though these are small matters, they reflect 
bigger things. (93-95) 
What seems indicative of Liang Qichao’s mindset here is his indignation about the 
lack of refinement and polish of ordinary Chinese when it comes to high culture. His 
account on not being able to enjoy a concert is the lament of a man of refined tastes 
who displays a certain habitus towards a social stratum that may not share his own 
cultural predispositions.  
Like Liang Qichao, who expresses dismay and embarrassment over the – in his eyes 
– not sufficiently sophisticated fellow countrymen, Tang Xiyang does not hide its 
frustration over the fact that an environmental consciousness in China has yet to 
manifest itself. In this regard, there is a significant amount of contempt for the 
Chinese “common man” and his or her disregard for the new morality and 
knowledge Tang tries to convey. The lament of a lack of “civilization” (wenming 文
明) responsible for Chinese backwardness in terms of environmentalism compared to 
its Western counterparts is a another very prominent trope within Chinese 
environmental nonfiction which will be addressed in the next chapter. 
 
 
  
V. Back to the future? Ecological 
Civilization, and the search for 
Chinese modernity 
The previous chapter considered the topos of seclusion within nature and the idea of 
self-cultivation. It demonstrated how allusions to cultural connotations concerning 
nature and character quality (suzhi) enables Chinese environmental activists to claim 
a status of a new elite. While suzhi usually refers to the micro-level of individual’s 
character, this chapter now turns the perspective onto the macro-level, and the notion 
of “civilization” (wenming 文明), a concept that usually refers to the sociocultural 
macro-structure. “Although differing in many ways from the English ‘civilization’ 
and ‘civility’, wenming has similar definitional aspects. It is used to denote a 
civilization in the human grouping sense, such as in ‘Chinese civilization’; 
civilization as an historical process; and a kind of civility in terms of social etiquette 
and relations.” (Dynon 2008: 83 (fn1))  
This chapter explores the use of wenming in environmental nonfiction, more 
specifically the concept of shengtai wenming [“ecological civilization”, an officially 
propagated concept that will be discussed en detail below. Gu in his 1999 study on 
Chinese “Cultural Intellectuals” in the 1980s argued that “different intellectuals […] 
strategically occupied different positions in the intellectual field” in order to carve out 
a niche in the emerging public sphere113 of China at the time, while closely interacting 
within complex institutional and clientelistic networks in order to secure their 
positions and achieve certain outcomes: “The difference in the positions that different 
segments of the intelligentsia occupied in the intellectual field was also significant for 
shaping the outcomes of the interaction. Thus, many economic policy intellectuals 
achieved their desire to play the traditional mandarin role in the policy-making 
process, and some prominent cultural intellectuals opened up certain autonomous 
public spaces in society to produce public discourses.” (Gu 1999: 427) Following this 
line of argument, the chapter explores the strategic occupying of domains of 
competence as a major factor in how environmental nonfiction authors position 
                                                 
113 Gu cautions against using the concept of “public sphere” uncritically in that context.  
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themselves in the context of “Ecological Civilization”. Since the Chinese wenming 
discourse is “a potent signifier that has enable[s] both critical reflection on the 
national past and an imaginary projection into the future” (Anagnost 1997: 75), a 
strategic positioning within that discourse allows its participants to establish their 
relevancy within public political life. This lends legitimacy and credibility to their 
cause and their position within China’s institutional framework. Wenming is a key 
concept in this regard, since the claim to its possession has been a key asset for the 
claim to political power in order to lead China into modernity. This is not only true 
for China every since it embarked onto its long and often painful journey to become 
part of the world in the 19th century, but for colonial claims to power and the right to 
hold dominion over other people. And with the claim to be China’s primary civilizing 
agent comes a claim to power, i.e. legitimacy.     
Anagnost (1997) argues that the concept of wenming has taken the place of class as 
“the central organizing figure of a post-Mao national imaginary.” (ibid: 75), and has 
become crucial as a legitimizing device for continued CCP rule. Tørgersen in his 
study of sources of cadre legitimacy in Xuanwei municipality (Yunnan Province) 
points out that the CCP’s power base at the local level is increasingly plagued by 
corruption, nepotism, and growing dissent, and suggests “that the Party at the 
ideological level responds to the crisis of legitimacy by presenting itself and its cadres 
as civilising [sic] agents bringing prosperity, science, morality, and social 
organization to the villages.” (id. 2003: 202) By presenting themselves as “civilising 
agents”, party cadres can rely on an “image of educational and cultural superiority” 
to claim a leadership position amongst the commoners: “They base their claim to 
legitimacy on the perception that they, because of their personal competencies and 
links to the party-state, represent a higher level of learning, information, and 
civilisation than the population in the rural communities they rule. They also believe 
that the Party they embody stands for modernity and progress and has the historical 
mission of leading the peasants to higher levels of economic development and social 
organisation, even when this means acting against the peasants’ perceptions of their 
own interests.” (ibid: 222)  
Within Chinese public life, wenming is a concept often propagated in official 
announcements, campaigns, and propaganda slogans, often prominently displayed 
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on signs, billboards, flags, official buildings, and other public spaces: Prior to the 2008 
Olympics in Beijing, the People’s Daily (2007/08/20) called the populace to “Let the 
Olympic Games become a new departure point of civilization!”, while one of the 
officially embraced mottos during the games itself was “Welcome the Olympics, pay 
special attention to be civilized, establish a new style!” (Ying aoyun，jiang wenming，
shu xinfeng 迎奥运, 讲文明, 树新风). More importantly, the language of wenming is also 
often used in environmental issues: In 2011, before the start of the 12th Five-Year-
Plan, the city government of Beijing organized a number of public events under the 
title “Be a civilized and polite Beijinger – China’s green take-off and civilized traffic 
starts with me!” Such public displays are all part of a new ideological as well as 
programmatic direction that has been propagated by the Chinese government in the 
last five years under the title “Ecological Civilization” (shengtai wenming 生态文明).  
In terms of its source material, this chapter relies on a broader range of texts. Most 
of them have been produced by Chinese NGOs and their leaders: As its core, the 
chapter will consider three books penned and/or edited by Liang Congjie 梁从诫 
(1932-2010), founder and leader of “Friends of Nature”. Their titles are: Marching 
Towards a Green Civilization (Liang/Kang 2005), Speaking on Behalf of Nature 
(Liang/Liang 2000), two books that are part of the “Friends of Nature Book Series” 
(Ziran zhi you shuxi 自然之友书系), as well as The Imperfect Circle (Liang 2002), a 
collection of Mr. Liang’s essays and articles. For comparison and reference purposes, 
it also includes the work of Liao Xiaoyi, founder and leader of the environmental 
NGO Global Village Beijing, and it will also referencing Tang Xiyang, Xu Gang, and 
other authors discussed earlier.  
V.1  What is “Ecological Civilization”? 
At the fifth plenary session of the 16th Party Congress, in 2005, premier Wen Jiabao 
put forward his vision of a “two-oriented” society – one that conserves resources and 
is environmentally friendly, pointing the direction for local development. The central 
government also provided support for trial reforms towards that goal. In 2007, at the 
17th Party Congress, Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 proposed his own ideological contribution to 
socialism with Chinese characteristics; the establishment of a “moderately well-off 
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society” (xiaokang shehui 小康社会). While this program entailed four basic goals 
(Chinese-style socialist economic development, political development, cultural 
development and social development), attached to the four goals were  five comments 
– one for each goal, plus the proposal to “build an ecological civilization.” (jianshe 
shengtai wenming 建设生态文明). At the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, Hu 
Jintao’s talk of building an ecological civilization put environmental issues higher up 
the agenda than ever before. Early this year, the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry for Environmental Protection (MEP) 
investigated progress on the ecological civilization in more than 10 provinces. By 
August, there were 53 trial projects under way. But what drew most attention were 
Hu's words: “Resource consumption, environmental damage and ecological 
efficiency shall be included in systems for evaluating economic and social 
development, in order to establish a system of targets, evaluation and rewards and 
punishments that reflects the requirements of an ecological civilization.” With the 
ecological civilization shaking up the existing mechanisms for evaluating official 
performance, the 18th Party Congress has shown the determination of China’s high-
level leaders. 
A lengthy editorial briefly after the 18th Party Congress, published December 24th 
2007 in People’s Daily and penned by the head of Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP), Zhou Shengxian 周生贤, laid out the meaning of the new concept. 
What is most noticeable is the fact that Zhou’s defining statements establish 
“Ecological Civilization” within the wider context of the modernization narrative of 
the CCP, as indeed Dynon remarks that “[w]ithin propaganda, the meaning of 
wenming is linked intrinsically with the CCP's modernization narrative.” (Dynon 
2008: 83 (fn1))   
Ecological Civilization is a form (xingtai 形态) of human civilization. It is 
based on the premise to respect and protect nature; its purpose is so that 
people, people and nature, people and society can live together 
harmoniously. It contains the establishment of a sustainable mode of 
production and consumption, and to guide people towards a sustainable 
and harmonious path of development. […] One could say that Ecological 
Civilization is the result of humankind’s in-depth reflection on the 
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traditional forms of civilization, especially industrial civilization, and it 
constitutes a significant progress of the developmental stage of human 
civilization in terms of philosophy, path, and model. [my emphasis] 
The last sentence especially has a strong teleological (one could say Marxist-
historicist) implication that characterizes Marxist-Leninist understandings of social 
development. The concept juxtaposes a new, “green”, “harmonious” and progressive 
future with the old, “black”, “destructive” societies of the industrial and post-
industrial age. It is alleged that the construction of Ecological Civilization will allow 
China to jump ahead of the West in terms of economic progress. Thus, the concept 
allows for the combining of developmentalism, environmentalism, and (cultural) 
nationalism, making it highly appealing to a broader Chinese audience. 
In this framework, the creation of Ecological Civilization is merely the next step in 
the long process of Chinese modernization. This reading become even stronger when 
further on, the editorial describes the historical relationship between mankind and 
nature through the lens of historic materialism, which is perfectly in line with 
standard interpretations of historic development in the People’s Republic: 
In primitive society, due to the very low level of productivity of human 
society, man lived in harmony with nature, but this harmony was merely 
characterized by fearful reverence (jingwei 敬畏) and passive obedience, 
the dominating factor in this harmonious relationship was nature. Once 
there was agricultural civilization, while the relationship between man 
and nature remained largely harmonious, there were periodic and 
regional instances of discord.  With the increase in population and 
gradual increase in productivity levels, humankind began to feel uneasy 
under nature's shelter and reign, and while it used nature for its own 
benefit also tried to change and shape nature, and these changes were 
often accompanied by blindness, recklessness and destruction. The 
emergence of industrial civilization constituted a qualitative leap in the 
productive forces of society, and humankind's ability to use nature to its 
own advantage increased dramatically. In this period, the attitude of 
humankind towards nature also underwent a fundamental change, from 
“use” to “subdue”, and [slogans such as] “man is nature's master” 
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became the dominant line of thought. Under the domination of this 
ideology, the conquest and domination of nature manifested itself in 
exploitation and destruction, uncontrolled mass consumption of natural 
resources led to large-scale pollution, eventually leading to rapid 
depletion of natural resources, environmental destruction, [...] and other 
catastrophic consequences. [ibid] 
The protection of nature hence is merely a prerequisite for the continued survival and 
prospering of the human race: 
The developmental practice of human societies has proven that if the 
ecosystem cannot continue to provide resources and energy, clean air, 
water, and other elements, the continued development of material 
civilization will lose its carrier and foundation, and then the whole of 
human civilization will be threatened. Therefore, the construction of 
Ecological Civilization is an inherent need to achieve the goal of building 
a moderately prosperous society, it is important to thoroughly implement 
the scientific concept of development. [ibid] 
Such re-assessments of its developmental path, indeed of its own political and 
ideological history, are not uncommon in the history of the CCP. Major course-
corrections have indeed occurred several times within the CCP’s history, often after 
internal struggles and major calamities, and the outcome is then ideologically 
codified in shared writings.114 Pan Yue 潘岳, outspoken vice-minister of the Ministry 
                                                 
114 Examples for such codified re-assessments include: The 1981 “Resolution Concerning Several 
Issues Regarding the History of the Party Since the founding of the PRC” (Guanyu jianguo yilai dang 
de ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi 关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议), which judged the Cultural 
Revolution to have been an “ultra-leftist” deviation, thus paving the way for the Dengist reform era. 
Another: In his political report to the Thirteenth National Party Congress on October 5th 1987, Zhao 
Ziyang 赵紫阳, then general secretary of the CCP, proposed a theory “Concerning the primary stage 
of socialism” (shehui zhuyi chuji jieduan lun 社会主义初级阶段论), essentially arguing that Maoist 
utopianism had misread the historic stage China found itself in by assuming China would soon enter 
the golden age of Communism. Instead, Zhao argued, China had barely started its Socialist stage, and 
hence required a vigorous development of its productive forces which were the prerequisite to further 
stages in socialist development. Also, excessive class struggle would hem such development and hence 
was to be avoided. This theory offered important ideological support to the economic reforms initiated 
by Deng since it justified the increased reliance on market mechanisms and rising inequality in the 
PRC’s economic trajectory. (see also: Zhao 2004: 225f.) 
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of Environmental Protection has indeed argued that China’s environmental 
calamities are in part to be blamed of a certain interpretation of Marxism itself.  
China’s environmental problems, complex as the causes may be, can 
ultimately be attributed to our understanding of Marxism. For most of 
our recent history, we saw in Marxism only a philosophy of class struggle. 
We believed that economic development would solve all our problems. 
In the reform period, this misreading of Marx morphed into an 
unrestrained pursuit of material gain devoid of morality. Traditional 
Chinese culture, with its emphasis on harmony between human beings 
and nature, was thrown aside. [...] 
Making matters worse, while we discarded the finer elements of our 
traditional culture, we failed to absorb the better aspects of modern 
civilization. The concept of a “social contract” based on rights and 
obligations – the essential values that constitute the most important 
precondition for effective environmental protection – goes largely 
ignored. As a result, environmental protection projects often fail to be 
included in calculating production costs. Scarcely anyone bothers to 
consider the environmental costs to – or rights of – the country’s poor 
and powerless. (Pan Yue: 2006) 
Pan Yue’s diagnosis offers a two-pronged critique: China’s environmental problems 
can be understood as a consequence of firstly a “misreading” of Marxism’s 
modernizing strategy, which refers both to the “philosophy of class struggle”, the 
Maoist era, as well as the Reform period under Deng, both of which witnessed great 
environmental destruction. Secondly, the “discarding” of China’s traditional culture. 
In terms of remedy, this reading of China’s environmental situation implies that both 
a correct application of scientific principles combined with a return to culture are the 
way for Chinese society to go forward. “Wenming discourse is a discourse of lack”, 
Anagnost reminds us, “referring to the failure of the Chinese people to embody 
international standards of modernity, civility, and discipline. All these translate into 
a construction of the Chinese people as being of ‘low quality’ (suzhi cha), which has 
perhaps become the reigning explanation for all manner of contradictions 
encountered in the flow of everyday life.” (Anagnost 1997: 76)  
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It is noteworthy that there is a considerable overlap between the position held by 
certain officials such as Pan Yue and environmental activists such as Tang Xiyang 
who also often blame China’s dire environmental situation on a disregard of China’s 
traditional culture. 
Chinese culture nowadays is confronted by serious challenges: Either to 
perish amidst today’s world’s currents (or maybe one should say to 
equally decline and fade into  the realm of archeology); or it will continue 
with China’s splendid cultural traditions and incorporate the best 
achievements from Western cultures, making it even the more alive and 
vigorous. I do not think that I am overly dramatic in this assessment: 
Today, Chinese culture is under attack from within, as well as from 
outside: From within, it has been under attack from the revolutions of the 
last years, especially the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution”. We 
revolutionized this, we revolutionized that, we did away with Zhuangzi, 
Laozi, Confucius, Qu Yuan, Sima Qian, Yue Fei, Tan Sitong, Sun Yat-sen, 
and others. As for the threat from outside: Following the economic 
reforms, commercial culture has swept into China like a force of nature, 
and whatever still existed in terms of humanity, idealism, professionalism 
and integrity, it all was transformed into a big “money” sign in the eyes of 
too many people. Chinese culture will be hard-pressed to fend off the 
combined attack from these two directions. (CCC: 100) 
At first glance, this diagnosis seems entirely plausible, as especially the era of Maoism 
has often been identified as a period of excessive environmental destruction, fueled 
by ideologically induced mass hysteria. Shapiro (2008) sees “Mao’s war against 
nature” as being fundamentally built against the same notion: “Maoism rejected both 
Chinese tradition and Western science. The effort to conquer nature was highly 
concentrated and oppositional, motivated by utopianism [...]. The articulation of 
Mao's war against nature is striking for its overtly adversarial expression and 
disregard of objective scientific principles, while its implementation stands out for 
focused destructiveness and mass coordination.” (Shapiro 2001: 8)  
Yet at the same time, any position that invokes “Mr. Science” and “Mr. Culture” as 
the remedy of China’s environment will have to confront several serious caveats: It 
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is undeniable that while the environmental excesses under Chinese socialism relied 
not on scientific but ideological justification, Socialism itself based its legitimacy on 
its scientific “correctness”, and many of the mass campaigns that proved to be 
disastrous for China’s environment explicitly pitted scientific progress against 
backward superstition and tradition.  
At the same time, several strains of China’s cultural tradition itself offered ample 
foundation for Maoism to built upon when it came to its antagonistic stance against 
nature: As Shapiro (2008) acknowledges herself briefly later in the same paragraph 
quoted above, Maoism showed significant overlap with Confucianism when it came 
to its critical, even hostile attitude against the natural world: “Maoism strengthened 
problematic aspects of Chinese tradition, such as the tendency to see nature through 
a purely utilitarian lens. At the same time, through suppression of local knowledge, 
it undermined aspects of traditional practice that fostered sustainable relations with 
nature.” (Shapiro 2001: 8) 
V.2  Mr. Science or Mr. Culture to the rescue? 
The visions found in Chinese environmental nonfiction of what shengtai wenming 
ought to be thus dovetails into what can be called a culturalist and a scientistic 
approach, which are not always compatible with each other, or even internally 
coherent. In this regard, the development of environmental nonfiction in China since 
the 1980s follows the intellectual, literary, and academic trends and discourses of that 
decade. Some scholars have categorized the main intellectual tendencies of these 
years as a conflict between two trends, “scientism” and “culturalism” (Chen Kuide 
1991; Chen Lai 1989). The split between ‘material civilization’ and ‘spiritual 
civilization’, as Anagnost calls it, “returned with a vengeance in the 1980s, and much 
scholarly energy has been devoted to tracing its history as an indigenous theoretical 
resource for talking about modernization.” (Anagnost 1997: 82) 
A first example that in fact employs both the culturalist as well as the scientistic 
argument is provided by an essay titled “Friends with nature. The green idea” (Yu 
ziran weiyou. Lüse linian 与自然为友. 绿色理念) penned by Liang Congjie detailing his 
meetings with likeminded friends that eventually lead to the founding of Friends of 
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Nature. 115  These informal gatherings were given the name “Linglong Garden 
Meetings” (linglongyuan juhui 玲珑园聚会 ). While short, the article manages to 
establish claims to both a cultural as well as a scientific legitimacy for the work that 
he and his fellow colleagues are about to set out.  
On June 5th 1993, on “World Environment Day”, under an ancient 
abandoned pagoda at the outskirts of Beijing, a group of intellectuals 
with a profound sense of social responsibility are sitting on the grass, 
engaging in as spontaneous informal debate. They were addressing 
China’s environmental situation and what responsibility the common 
people should shoulder for the environment. (WWDZ: 1) 
This very first paragraph, albeit short, deserves closer attention due to the imaginary 
it invokes. Firstly, the depiction of the locality itself is rather significant. The 
protagonists in the establishing of China’s first NGO gather at “the outskirts of 
Beijing”, geographically and also metaphorically located at the margins of, yet not 
outside, the center of political power in China. They gather in an informal setting, 
sitting on the green grass under an “ancient” (gu 古) and “neglected” or “abandoned” 
(huangfei 荒废) pagoda, a symbol of traditional Chinese culture and religious practice 
which has been disregarded and abandoned over the last decades. It is no coincidence 
that laments about the sad state of traditional Chinese culture in post-Mao China 
were ubiquitous in China in the early 1990s in intellectual circles. For example, Yu 
Qiuyu’s 余秋雨 “A Bitter Journey through Culture” (Wenhua kulü 文化苦旅), in which 
the author takes an increasingly infuriating journey to places of traditional Chinese 
culture had been published in 1992 and had become a huge success in the PRC (see 
below). The appropriation of traditional culture, and the subsequent equation of 
culture with nature, is a powerful trope in Chinese environmental non-fiction writing. 
This framing often is accompanied by a certain patronizing and contemptuous hand-
wringing attitude by Chinese intellectuals over the inadequacies of government 
officials and the stupidity of the common people, to which I will return to this point 
later in this chapter. The scenery depicted by Liang Congjie also evokes literary 
                                                 
115 The essay is found in “Speaking on behalf of nature” (Wei wugao de daziran 为无告的大自然), a 
collection of essays published by Friends of Nature. It features contributions from a wide number of 
authors, among that Liang Congjie 梁从诫, Wang Lixiong 王力雄, Wang Dongping 王东平, and 
many others. 
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echoes of similar gatherings of like-minded and righteous people pledging to stand 
together to fight the good fight (often, abandoned temples or gardens provide the 
setting for such gatherings). For example, the setting is reminiscent of a famous scene 
from Luo Guanzhong’s 14th century novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms (San guo 
yan yi 三国演义), the “Oath in the Peach Garden”, in which the righteous heir to the 
Han throne, Liu Bei 刘备, takes an oath of fraternity with the knight Guan Yu 关羽 
and the giant Zhang Fei 张飞.  
While Liang’s account more heavily turns towards invocations of what could be 
called cultural legitimacy, it also advances a scientistic claim. Referring to the 
“erroneous concepts and slogans of the last few decades” he criticizes Marxist dogma 
that let people to believe that by reliance on “so-called modern science and 
technology, mankind could endlessly extract and exploit nature:” 
In the 1950s, China took kindly to a slogan we had picked up from some 
scholar at the Academy of Social Sciences of the U.S.S.R. that said “We 
must not wait for earth to bestow her gifts unto us; we must extract from 
nature what we need!” Later, we listened to [slogans such as] “man will 
certainly conquer nature” [ren ding sheng tian 人定胜天, a Maoist slogan 
popular especially during the Great Leap Forward], “We can create any 
miracle as long as there are men!”, or even “The more audacious we are, 
the higher will be earth’s yield!” (WWDZ: 4) 
Liang Congjie and his followers have nothing but contempt for such “ignorant 
ravings” (wuzhi kuangyan 无知狂言). The role of the actors themselves is comparable 
to what this study has discussed in detail in previous chapters: all are intellectuals 
who, as Mr Liang points out, have no qualification in terms of environmental 
expertise, but merely share “a profound sense of social responsibility”, invoking the 
well-established role of the socially responsible literati. 
A third dimension in this account concerns the connection between China, its 
cultural tradition, and its place in the world. Liang’s account from the very start puts 
his and his colleagues’ efforts in an international context, by pointing out that their 
meeting takes place on “World Environment Day”, under the auguries of the United 
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Nations, and links their struggle to the growing international environmentalist 
movement: 
In today’s world, the environment has become one of the issues 
hundreds of millions of people care most about. It transcends the borders 
of nation states, races, social systems, ideologies, and ages, and it touches 
upon the present and future well-being of every single individual on this 
planet. (WWDZ 1-2) 
Liang then engages the previously mentioned “discourse of lack”, lamenting how the 
West is already more advanced, and how China is again lagging behind: 
However, in the last couple of decades, Chinese people’s understanding 
of environmental issues has been quite superficial, even erroneous. In the 
1960s and 1970s, when the broad populace in Western industrialized 
nations was becoming aware of the severe harm that environmental 
destruction posed to public health, to the global ecosystem and societal 
development, at the moment when mass-style popular environmental 
movements were about to unfold [there], most people in China still 
attributed environmental problems to social maladies that could only 
occur under capitalism, and saw environmental pollution as an 
illustration of the greed of bourgeois money-grabbers, piling on criticism 
and ridicule! (2) 
The experience of the Western countries, according to Liang, had shown that public 
participation was crucial for establishing environmental protection regimes and 
policies: “International experience has proven: with governmental management 
alone, and without supervision by and participation of the masses, a country, a city, 
a region will not be able to do a good job at environmental protection.” (ibid. 3) The 
government, Liang explains, should take on the role of parents who rely on the 
cooperation of the entire family to run the household. It is this insight that has led 
himself and his fellow intellectuals to establish Friends of Nature 
The following pages detail the invocation of “Mr. Science” and “Mr.Culture” in 
greater detail. The demarcation line between the two argumentative strains is not 
always clearly drawn, yet at the same time there exist considerable tension between 
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the two. This shows that discourse in environmental eco-literature in China is not 
monolithic, but multi-facetted and writers often appropriate different strains of 
officially advanced discourse to lend credibility to their own arguments. In fact, the 
vagueness of the term “civilization” facilitates the various uses, since it allows for 
appropriation of the term by various actors for various agendas: “The sacred 
language of wenming both gave rise to and benefited from a mutually reinforcing 
promotional mechanism, as officials and work units pushed to peddle otherwise 
disparate ideas and activities as examples of spiritual civilization and the media 
scrambled to ensure their content bristled with reportage of them.” (Dynon 2008: 98-
99)  
V.2.1 Mr. Science 
Modernity discourse and the language of scientism in 1980s China 
Already in 1977 after Deng’s reinstatement, the party had launched a “movement to 
liberate thinking” (jiefang sixiang yundong), which started a process that Xu (2004: 184) 
calls the evolution from Maoism to “secular socialism” (shisuhua shehuizhuyi 世俗化社
会主义). This represented a party-intern educational effort to get cadres to let go of 
rigid Maoist dogmas and accept the new paradigm of pragmatism; “practice is the 
sole criterion for truth” in order to move China into the future. Because Maoist 
dogma was to be replaced with scientific “truth”, the officially encouraged discourse 
on how post-Mao China’s future was to look like had a strong element of scientism 
(kexue zhuyi 科学主义), which “claimed that the sole criterion for measuring social 
development is the strength of productive forces and that science and technology are 
the pre-eminent productive forces in modern society” (Xu 2004: 185)116 The new 
                                                 
116  The CCP’s unabashed embrace of Modernity received a great deal of supporting fire from 
important scholars within Chinese academia: Among its main representatives was the  so-called 
“Towards The Future” (zou xiang weilai 走向未来) group (after a book series published under this 
name) that loosely centered around acclaimed scholar Jin Guantao 金观涛, then an editor of the 
Journal of Dialectics of Nature, a reputable periodical published by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) 
which had introduced the Chinese audience to many Western thinkers such as Karl Popper and 
Thomas Kuhn (Gu 1999: 396). Jin’s writing channeled Hegel’s historical and Max Weber’s cultural 
determinism (Chen 1991: 46 f.): He agreed with Weber’s argument that the path to Modernity 
inevitably led through a process of increasing rationalization. The rationality of modernity in this 
context meant a commitment to system and structure, and it was neither to be found in Hegelian-
Marxist dialectics, nor in culturally specific forms of rationality. Instead, Jin advocated “scientific 
rationality” (kexue lixing): sciences and ethics should engage in a constant dialogue to bridge the gap 
between instrumental and moral rationality. In 1982, the Journal of Dialectics of Nature organized an 
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scientistic approach to China’s development under Deng and its concentration on 
“scientific truth” opened up deliberative spaces for individual intellectuals and 
officials who could use this new language to not criticize the “unscientific” excesses 
of Maoism, but also develop visions for China’s path into the future. This also 
implied a new, more important role for China’s intellectuals since they were the 
preeminent custodians and creators of scientific truth. An early example for this 
stance in the context of environmentalism was Qu Geping 曲格平. In 1972, the 
Chinese Communist leadership for the first time had come into contact with 
international environmental protection ideas, when a group of Chinese delegates, 
reporting to Premier Zhou Enlai 周恩来 himself, attended the UN Conference on the 
Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm: “This conference planted the seeds 
of environmental change in China […]” (Economy 2004: 93). Upon return, the report 
of the delegation, of which Qu Geping was a member, let Zhou to organize China’s 
“First Conference on Environmental Protection” in 1973. Qu would go on to become 
one of China’s most vocal and respected environmental protectionists. His talks and 
essays are collected in a work called “We need a transformation” (Women xuyao 
yichang biange 我们需要一场变革), another part of the “Green Classics Library”. (Qu 
1997). The language of these texts to a large extent operates in the context of China’s 
Dengist modernization narrative; environmental protection in this regard belongs to 
the “correct” policies that are indispensable for China to make strides in its economic 
and social development. In an article entitled “To protect the environment is a basic 
national strategy for China” (Baohu huanjing shi woguo de yixiang jiben guoce 保护环境是
我国的基本国策) from 1984, Qu argued: “To make environmental protection a national 
strategy is determined by our national situation, it is completey correct, and 
indispensable. If we do not pay attention now, and firmly grasp the task of protecting 
the environment, then by the end of this century the degree of environmental 
pollution and ecological destruction might resemble our population problem, and 
become an issue that will be only very hard to address.” (Qu 1997: 66) 
                                                 
important (and later much referred-to) conference which identified traditional Chinese culture as the 
main culprit for modern China's backwardness in science and technology. The conference volume, 
published in 1983, was entitled Kexue Chuantong yu Wenhua [Scientific Tradition and Culture]; Xi'an: 
Shaanxi Science and Technology Press. 
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The issue of China’s population crisis is arguably the most prominent argument 
advanced within scientistic conceptualizations of China’s environmental issues: The 
explosion of the Chinese population – in this line of reasoning – is attributable to 
Mao Zedong’s disdain for scientific insight and Maoism’s persecution of China’s 
intellectuals. Ma Yinchu 马寅初 is arguably the champion of propents of the scientistic 
approach to the pursuit of Ecological Civilization. Born 1882, he received a Ph.D. in 
economics and philosophy from Columbia University in 1914 and in 1920 helped to 
found the Shanghai College of Commerce. During the 1930s, Ma began to criticize 
the Guomindang government, and was subsequently incarcerated in the Xifeng 
concentration camp in Guizhou in 1940. In 1949, at the request of Zhou Enlai, he 
served as a nonpartisan delegate to the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference. From 1950 to 1951, he served as the president of Zhejiang University, 
and then as the president of Peking University from 1951 to 1960, a respected and 
beloved figure. 117  
In June 1957, at the height of his professional career, Ma presented what was meant 
to be his academic masterwork, the New Population Theory at the fourth session of the 
First National People's Congress. Having examined trends of the early 1950s, he 
concluded that further population growth at the current rates would be detrimental 
to China's development. Therefore, he advocated for the strong implementation of 
birth control by the government, as well as education campaigns on family planning. 
During the following three years, Ma and his theory were repeatedly attacked as 
having created a “political conspiracy” and he was banned from public life. The 
charges of the government were that the theory followed Malthusianism, attempted 
to discredit the superiority of socialism, and represented bourgeois elitism. 
Ma and his New Population Theory did not receive mention until 1979 when he was 
rehabilitated. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China formally 
apologized to him, stating his theory had been validated by reality. All charges 
against him were retracted, and he was made honorary president of Peking 
University. Ma Yinchu died a few years later on May 10, 1982 at the age of 100.   
                                                 
117 For an extensive discussion of Ma’s life and work, see Shapiro 2001: 36-48. 
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Even before Ma's death, scholars were realizing the enormity of the government's 
error in censoring his views for two decades. Ma's theory also became enshrined in 
public policy; China's One Child Policy draws heavily on Ma's reasoning that "the 
State should have the power to intervene in reproduction and to control population", 
and follows his advice in heavily utilizing propaganda on the dangers of population 
growth. In Ma's hometown, a middle school has been named in his honor, his birth 
home is being renovated as a museum. Nationally, the scholar is featured 
prominently in primary and middle school textbooks as "Uncle Ma", where he is 
praised for his contributions to population control and environmental protection. In 
1997, a nine-part series about his life was aired in commemoration of the 40th 
anniversary of the publication of his population theory.  His work, A New Population 
Theory was republished in full by Jilin People’s Publishing House as part of the 
“Green Classics” collection, together with an extensive foreword by Zhang  
Chunyuan 张纯元 in which he cast Ma Yinchu as a model for objectivity and “correct” 
scientific attitude whose work was disregarded by “dogmatists”: 
Ma Yinchu was a patriot of absolute sincerity, he loved the party and he 
loved socialism. Regardless of the constraints put onto him by 
dogmatism, he put aside any concern for his personal safety and boldly 
addressed the problem of overpopulation in China, based on empiricism 
and with Marxism-Leninism as his guideline. Mr. Ma [orig. “Ma Lao 马老”, 
a term of special reverence] was of the opinion that China 's population 
was too much, its growth rate too high, if such unchecked development 
was allowed to continue, it certainly would become an obstacle for 
China's productive force [...]. This was no baseless speculation, but was 
unshakably grounded on the practical situation of China's population. 
(Ma 1997: 68) 
Comrade Mao Zedong says: "There is only one kind of true theory in this 
world, theory that is drawn from objective reality and then verified by 
objective reality." Ma Yinchu's theory was exactly that. As a result, he was 
a real Marxist, and not a Malthusian.Ma Yinchu's theory on the existing 
population problem in China was neither respected nor adopted at the 
time; to the contrary, he was subjected to merciless criticism, indeed 
those delusional dogmatists who preached "the bigger the population 
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the better" had the upper hand. Under such erroneous theories, China's 
population continued to blindly grow unchecked. (ibid: 69) 
The dialectics of history turn mercilessly; they finally announced that Ma 
Yinchu's argument on the existing population problem in socialist 
societies was correct, and that those dogmatists who said "If the Soviet 
Union does not address it, we do not need to, either" were wrong. (ibid: 
70) 
Given the role Mao personally played in the destruction of Ma Yinchu and his work, 
there is a certain irony in the fact that this foreword features the quote of the 
Chairman to support the argument for the primacy of scientific fact over dogmatism. 
However, what seems clear is the argumentative thrust, and also the strong 
identification of Ma Yinchu as a role model not only for fellow scientists, but as an 
admonishion to government officials to respect their work. 
“Ecological Civilization” and “The Fourth Wave” 
In the wake of China’s economic opening, the influx of foreign capital, technology 
and know-how into China was accompanied an equally enormous flow of ideas, 
theories, and concepts from abroad.118  The fact that modernization theory in general, 
and Toffler’s work The Third Wave (1980)  in particular, were amongst the spearhead 
of Western-imported economic theory during the 1980s is quite telling about the 
unbroken faith in modernism the Chinese Communist Party’s held during that time. 
The Chinese translation of the book under the title disanci langchao 第三次浪潮 was 
published in 1983. Toffler’s optimistic forecast of the possibilities of economic 
development towards a “post-industrial society” (the third wave, the second being 
industrial society) through a technological revolution hit a nerve with Chinese 
officials and intellectuals alike, who took his thesis as a wake-up call for intensified 
efforts to march towards an utopian future via means of modernization. (Wang 1996: 
41) What especially thrilled the Chinese side was Toffler’s argument against the 
pessimism that had permeated The Limits of Growth, a study commissioned by the 
Club of Rome in 1972, which had analyzed the consequences of interactions between 
                                                 
118 Han Shi (1992) 13-14. Jiang Zemin 江泽民 is said to have been particularly fond of this Toffler’s 
work. 
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the Earth’s ecosystems and human societies. This study had come to the conclusion 
that while the world’s population was growing exponentially, the ability of new 
technologies to increase the availability of (limited) natural resources only grew 
linearly. Under these conditions, the capacity for economic growth, especially for 
countries with massive overpopulation such as China, was inherently limited, and 
the study had predicted a collapse of the world’s economic and social systems as well 
as a massive failing of whole ecosystems for the 21st century. Given this background, 
one could argue that the attraction of the Third Wave argument – potential for 
unlimited economic growth through a transition towards a knowledge and 
technology based economy – for the Chinese readership essentially was the same as 
what Marxism had promised over half a decade earlier: here was an economic theory 
from the West – thus invested with all the intellectual authority of the much-envied 
West –, yet it promised to not only catch up but also to overtake the West’s economic 
development by a program of audacious policies that would lead China into an 
utopia. Thus, Western thought appropriated by China’s leaders initially displayed a 
bias towards a technology and knowledge-based modernization approach, which in 
the 1980s in China led to a discourse on modernization that had significant utopian 
character, but was based on (economic, not political) liberalism and scientism.  
The scientistic version of Ecological Civilization in a very similar manner is firmly 
situated the framework of officially propagated modernization discourse in China. In 
this context, the “establishment of an ecological civilization” (jianshe shengtai wenming 
建设生态文明), as it is referred to, is merely the next step in China’s long run to catch 
up with the West, its “Fourth Wave” (di sici langchao 第四次浪潮). This is also the title 
of an official propaganda book119 that was published in 2011 to much fanfare: The 
Fourth Wave: Ecological Civilization. A propaganda book for the age of green civilization. The 
book puts itself in a direct lineage with Toffler’s work and presents a blueprint how 
China has to move “from the Third to the Fourth Wave.” After outlining Toffler’s 
argument, the authors ask rhetorically: “Alas, who will bring black civilization to its 
conclusion? Who [sic] will be the Fourth Wave following the Third Wave? (ibid: 9). 
                                                 
119 LU Junqing 卢俊卿, QIU Fangying 仇方迎, et al. (2011): Di sici langchao: Lüse wenming. Yibu lüse 
wenming shidai de xuanchuanshu [The Fourth Wave: Ecological Civilization. A propaganda book for 
the age of green civilization]. Beijing: Zhongxin chubanshe. 
  
162 
 
 
Ecological Civilization and the search for Chinese modernity 
 
  
Such a perspective is indicative of Chinese modernization discourse in general which 
is concerned with jumping ahead of the West in terms of economic development. 
The following graph illustrates this understanding very succinctly. It is taken from a 
study conducted by Zhang and Mol (2007) on the Chinese Modernization Report 2007 
produced by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), more specifically its inherent 
conceptualization of “ecological modernization”, a key concept within the context 
of shengtai wenming. According to the report, depending on the modernisation stage 
a country is in, the pathways towards ecological modernisation can be different.  
 
Source: Zhang and Mol 2007: 663. 
“Pathway 2 (labeled integrated ecological modernisation) applies to developmental 
countries that take a short cut (the Canal strategy) towards an eco-modernised society 
by focusing on accelerated greening industrialisation and ecologising economy 
towards a knowledge society.” (Zhang/Mol 2007: 663) Echoing the argument of The 
Third Wave, pathway 2 (preferred by the CAS study) presents ecological 
modernization as the latest shortcut that will enable China to jump ahead of Western 
nations in terms of its level of modernization. Ecological Modernization hence presents 
a “upgrade through transformation” (zhuanxing shengji 转型升级). (Shen/Ma 2010) 
Implicit in this context is a political dimension: the establishment of shengtai wenming 
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will allow the CCP maintain the helm of China’s modernization project, a function 
that forms one of the party’s most fundamental claims to political legitimacy. 
The Fourth Wave similarly represents a comprehensive guide towards the 
establishment of Ecological Civilization that goes beyond a mere economic blueprint, 
but offers guidance for a reform of state-society interactions and good governance, 
all in the interest of establishing a “harmonious coexistence between man, society, 
and nature.” “The Fourth Wave” of China’s Ecological Civilization is not only 
advocating an overhaul of government agencies towards more transparency and 
accountability, but is also directed at the general public. In a chapter “The green 
citizen” (lüse gongming 绿色公民), “The Fourth Wave” presents a blueprint for how 
the Chinese population should behave to correspond to the new developmental 
direction. The addressee in this regard is less the broad populace, but rather China’s 
new middle class that is called to make the transformation from “white collar” to 
“green collar” work- and lifestyles: “Green collars: the trailblazers of the green 
civilization.” (lüling – lüse wenming de nongchao’er 绿领绿色文明的弄潮儿, Lu/Qiu/al 
2011: 49 ). 
In the last years, following China’s swift and violent economic 
development, a new trend has been blossoming everywhere, to again go 
into the countryside, return to nature, enjoy environmental protection 
and romantic fields and gardens. Some people who had gotten rich first 
in the cities are buying residences in the coutryside, they plant 
vegetables, enjoy a pastoral lifestyle, but at the same time also do 
business or found businessesm far fromv the travails and environmental 
protection of the cities. The denomination they give themselves is “new 
shangshan xiaxiang” movement. (ibid: 52) 
Not only individuals citizens, but NGOs in China as well also assigned a special role 
in this regard: “When it comes to advancing green civilization, [the two sides] civic 
and official, those within the system and those outside, are not mutually exclusive 
paths, but they are just like the two wheels on a chart, the two wings of a bird, only 
when both wheels spin or the two wings flap, only then can society develop 
harmoniously. Under the conditions of the Opening and Reform Policies, and within 
the framework of the law, we should appeal loudly and clearly to the 
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nongovernmental green protection organizations to break down the restrictions of 
system insiders and outsiders, allow them greater living space […], an even more 
respectable social status, this way our march towards green civilization will be faster 
and steadier.” (Liu/Qiu/al 2011: 205)  
V.2.2 Mr. Culture 
Ecological Civilization’s second argumentative strain is composed by appeals to use 
China’s culture and traditions for the sake of environmental protection. These 
appeals are often characterized by a highly essentialist manner that do not take into 
consideration the nuanced perspectives traditional Chinese culture had developed 
when it came to man’s relationship with nature. For example, “The Fourth Wave” 
calls its readers to “derive strength from the wisdom of the East” (ibid: 312) 
The cultural argument is made probably most succinctly by a participant of the early 
Linglong Garden Meetings, well-known literary critic and Beida professor Ji Xianlin 
季羡林 in March 1994, shortly before the founding of Friends of nature.  
Eastern culture already contains the basic notion of environmental 
protection. The core of Eastern culture - Chinese traditional culture - 
especially emphasizes “tian ren he yi”, and the pursuit of a harmonious 
coexistence between mankind and nature. Western culture by contrast 
overly emphasizes an antagonistic relationship between mankind and the 
natural world, and such an antagonistic stance will eventually result in a 
backlash from nature. Hence, if today we want to develop the business 
of environmental protection, we must inherit and carry forward the 
quintessential thoughts in our nation’s traditional culture that will be of 
use for the cause of environmental protection.120  
From this recognition, there are various ways in which environmental writers draw 
on Chinese cultural traditions in order to pursue the culturalist argument for 
environmental protection. Such appeals to the return to ancestoral values is often 
accompanied by “discourses of lack”, laments on the mistreatment of Chinese culture 
                                                 
120 Wang Jun 王军: “Minjian baohu yishi de jueqi [The rise of civic environmental awareness].” In: 
WWDZ: 60. 
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by those too ignorant to know any better. In an article entitled “China’s traditional 
green culture” (Zhongguo de chuantong lüse wenhua 中国传统的绿色文化), written in form 
of a response letter to a friend dating from 1989, Tang Xiyang writes: 
Dear friend, 
[...] as you can see, it is a common phenomenon in China that nature is 
not loved or protected. This can even be felt by Chinese living in China, 
but it’s not as blatantly obvious to them as it is to those Chinese who have 
lived abroad or to Westerners who have lived some time in China. There 
are intricate reasons for this discrepancy; they are political, economic, 
cultural, population-driven, etc. You raised another important aspect of 
this problem: 
You wrote: ‘There is a question I have been struggling hard to find an 
explanation for, and that is how can a nation not have a tradition of 
cherishing nature, The Earth, and all life; abuse its natural resources for 
hundreds and thousands of years; and violate most parts of China to a 
degree that it likely will never recover? I also do not think that there is 
such a situation, a whole people’s cultural tradition allows for nature to 
be destroyed?’ 
After reading these lines, I constantly thought about this question: Could 
it be that China’s cultural traditions do not entail elements that love 
nature, protect nature? [...]  History and reality are inseparable; when we 
examine the present, we can see history more clearly. We review history, 
and can learn about the present. Amidst a feudal rule of long-lasting 
isolation and dictatorship, one that did not practice democracy 
domestically nor had much exchanges with the outside world, China’s 
culture always has been staggering along an extremely narrow path, one 
that made it just as difficult to develop modern scientific techniques as it 
hampered the development of a tradition that emphasized the love for 
nature or cared about its protection. (CCC: 105) 
Chinese environmental writers have taken great efforts to equate Chinese culture 
with Chinese nature.  For this task, they can refer to long-established practices in 
Chinese cultural history that treat nature as one of the central sources of inspiration 
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for the production of cultural objects, be it poetry, painting, or philosophy. The 
equation of culture and nature can even be traced back to linguistic tropes which 
often employ loci classici of the traditional Chinese literary canon when writing 
about natural phenomena today. The argument of modern-day environmentalist 
writers that whoever respects and preserves Chinese culture must equally care about 
the preservation of its ecosystems has to be understood as a strategy to appeal to an 
audience in which nationalist and culturalist sentiments are much more prevalent 
than environmentalist ones. 
The equation of nature with culture 
In this manifestation of the culturalist argument, Chinese nature is being framed as 
embodying Chinese culture.  
Sometimes, the equation of nature and culture does not require a reference to famous 
scenic spots but more to cultural objects of national importance, as in this episode 
reported by Xu Gang 徐刚: 
In 1979, fifty-eight specimen of yinshan 银杉 (Cathaya argyrophylla, a rare 
species of pine tree that occurs only in China) were discovered in Hunan 
Province in the area around Chengbu County They are the rarest of tree 
species in China, “living fossils” of the plant kingdom that have existed for 
over 100 million years. Some call them “The Great Pandas of plant life”. 
The world regards them with awe and reverence. However, just as was to 
be feared, many ambitious people saw on the TV that somewhere a new 
scenic spot had been discovered, and thus this discovery heralded its 
defilement and destruction. And who would have thought this 
destruction would occur so swiftly, and that the means of its destruction 
were so manifold! As soon as the 58 trees had been discovered, 
everybody scrambled for bringing this national treasure (guobao 国宝) 
under their administrative control in order to get rich. Xinding county and 
Chengbu Muzu autonomous county squabbled over these property rights 
in court for over 6 years, until finally in 1986, Shaoyang prefecture 
decided that the trees and the 8200 Mu of land on which they stood were 
to be managed by Chengbu Muzu autonomous county. 
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Some people's tenet in life is: “If I can't live, I won't let you live either. 
What I can't have, I won't let you have either.” Since that day, a bunch of 
people from Xinding County saw the fifty-eight Cathayas as their enemy 
target, and so, in an orgy of reckless destruction, their axes cut, and their 
spades dug. On one occasion, no less than 130 people set out and laid 
waste to the administrative office Chengbu County had established for 
the reservation area. Not able to put their hatred aside, around the same 
time they stripped the bark from nine of the trees or dug their roots out. 
One Chinese hemlock (Tsuga chinensis) that similarly had been under 
state protection was set ablaze and crashed onto one of the Cathayas, 
burying the tree beneath it. […] 
Has it ever occurred to these people that this is the nation of China's 
wealth, as well as a treasure of humanity? 
Let's assume that the mountain folk do not understand such reasoning, 
but what about the party secretaries and officials in Xinding County? They 
have all these red-inked official documents from their superiors, and 
proclaim all day how they want to "Serve the People"; shouldn't they 
know the law, study the law, defend the law? What are they doing? 
To fully demonstrate their barbarism (yeman 野蛮) and ugliness (choulou 
丑陋), these people not only destroyed the Cathayas, but since July of the 
same year they have excorticated 150 Cassia trees within the reservation 
area, dug up and upset 120 mulberries, cut down five camphor trees and 
wrecked eight wooden bridges in the same area. The reader can imagine 
how much of the nation’s Cathaya habitat remains today.   
What this author cannot understand is: To steal the heads of Terracotta 
soldiers, and to excorticate Cathaya trees, which also are a national 
treasure, where is the difference in terms of the quality [of these crimes]? 
What weights heavier? Does one have to murder somebody before one 
is considered a villain? (Xu Gang 57-58) 
The Cathayas are readily recognizable as something that is not only very precious or 
rare, but also something that is genuinely Chinese, since this particular species of tree 
only grows in a certain part of this particular country. Moreover, the fact that they 
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are repeatedly referred to as “national treasure” (guobao 国宝 ) establishes an 
ontological connection between a natural object, the tree, and a cultural object, a 
symbol of the Chinese nation. The term guobao is no innocent term is this regard, but 
a highly charged concept that carries heavy connotations of cultural achievement, 
identity, and historic continuities, something that carries intrinsic value.121 In the 
context of the text, the trees are Chinese culture. The congruence between nature and 
culture is further enforced by comparing transgressions against the rare trees with the 
theft (and thus ultimately the defilement) of Terracotta soldiers found in the 
necropolis of China’s first emperor, Qin Shihuang, near Xi’an in 1974, an 
archaeological find of mountainous importance that ever since has been employed 
by the Chinese government to propagate the great achievements of Chinese culture 
to the rest of the world. Thus, the thrust of the anecdote is that whoever destroys the 
“treasures” of China’s nature is equally guilty of transgressions against Chinese 
culture. This assertion is further emphasized by characterizing the actions of the 
people of Xinding country as “barbaric” (yeman). Traditionally, this expression in the 
context of Chinese language identifies those outside Chinese civilization (wenming) 
who are hence on an inferior level of cultural sophistication.  
The author’s (somewhat exaggerated) statement that “the world looks at [these trees] 
with awe and reverence”, alongside calling them “a treasure of humanity”, 
argumentatively links the reputation of the Cathayas to the international attention 
towards the Terracotta army introduced a few paragraphs later. By establishing an 
international dimension to the argument, the author is able to appeal to a Chinese 
readership’s national pride and sensibility, by insinuating that to protect China’s flora 
is equal to protect China’s face against the judgment of the world community. 
In FON’s Towards Green Civilization, a similar framing device is employed: A perfectly 
factual article by Gao Wu高武 from 2002 tracing the correlation between the tree 
and the avian population in Beijing, and the diminishing avian biodiversity in the 
                                                 
121 For the most part, the term guobao refers to man-made inanimate items of crafts and art, but 
occasionally certain personalities of extraordinary merit are referred to as “national treasures” as well 
(Zhongguo guobao renwu 中国国宝人物).. 
  
169 
 
 
Ecological Civilization and the search for Chinese modernity 
 
  
city due to habitat destruction, is entitled “Parasol Tree and Golden Phoenix” 
(Wutongshu yu jin fenghuang 梧桐树与金凤凰). It opens saying: 
“One cannot beckon the Golden Phoenix without a parasol tree.” This is 
a very philosophical old saying. Although the phoenix does not actually 
exist in this world, it is the symbol of one-hundred birds, it represents 
birds in general. The Chinese Parasol Tree (Firmiana simplex) is said to be 
the favorite living environment of the phoenix. Every species has a habitat 
it is best fit to live in, and can also survive in a not-ideal environment 
whose impositions it can tolerate, but once those become too severe, 
that species will die, and become extinct. (ZXLW: 136) 
This argument follows along the same lines as Xu Gang’s text analyzed above: Both 
the wutong tree and the phoenix are symbols of genuine “Chineseness”. As an entry 
into a generic research article on bird population, they move said article into a larger, 
cultural context, in which the preservation of avian biodiversity becomes akin to 
preserving a paragon of Chinese culture.  
Inscribing nature 
In other accounts, nature is literary inscripted with signs and symbols of Chinese 
civilization in order to merge culture with nature. Moran (2002: 211) in this context 
reminds us that the “return to ‘inscribed landscapes’ in search of cultural memories” 
was a very prominent cultural and literary current. In Chinese environmental 
nonfiction, we can find similar accounts: Liang Congjie, for example relates in an 
essay his role in an excursion with the “Three-Gorges Cultural Relics Investigation 
Group” that travels the Yangtze River in late 1993 to the three gorges.122 The author 
informs the reader that the area is home to the “Peking Man’s ancestor”, referring to 
archaeological finds in the area around Wushan District 巫山县  that in 1985 
discovered the fossilized remains of hominids (possibly of 2 million years of age). 
This, according to Liang, seemed to confirm predictions made by Prof. Fei 
Wenzhong 斐文中 who predicted that the biological ancestor of the Peking Man, 
                                                 
122 Liang Congjie; Remarks on searching for archaeological relics in the Three Gorges Area 三峡访古
杂谈 [In: 不重合的圈 (190-200)] 
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discovered  about half a century earlier, were to be located in the Three-Gorges area. 
Introduced to the reader in this way, the very soil is endowed with cultural 
significance (through the human or pre-human bones and their cultural artifacts being 
buried inside it). This connection is further emphasized by photographs of rocky cliffs 
inscribed with Chinese characters that accompany the article: the soil is “stamped” 
with culture. Later, Yang argues that not only the high plains of the Yellow River, 
but also of the Yangtze should be considered “the cradle of Chinese civilization”: 
“to consider the Huanghe region as the sole cradle for the ancient 
civilization of the Chinese nation, to view solely the earliest inhabitants 
there as the founders of ancient Chinese civilization does not fit the 
historic facts. The more knowledge we have about pre-historic 
civilizations outside the Huanghe River basin, the more we can proof that 
the ancient Chinese civilization is the result of the merging of the 
aboriginal, diverse peoples that inhabit the territory of China today; and 
that moreover, the so-called Han Chinese were also formed in this 
merging process. [...] The deeper importance to discover and study (with 
a conservatory intent) the ruins of prehistoric cultures lies just in this. 
(BZQ: 197) 
The article then goes on to introduce to the reader “ancient structures and historical 
sites of lesser renown”, accompanied by a series of photos of steles, structures, and 
temples.  
Traditional Chinese culture is the psychological gene (xinli jiyin 心理基因) 
that provides the cohesive force for the Chinese nation. The national 
identity for Chinese people in China and abroad is first and foremost 
derived from the love for and practice of Chinese traditional culture. 
Therefore, to save and to protect the Three Gorges and its cultural 
artifacts is a concrete activity to protect the cohesion of the Chinese 
nation. We still have ca. 10 more years before the projected completion 
of the Three-Gorges Dam. To rescue the cultural artifacts of the Three 
Gorges in an organized fashion in such a short amount of time will provide 
an extraordinarily difficult duty for cultural workers and archaeologists. 
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Certainly, it is a challenge that must be shared by all Chinese people 
collectively, at home and abroad. (BZQ: 200) 
Similarly to Liang, Xu Gang employs this framing device to great effect when he 
addresses the issue of soil erosion and soil pollution in one of his reportages Xu Gang 
沉沦的国土. In this instance, the author combines accounts of annual soil loss with 
reports of wide-spread grave robbery during the 1980s, and draws parallels between 
the loss of soil and the loss of cultural artifacts. Framed in this way, the very soil in 
endowed with cultural properties, the physical representation of this culture – not 
only Chinese antiques, but also the bones of ancestors – being buried within them 
As the Chinese are building new graves, they are also excavating the old 
ones, or one should rather say: they are robbing graves. Even if only the 
ancestral graves of our richer forebears contained bits of gold and silver, 
none of them escaped the fate of being dug up and plundered. 
Throughout the dynasties, people would use spades and explosives to 
turn ancient relics into piles of rubble, cultural artifacts would find their 
way to Hong Kong, Europe, and China’s national treasures would be sold 
off at a bargain price! 
Ah, China you have lost your way! 
The German weekly newspaper “Die Zeit” ran an article that exposed that 
“in China, the graves are opening up as well”, while the “London Times” 
reported that “China is experiencing a wave a grave robberies, the 
smuggle of antiques is booming, markets in Hong KOng and London are 
flooded with cultural relics from China.” (FMXL: 164) 
Our soil once was fertile and beautiful, our shining old civilization and 
culture endowed our soil and our nation with unsophisticated splendor 
and mystery, brimming with the charm, grace, and allure of the East. It is 
not the soil that made us ignorant, but our ignorance turned the soil into 
an open wound as far as the eye can see.  (FMXL: 166) 
While our nation’s soil is bleeding, while the millenia-old culture of the 
Chinese nation is being shipped off, plundered, sold off by evil and 
ignorant gangsters, while this is a historically unprecedented grave-
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robbery fever, it is not an isolated phenomenon, but it reflects yet 
another destructive excavation activity: The Chinese gold rush, the insane 
gold fever in China.  (FMXL: 168) 
 
Culturalist discourse in the 1980s in China 
As might be expected, such appeals also feature no small amount of cultural self-
essentialization, as they conjure up an imagined past in which man and nature in 
China lived in harmony together guided by the wisdom of the ancients. Roetz’ earlier 
critique of essentialist notions on Chinese concepts of nature hence not only pertains 
to Western perspectives, but is also in part being reciprocated within Chinese 
environmental nonfiction. The historical patterns of such romanticism become even 
stronger when we consider even older trends in Chinese literary history, namely the 
phenomenon of “native-soil literature” (xiangtu wenxue 乡土文学 ) or “native-soil 
fiction” (xiangtu xiaoshuo 乡土小说) in China during the 1920s to the 1940s. The 
historic sociopolitical circumstances between this era and China during the 1980s 
bear some similarities: Chinese intellectuals were confronted with socio-cultural 
changes that had transformed China, not to speak of their intellectual world, in 
profound ways. Writers of native soil literature dealt with these changes by 
constructing an idealized native home country, a place of solace, harmony and 
simplicity that stood in sharp contrast to the onslaught of Western-induced 
modernity upon everything they had once held dear. Their literary response was 
pastoral, as they conjured up lost landscapes and yearned for were an important 
literary trope that was actually addressing memories of cultural traditions which were 
fading away so rapidly.  
It was once more Lu Xun who played an important role in initiating this particular 
literary form. Several of his short stories are set in his native town of Shaoxing (e.g. 
“My Home Town”). Lu Xun certainly was no writer that idealized traditional 
Chinese society, but what these stories address is a bitter-sweet memory of things past, 
and the eventual collapse of a rural idyll by the intrusion of modernity, war, 
industrialization and urbanization. Lu Xun also tried to establish a conceptual 
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framework for native-soil literature. In these remarks from 1935, the congruence of 
pastoral-cultural becomes even clearer: 
Those in Beijing writing about their feelings (towards their native place), 
no matter if they consider themselves subjective or objective, actually are 
writers of native-soil literature. They are Diaspora writers (qiaoyu de 
zuozhe 侨寓的作者) even if they are expressing themselves while living in 
Beijing. But this is not the “Emigrant Literature” (qiaomin wenxue 侨民文
学) George Brandes is talking about.123 It is only the author himself who 
dwells in a distant place, but not his writing. Hence, [in the texts] emerges 
an intermittently visible nostalgia [about the author’s native place], 
rather than the exoticism of distant lands, which might open the reader’s 
eyes or illuminate the world the author finds himself in. 
Before an authors such as Xu Qinwen 许软文 […] even begins to write 
native soil literature, he has already experienced exile, being forced to 
live in a remote and strange place. Such authors cannot but return to "the 
gardens of their fathers", gardens that in reality no longer exist. Because 
it is more comfortable and more consoling to recall things long gone 
which once existed in one’s home place, than thinking about those things 
that actually still exist but are beyond one's reach.124 
What is of importance here is the re-constructed, re-imagined quality of the pastoral 
native soil literature authors are writing. “The gardens of their fathers”, as Lu Xun 
puts it, have never existed in the way they appear through the brush of the writers. 
They are an idealized, essentialized construct of reality that has to be understood as 
way to cope with the experience of confusion about the Self and the Other. Wang 
Der-wei speaks in this context of “Imaginary Nostalgia” in his study of Shen 
                                                 
123 Lu Xun is most likely referring here to Brandes’ Main Currents in Nineteenth Century Literature 
published in 1906, more specifically the chapter “The Emigrant Literature” in Vol. 1. The work is 
accessible here: 
http://www.archive.org/stream/maincurrentsinn07brangoog#page/n10/mode/2up [2011/06/09] 
124 My own translation. For the original Chinese quote, see Lu Xun’s preface to: Lu Xun: Zhongguo 
xín wenxue daxi: Xiaoshuo erji [Anthology of the New Literature of China: Xiaoshuo, Second Volume, 
in: ZHAO Jiabi 赵家璧, ed. (1935-1936). Zhongguo xiandai wenxue daxi [Compendium of Modern 
Chinese Literature]. Shanghai, Liangyou tushu gongsi. I am not in the possession of this volume, Lu 
Xun’s preface is reproduced digitally here: http://wentong.org/luxun/works/qjzr/6.htm 
[2011/06/05] 
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Congwen 沈从文, one of the most famous writers of native soil literature. “At a time 
when most Chinese writers write about war, famine, and social injustice, Shen 
Congwen proceeds to create an idyllic country of his own [...]. But Shen's textual 
utopia reveals its imaginary quality, because it is encased in a menacing reality that 
is anything but utopian, and because, after all, it is only a reinscription of the ancient 
desire for Home and Origin. […] If there is an ideal West Hunan that has fallen into 
the present and the real, reconstituting it yields to an aesthetic and residuality and 
incompleteness: his homeland tour, actual or textual, must betray its imaginary roots. 
Nostalgia refers not so much to a representational effort to enliven the irretrievable 
past as to a creation of an imaginary past on behalf of the present.” (Wang 1992: 248, my 
emphasis) 
Similarly to xiangtu wenxue, various schools or positions arose in antagonism to what 
they perceived as an overly uncritical stance towards Modernity, scientism and 
universalism.125 Moreover, they shared the commitment to a critique of a-historic 
rationality, and a conviction that modernity for China could not only mean a 
modernization of the economic sector via scientific means. Arguably the most 
influential of these schools concerned with culture was a group of scholars that 
should become known as the New Enlightenment (Xin qimeng) movement, as 
represented e.g. by the scholar Gan Yang 甘阳. In his 1988 book “The Contemporary 
Chinese Cultural Consciousness” (Zhongguo dangdai wenhua yishi 中国当代文化意识)126, 
he attacked the largely uncritical acceptance of the prospect of modernity by the 
Chinese academic mainstream. In Wenhua: Zhongguo yu Shijie [“Culture: China and 
the World”], an important publication of the New Enlightenment group, he made 
what can be read as a programmatic statement, that the question of modernity in 
China required a profound reevaluation of which role Chinese culture itself had to 
play in China’s modernization project: “As China moves towards becoming part of 
the world it is only understandable that Chinese culture will also have to become 
internationalized. As China works to achieve modernization, it is a corollary that 
‘cultural modernization’ will also be on the agenda. This is the shared belief of all 
                                                 
125 For an introduction to three groups of culturalist-oriented scholars, see: Chen and Jin 1997: 1-11. 
126 The title of later editions was changed to Bashi Niandai wenhua yishi. 
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people of conscience of the 1980s. This is an inevitable and logical part of China’s 
historic take-off.” (cited in: Xu 2004: 188)  
In a similar vein, there was a smaller but also important group of “New Confucianist” 
scholars that argued for a greater consideration for traditional Chinese thought in 
modernity, which found considerable support from the Chinese overseas community, 
such as mainland scholar Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 from the Academy of Chinese 
Culture (Zhongguo shuyuan), Tu Wei-ming from Harvard University or Hong Kong 
university professor Liu Shu-hsien. Amongst the mainlanders, Li Zehou 李泽厚
proposed that Chinese modernity should consist of an “Amalgam between East and 
West” (Xi ti Zhong yong), an expression that echoed what Zhang Zhidong 張之洞, one 
of the last great officials of the late Qing empire, had argued for when he addressed 
the adoption of Western science and technology into Chinese society almost 100 
years earlier: Zhongxue wei ti, Xixue wei yong 中学为体, 西学为用 - “Chinese learning as 
the core, Western learning for practical use.” 
The issue Xungen writers were struggling with during the 1980s was nothing less than 
China’s cultural identity in the face of Modernity, and the West. Wang Jing (1996: 
213 f.) has quite illustratively mapped out these difficult relationships on a binary 
coordinate system: One axis is constituted by the temporal paradigm, the relationship 
between the “old” or “ancient” (gu 古) and the “new” or “contemporary” (jin 今) “or, 
put in the vocabulary of the Xungen movement, the cultural unconscious versus 
modern consciousness.” (ibid.) The other axis represents the spatial paradigm of the 
relationship between “China” and “The West”: “Chinese writers have to establish 
World Literature as their destination. The recent craze about ‘root-searching is 
intimately connected with this objective. We search for our roots so that we can have 
a dialogue with the West.” (Cao Wenxuan 1988: 240) Xungen writers thus found 
themselves in a difficult double-bind, inasmuch they are forced to both engage in a 
dual criticism of both tradition and modernity, China and the West, constantly forced 
to re-negotiate their individual as well as their collective cultural identity. To this end, 
the Xungen School called for a re-discovery of Chinese culture in the realm of literary 
production, a re-incorporation of China’s rich traditions into literature after the 
onslaught of Maoist literary orthodoxy.  
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Most Xungen writers maintained that no one engaged in cultural production could 
free him- or herself from one’s cultural predispositions (‘roots’), and hence these 
predispositions needed to be re-discovered, consciously addressed, and then put to 
fruitful use. The poet Yang Lian 杨炼 , in an essay entitled “Tradition and us” 
[Chuantong yu women] wrote in 1983: 
This is tradition, the tradition that none of us can cast off. We are rooted 
in a common culture, in the unique linguistic form of a psychological 
structure. It is a form, in that it never determines the modernity of the 
subject-matter, but instead dictates certain peculiar modes of feeling, 
thinking and expression. It commands our obedience in each act of 
artistic creation. I believe that no individual artist in hi creative work can 
betray his tradition. Either consciously or unconsciously, every artist's 
work, his "individual entity", to a greater or lesser degree permeated with 
the "intrinsic elements" of his tradition. (Yang Lian 1983) 
Ah Cheng 阿城, one of the most important representatives of the Xungen movement, 
echoed a similar sentiment in an important theoretical essay called Wenhua zhiyuezhe 
renlei 文化制约着人类 [“Culture constrains humankind”] in which he argued that all 
artists were bound by “cultural constraints” (wenhua zhiyue) to their own particular 
artistic and aesthetic heritage: “Humankind created culture, and culture in return 
constrains humankind.” (Ah Cheng 1985) Han Shaogong 韩少功, whose 1985 essay 
Wenxue de ‘gen’ 文学的‘根’[“The ‘roots’ of literature”] can be read as a manifesto that 
lent its title to the movement as a whole127, called for the re-discovery of aesthetic, 
political, and cultural roots that were intrinsic to “the subject of the nation” and the 
"archetypical subconsciousness immanent in the strengthened subjective spirit of the 
Chinese race." (Han Shaogong 1985: 5)  
It is important to stress at this point that the “searching-for-roots” representatives did 
not understand themselves as a reactionary or conservative force, but saw China’s 
                                                 
127 Next to the essays of Ah Cheng and Han Shaogong I discuss here, other important programmatic 
texts of the movement include Zheng Wanglong’s 郑万隆 Wo de gen[“My roots”], Shanghai Wenxue 
1985 (5); Li Hangyu’s 李杭育 Li yi li women de ‘gen’ 理一理我们的根 [“Let’s put  our ‘roots’ in order] 
Zuojia 1985 (6); and “Stride across the fault zone of literature!” (Kuayue wenhua duanliedai 跨越文化断
裂带 ) by Zheng Yi 郑义, Wenyibao 1985/07/13. 
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only way forward in returning to China’s past in order to critically come to terms 
with modernity. This progressive programmatic is maybe best captured by a 
statement by Xu Zidong 许子东: “Planting our ‘roots’ deeply into the yellow soil 
(huang tudi 黄土地) is the broadest possible path in China for Modernism.” (id. 1989: 
33)  
But in order to do so, Xungen writers had to first re-construct a cultural past that for 
large parts had been lying dormant for a long time, forgotten, or indeed destroyed. 
Moreover, what they were interested in was not so much the heterogeneous, often 
contradictory, and multi-facetted tangible cultural history of China, but rather a re-
invented, homogenized or essentialized past that could serve as a strategic tool for 
China’s way to the future: “Why do we want to search for our own roots? – Because 
we want to march towards the world!”, Li Tuo 李陀 wrote (quoted in Lin Weiping 
1986: 96) C.T. Hsia has famously written about Chinese intellectuals’ "Obsession 
with China" in the appendix to the second edition of his standard work A History of 
Modern Chinese Fiction, published in 1971. He alleged that virtually all Chinese writers 
in the years between 1917 and 1949 were haunted by the question of “What is wrong 
with China?”, and what can be done to remedy China’s weakness and humiliation. 
As Perry Link comments, Hsia’s observation is quite accurate, albeit the time frame 
he chooses might be to narrow: The “obsession” he diagnoses also holds true for 
much of the time before 1917, and “’obsession with China’ resurfaced in the 1980s, 
and, as Hsia claims for the 1917-1949 period, was virtually universal among literary 
intellectuals-including even those who consciously sought to escape it.” (Link 1993: 
11) 
One might describe the perspective of Xungen writers as being characterized by a 
deep-seated schizophrenia in which the West is simultaneously rejected and coveted, 
the object of resentful envy. But to Chinese intellectuals, this schizophrenia does not 
only apply to the West but also to China itself, since the question “What is wrong 
with China” implies both massive frustration with one self but while at the same time 
feeling the need to constantly espouse what is right with China. As so many things, 
this paradoxical relationship also has its precedents in the history of China’s 
encounter with the West. Huters has referred to this state of mind as “a double bind 
– in which recourse to the West was at the same time mandatory and highly 
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distasteful.” (id. 2005: 14) Nowhere is this double bind more visible than in the 
following quote from Han Shaogong:   
After the May 4th movement, Chinese literature turned to the outside 
world to learn from the West, from Japan, Russia, and the Soviet Union. 
Yet at the same time, China in self-deluded arrogance closed its doors to 
"Western imports" which it shunned or burned. [These two extreme 
positions] caused the destruction of our ethnic culture, and the decline 
of our national self-esteem. The same can be seen today, when 
everything from foreign currency exchange to imported perfume has 
become so fashionable amongst certain people. Yet maybe in this process 
of making tabula rasa and leveling harsh criticism [against one’s own 
culture], of withering and destruction, Chinese culture might just about 
to experience its rebirth. 
The great Western historian Arnold J. Toynbee places high hopes on 
Eastern Civilization (dongfang wenming 东方文明). He says that the 
Western Christian civilization is in decline, while the ancient Eastern 
civilization, sound asleep, might rise again due to the 'challenge' posed 
by the Western civilization, and shine its light on the whole world. We 
need not concern ourselves presently with the question whether 
Toynbee is correct or whether he is jumping to conclusions, what matters 
is that many Western scholars hold similar views on this matter. Natural 
scientists such as Descartes, Leibniz, Einstein, and Heisenberg; or 
hommes des lettres such as Tolstoy, Sartre or Jorge Luis Borges, they all 
share a very keen interest on Eastern culture, especially on Daoism [lit. 
Laozi and Zhuangzi], they look up to China and fully respect the Chinese 
people. […] 
A grand and spectacular reform of our economic system is occurring here 
presently, an economic and cultural reconstruction, we pick and chose 
whatever science and technology from the West is useful [to this end], a 
lifestyle of marching towards modernization. But [the cosmic principles 
of] Yin and Yang give rise to one another, there are both gains and losses, 
the new and the old mutually influence each other, a myriad of profound 
changes; China is still China, especially in the field of literature and arts, 
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our deep ethnic essence (shenhou minzu jingshen 深厚民族精神) and 
cultural substance (wenhua wuzhi 文化物质) we have an ethnic sense of 
self. Our responsibility is to release the thermal energy of modern ideas, 
to recast and give a bright plating to the sense of self. This is our 
consolation, and our hope. (Wang Shaogong: 5) 
The author seems to be oblivious to the irony in his own writing: It becomes clear 
that he harbors no small amount of resentment towards the incursions of Western 
culture into Chinese culture, yet at the same time there seems to be an almost 
desperate need for recognition, not from one’s own peers mind you. Instead, the 
validation for one’s own cultural accomplishments is sought from the very same side 
one is so resentful towards. 
This double bind Huters speaks of is very visible in a 2010 book by Liao Xiaoyi, 
leader of the NGO Global Village Beijing. In “Environmental Remedies: Sheri Liao’s 
Talks with Eastern and Western Thinkers”, Liao interviews a series of Western 
scholars, thinkers, and politicians, on the topic of the value of “Eastern philosophy” 
for environmental protection. Every  interviewee  is  introduced  with  a  short  
paragraph  that  also  features  his  Chinese zodiac,  while  traditional  Chinese  
artwork  is  displayed  throughout  the  book.  The contributers  address  questions  
such  “Return  to  ancient  Chinese  cosmology”,  or “Rejuvenate  traditional  Chinese  
medicine”.  In her introduction to  the  volume,  Liao advocates  on  behalf  of  an  
„environmentalism  with  Chinese  characteristics“  (Zhongguoshi huanbao 中国式
环保) . 
To adjust to nature (shunyin daziran 顺应大自然) and unity between man 
and nature  (tianren  heyi  天 人 合 一 ),  those  are  the  natural  models  
for environmentalism  with  Chinese  characteristics.”  This model […] was 
not without flaws, however as the essential aspect of Chinese thinking 
and Chinese spirit, environmentalism with Chinese characteristics still left 
us with a perfect intellectual goldmine. Before the Western cannons 
invaded us alongside modes of thinking such as production lines and 
consumer models, our ancestors had left  us  with  surging  rivers,  vast  
grasslands,  rich  soils  not  yet  polluted  by industrial  fertilizers,  and  
forests  not  yet  cut  down  by  electric  saws.  When homogenized and 
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formalistic notions of Western “democracy” destroyed the cultural 
diversity of the West itself and that of its colonies, China – which they had  
labeled  “autocratic”  –  still  had  the  exquisite  agronomy  of  at  least  
56 ethnicities,  consummate  medical  systems,  delicate  handicrafts,  and  
other material  and  nonmaterial  cultural  heritages.  This  included  the  
richest biodiversity  in  the  world  that  had  been  preserved  through  
these  forms  of cultural diversity, because China had been practicing 
environmental protection for 5000 years!” (Liao 2010: V)  
This  quote  exemplifies  the  at  times  paradox  situation  proponents  of  the  
culturalist argument  for  “Chinese”  environmentalism  have  to  face.  While  
Chinese  legacies  of environmental destruction are ignored in favor of essentialized 
notions of “unity between man  and  heaven”,  the  West  is  being  blamed  for  the  
introduction  of  the  pernicious ideologies and technologies that caused China’s 
ecological crisis. However, Marxism itself is a Western ideology, and earlier 
generations in China precisely adopted it to cure “the sick man of the East”. Now  
again,  the  West has jumped ahead in its development of green environmental modes 
of thinking and technologies,  and  China  again  is  faced  with  having  to  cope  with  
a  perceived  status  of being the perpetual laggart. The invocations of traditional 
Chinese culture can be seen as a way to cope with these perceived deficiencies. 
However, there is something paradox in the endeavor of Liao’s  book:  the  urge  to  
seek  validation  from  Western  thinkers  on  behalf  of  traditional Chinese  culture  
invoked  in  order  to  overcome  Western  developmentalism.  One might speak in 
this regard of yet another manifestation of a long-established inferiority complex 
within the Chinese intellectual establishment, or even indeed the entire Chinese 
population vis-a-vis the West. Wang Nuo in his 2007 volume addresses exactly this 
situation when argues that Chinese Ecocriticism and the study of foreign literature 
should make greater strides towards overcoming “national inferiority complexes”:  
I think that in the current context, teaching and research of foreign 
literature in China should undergo large-scale reforms as far as the 
content of teaching and and the object of research is concerned.  It  
should  do  in  order  to  impel  the Chinese  nation  to  overcome  its  
national  inferiority  complex,  to  dispel  its increasingly  extremist  
nationalist  sentiment,   and  contribute  to  the  change, rejuvenation and 
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strengthening of the sense of self of a Chinese nation in the midst of 
ongoing cultural globalization. (Wang Nuo 2007: 216)  
The  essence  of  [our]  national  inferiority  complex  consists  of  a  lack  
of  self-confidence,  of  weakness,  a  feeling  of  insignificance,  but  in  its 
outward manifestation it resolutely refuses to acknowledge this and is 
more afraid that the nation might become aware of these weaknesses, 
which creates a strong desire for self-protection. The nation constructs a 
defensive net between itself and other nations as tightly as possible in 
order to dismiss all information that might touch its inferiority complex 
or threaten to dissolve its own erroneous informations [about itself] 
growing accustomed to view the outside world with suspicion,  hostility,  
and  combativeness.  When this self-protection goes to extremes, it 
becomes a self-isolationist closed-door policy. (ibid) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
VI. The allure of the periphery: 
Cultural counter-narratives and 
social nonconformism 
The preceding chapters have dealt with conciliatory modes of framing that involve 
rhetoric devices such as accommodation, cooperation, or remonstrance. While these 
are and will remain important discursive modes of Chinese environmentalism, we 
must not forget that activism around environmental issues often challenges 
established understandings of progress and development and hence contain a 
potential for social conflict.  
The development of the environmental movement in the West occurred in the 
context of a blooming of alternative lifestyles and subcultures during the 1960s. Jenei 
und Kuti (2008) in this context describe the rise of “movements and intentional 
communities” in the European countries and the United States during the 1960s and 
1970s that created a new wave of associational involvement and participatory 
behavior of the citizenry. These movements and intentional communities coalesced 
around a wide variety of issues that initially were not necessarily political in nature 
but often enough represented social or purely hedonistic issues: the rejection of the 
Vietnam War, the protest against racial discrimination, the fight for alternative sexual 
mores, etc. gave rise to new forms of social organizing around new lifestyles that 
often provided an initial framework onto which more politically aggregated activism 
would later be built. “Religious and pseudo-religious groups”, for example “represent 
special types of societies for alternatives. They provide a framework for the 
emergence of alternative lifestyles all around the world in form of ashrams, kibbutzim, 
Buddhist monasteries, […].” (Jenei/Kuti 2008: 11) This is also true for the 
environmental movement. “All the above listed forms of alternative societies and 
societies of alternatives have one thing in common: they provide special solutions for 
the political empowerment of civil society. In this form of empowerment, citizens 
look for tools and methods of taking control of their own lifes, turning against the 
political power of the state and the public sector and against the economic power, the 
market-type mechanism dominating the private sector.” (ibid: 11) 
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Such mechanisms can also be observed in countries in which political power has been 
monopolized by one party. In such a tightly controlled political environment, the 
creation of artistic and cultural spaces that do not conform to officially propagated 
aesthetic norms can be viewed as inherently political since they challenge the all-
encompassing claims of state power: Commenting on the relationship between 
subcultures and the development of civil society organizations in Eastern Germany 
in the 1970s and 1980s, Olivo observes that “[...] cultural and artistic subcultures 
played a significant role in the development of a parallel polis. These subcultures 
reflected attempts to create an understanding of art separate from that of the state or 
to develop alternative lifestyles. Even though most of these activities were not 
undertaken with political intent, they were subversive.” (Olivo 2001: 86)  
To explore the representation of alternative lifestyles in Chinese environmental 
nonfiction, we turn to nature writing set in China’s periphery, with a special emphasis 
on Tibet. The term “periphery” in this context not only connotes a spatial dimension 
– the border regions of the People’s Republic of China – but also an ethnic and 
cultural dimension, since these regions are inhabited by what is commonly referred 
to as China’s “ethnic minorities”. With regards to Chinese nonfiction environmental 
literature, some of the most popular or widely-read texts are set in or deal with the 
experience of nature at China’s border regions: This chapter focuses on the works of 
two popular writers; Yang Xin’s 杨欣 “Soul  of the Yangtze” (Changjiang hun 长江
魂), an account of his attempt to raft the Yangtze in the 1980s,  and “Ten years in 
Kekexili” [Qinli Kekexili shinian 亲历可可西里十年], an account of the establishment of 
China's first environmental monitoring station in Qinghai Province. The other one is 
“Heavenly Beads” (Tianzhu 天珠) by Liu Jianqiang 刘鉴强 (2009). In addition to these 
core texts, the chapter also draws from several other environmental nonfiction texts 
dealing with Tibet in the context of Chinese environmentalism. Most notably, these 
texts are “Green Camp in Tibet”128, by Tang Xiyang and “Chasing Dreams at Snow 
Mountain” (Xueshan qiumeng 雪山寻梦, published in 1998), a separate account of 
                                                 
128 The chapter appears in both the 1997 version of A Green World Tour, as well as in CCC. The chapter 
has also been published separately as an article in its own right in various Chinese journals since 1998, 
including in Ecological Economy [Shengtai Jingji] (1998/01), Chinese Wildlife [Yeshang Dongwu] (1999/02), 
and Environmental Education [Huanjing Jiaoyu] (2002/05).  
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Green Camp’s journey to China’s Himalayas region by Shen Xiaohui 沈孝辉, a 
student of Mr. Tang and well-known Chinese environmental advocate and reporter.  
VI.1 The rugged individual in the wilderness: Yang Xin  
The sociocultural landscape of the 1980s in China was in many ways concerned with 
rediscoveries, and amongst the many things waiting to be re-discovered was the 
individual self: Decades of incessant campaigning had hammered into the Chinese 
populace the idea of the supremacy of the collective over the individual, that personal 
happiness had to be sacrificed for the greater common good, that socially non-
conformist behavior would be severely punished. Maoism had done away with 
individual privacy and established pervasive rituals of self-examination that required 
ever-new pronouncements of loyalty and exaltation to the cause of Socialism, while 
every individual was constantly expected to bare their most private feelings to the 
group, through “confessions”, “self-criticism”, and “struggle sessions”. After the 
revolutionary furor had resided, the heavy toll of totalitarian collectivism became 
visible. A generation left uneducated, brutalized, and disillusioned, the nation’s 
economy in shambles, the early idealism for the Chinese socialist project squandered.  
The youth culture of the 1980s in China, culminating in the student movement and 
the massacre on Tiananmen Square in 1989, can also be understood as a reaction to 
the anti-individualism of the Cultural Revolution. Cui Jian 崔建 , “China’s Bob 
Dylan”, was the representative voice of this movement. In 1989, Wu’erkaixi 吾尔开
希, one of the student leaders on Tiananmen Square (and himself member of the 
Uighur ethnic minority), stressed the role of rock singers such as Cui Jian as being 
the voice of their generation: 
Chinese college students have been stressing the individual, the self, and 
rebelling against all sorts of authority […] but this idealism and the sense 
of the individual is contrary to the reality of present society. […] The 
people who are most influential among young people are not [the 
dissident intellectuals] Fang Lizhi and Wei Jingsheng, but singers such as 
Cui Jian. (cited in: Jones 1992: 123) 
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In his song “Fake Itinerant Monk”, Cui Jian strikes the posture of a lone adventurer 
making his way into the unknown, far away from the restraints and demands of 
society: 
Cui Jian – Fake Itinerant Monk (Jia xingseng 假行僧): 
 
I want to wander from south to north. 
I want to wander from day into the night. 
I want everybody to see me, 
But not know who I am. 
 
Should you see me looking a little tired, 
Then please pour me a bowl of water. 
Should you've fallen in love with me, 
Then please kiss my mouth. 
 
I have these feet, I have these legs. 
I have so many mountains and rivers. 
I want all of this everything - but not hate or regret. 
If you want to love me, don't worry about regret, 
Because eventually I always leave everything 
behind. 
I never stay in one place, 
And never want anyone to follow me, 
 
I want to wander from south to north. 
I want to wander from day into the night. 
I want everybody to see me, 
But not know who I am. 
I only want to see you grow beautiful, 
But don't want to know about your suffering. 
I wish to attain the waters of heaven, 
But not your tears. 
 
I have no wish to believe in demons, 
And no wish to oppose anybody. 
Don't try to figure out who I really am, 
And don't try to see through my facade. 
Such lyrics hit the mood of an entire generation of young Chinese who above all 
wanted to be left alone by state propaganda and demanded their own space for self-
discovery and “the pursuit of happiness”. Cui’s song is not just about Wanderlust and 
youthful reveries about adventure and romance: The wanderer, the lone individual, 
refuses to be co-opted by the constraints of society, be it love or conflict. His wish to 
“be seen by everybody, without knowing who I am” can be seen as more than 
adolescent posturing, the construction of an aloof, debonair, and macho persona, but 
as a rejection of the rituals of self-baring the individual was subjected to during the 
Cultural Revolution. The mention of “mountains and rivers” (shanshui 山水) provides 
an initial clue concerning the connection between the wilderness imaginary and 
social escapism: Even though Cui Jian can be counted among the ecological 
movement in China, his lyrics evoke a romantic ideal of breaking free and finding 
freedom outside society in the wilderness. They also echo with a beloved literary 
classic, The Outlaws of the Marches (also known as All Men Are Brothers and The Water 
Margin), the epic tale of 108 somewhat rowdy yet chivalrous warriors who gather in 
the wilds to wage guerilla warfare against a corrupt imperial government (the Chinese 
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title of the novel, Shuihu zhuan 水浒传, lit. “Tales from the Water Margins”, refers to 
the outlaw’s mountain stronghold amidst inaccessible marchlands). 
The naturescape invoked does not only promise freedom in a political sense, but 
more generally can also be read as the longing for a place where the rigid norms of 
Chinese socialist society do not apply, which includes its sexual mores. This 
connection between wild untamed nature, raw masculinity, and sexuality is gained 
significant prominence in the Chinese cultural landscape of the 1980s, probably most 
prominently expressed in Mo Yan’s bestselling novel “Red Sorghum”: Mo Yan 
became famous in the late 1980s when filmmaker Zhang Yimou 张艺谋 made his 
novel, a saga of life in rural Shandong during the Japanese invasion in the 1930s and 
1940s, into a prize-winning film. Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波 later wrote that one reason for 
the film’s tremendous success was that 
[it] drew freely upon the themes of raw sexuality and adultery. Its theme 
song, “Sister, be gutsy, go forward,” was an unbridled endorsement of the 
primitive vitality of lust. Against the backdrop of fire-red sorghum in 
desolate northwestern China, under the broad blue sky and in full view 
of the bright sun, bandits violently abduct village women, wild adultery 
happens in the sorghum fields, bandits murder one another in 
competition for women, male laborers magically produce the widely 
renowned liquor “Six-Mile Red” by urinating into the heroine’s brewing 
wine, and so on. All of this […] not only sets the scene for marvelous 
consummations of male and female sexual desire; it creates a broader 
dream vision that carries magical vitality. That Red Sorghum could win 
prizes symbolizes a change in national attitudes towards sex: “erotic 
display” had come to be seen as “exuberant vitality.”129 
Ma Jian’s 马建 “Red Dust” (Hongchen 红尘) struck a very similar note during the 1980s. 
The book is the travelogue of a rebellious young man, the author himself, a struggling 
                                                 
129 The quote can be found in an essay published in 2004, “Qingse kuanghuan – Zhongguo Shangye 
wenhua piping zhi yi  情色狂欢. 中国商业文化批判之一” 
[http://blog.boxun.com/hero/liuxb/174_1.shtml, accessed 2012-11-12] at the web site of The 
Independent Chinese Pen Centre. The translation, “The Erotic Carnival in Recent Chinese History” is 
found in: Liu Xiaobo and Perry Link (2012): No Enemies, No Hatred, Harvard University Press: 150-
174. I am grateful to Prof. Perry Link for directing me towards this quote. 
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photographer and journalist in Beijing in the year 1983. Being constantly harassed by 
the authorities for his rebellious behavior, he flees Beijing under cover of night and 
sets out on an unscripted three-year journey that leads him into remote areas far from 
China’s political or cultural centers (and includes numerous, also sexual, adventures). 
The title of the book refers to the Buddhist expression for the ordinary material world, 
the vale of tears, and can be seen as an indicator for the spiritual dimension of the 
journey. Ma Jian’s work does not only address the fatigue of his generation with 
Chinese Socialism, but intersects with another prominent literary trope of the time, 
that of the drop-out, the social undesirable, or ruffian: For some, the end of the era 
of revolutionary idealism meant the rise of an increasing cynicism, and they focused 
their attention away from politics towards hedonism and material well-being. The 
liumang or pizi, the hooligan or ruffian, can be seen as representative of a 1980’s 
Chinese counter-culture that contemptuously rejects societal conformity. 130  This 
literary archetype is probably best represented in Chinese literature in the “hooligan 
stories” and novels of Wang Shuo 王朔. The characters that inhabit Wang’s stories 
are gamblers, ne'er-do-wells, adventurers, and rogues in pursuit of money, sex, and 
the cheap thrill. However, the celebration of eccentric and/or hedonistic 
individualism does not necessarily mean a celebration of stagnancy or passiveness. 
To the contrary, as Wang Shuo himself remarked at one point, non-conformist 
individualism can be seen as a means of progress, by introducing previously alien 
concepts into mainstream society, something that could also be said for the role of 
eccentrics in Western environmental activism131: 
                                                 
130 For an extensive account of the historic genesis of the terms as well as its literary use, see: Tanner 
2000. Another manifestation of the trope of the independent tough-guy during the 1980s was the 
celebration of gemen'r 哥们儿 [“buddies” or “sworn brothers”], groups of men who banded together 
against outside adversity, which was an indirect result of the overall disenchantment with the Chinese 
socialist state. “As the party and state were increasingly perceived as being morally bankrupt and the 
workplace as merely a microcosm of the state, it was often felt that only strong gemen'r relationships 
could inspire people to acts of heroism or even basic decency, thereby helping the individual maintain 
workable social relationships.” (Barmé 1999:87-88) 
131 This is not the place to discuss the very rich topic of the role of individual eccentricity in social 
movements. A strong argument can be made that social changes have often coalesced around certain 
prominent individuals, often initially dismissed as eccentrics or troublemakers, that went on to become 
spokesperson for their cause. (We might think of German author Hermann Hesse and his role in 
propagating issues such as veganism or nudism during the 1920s, issues that were highly controversial 
at the time.) In the case of international environmentalism, we might point to individuals such as 
Edward Abbey, life-long American protectionist and author of the widely known The Monkey Wrench 
Gang, a classic among the more militant part of the ecological movement in the West. An anarchist, 
environmental activist, author, and eccentric by any stretch of the imagination, Abbey was famous 
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All the driving force behind reform and opening has come from pizi. It is 
pizi who go into business, it is pizi who start up factories, open stores, it 
is their craziness [fengkuang 疯狂] that pushes society ahead. Because 
China's economic system is not yet perfected and its legal system is not 
completely set up, you can see that the people who have really been 
successful, the ones who have already gotten rich, they're all pizi. (cited 
in Liu Weimin 1995: 2) 
Yang Xin 
Environmentalist Yang Xin 杨欣 certainly fits the description of a individualistic non-
conformist who does not let social conventions get into the way of pursuing his 
passions. Yang Xin is the founder and director of “Green River” (Lüse jianghe 绿色江
河, founded in 1995), an internationally renowned environmental NGO.132 Yang Xin 
is best known for the establishment of China’s first non-governmental Nature 
Conservation Station in 1997, located at an altitude of 4,500 meters on inhospitable 
high plateau in the Himalayans, the no-man’s land of Kekexili (or Hoh Xil), between 
Tibet and Qinghai. Named “Sonam Dargye” in memory of a Tibetan ranger who 
was murdered in 1994 by a gang of poachers, the conservation station monitors and 
protects the population of the Tibetan antelope which by the 1990s had been almost 
                                                 
and infamous for his bearded outlaw persona, the unconventional directions he provided for his own 
funeral, and for social graces illustrated by statements such as: “Your criticism is greatly appreciated, 
but fuck you all the same.” In a talk addressed to a group of students he stated: 
“It is not enough to fight for the land; it is even more important to enjoy it. While you can. While 
it’s still here. So get out there and hunt and fish and mess around with your friends, ramble out 
yonder and explore the forests, climb the mountains, bag the peaks, run the rivers, breathe deep of 
that yet sweet and lucid air, sit quietly for a while and contemplate the precious stillness, the lovely, 
mysterious, and awesome space. Enjoy yourselves, keep your brain in your head and your head 
firmly attached to the body, the body active and alive, and I promise you this much; I promise you 
this one sweet victory over our enemies, over those desk-bound men and women with their hearts 
in a safe deposit box, and their eyes hypnotized by desk calculators. I promise you this; you will 
outlive the bastards.” From a speech to environmentalists in Missoula, Montana, and in Colorado, 
which was published in High Country News, (24 September 1976), under the title "Joy, Shipmates, 
Joy!", as quoted in Saving Nature's Legacy : Protecting and Restoring Biodiversity (1994) by Reed F. 
Noss, Allen Y. Cooperrider, and Rodger Schlickeisen: 338) 
132 It has received the “SEE&TNC Eco Award” in 2007, and the “Earth Award” in 2000 and 2001. 
The SEE&TNC Eco Award (SEE&TNC 生态奖) is a prize jointly awarded by the SEE Foundation 
(SEE 基金会) and The Nature Conservancy (大自然保护协会). The “Earth Award” (Diqiu Jiang 地球
奖) is an annual recognition jointly awarded by the China Association of Environmental Journalists 
and the Hong Kong Friends of the Earth. 
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hunted to extinction. (The story of Sonam Dargye’s death is an essential part of the 
mythology of China’s environmental movement, it will be addressed in detail below.)  
Sporting his trademark full beard and 
long hair, Yang retains the public 
persona of an unrefined man of 
action who prefers the rough climate 
and adventure of the high mountains 
to a cushy office job in the city. As 
such, his biography resonates with 
the popular youth culture of the 
Chinese 1980s when – just like the 
protagonist of Cui Jian’s song or Ma 
Jian’s novel – he broke with social 
expectations and wandered into the unknown: Born in 1963 in Chengdu, he 
graduated from Chongqing Technical University only to forfeit a regular career in 
favor of a more adventurous lifestyle: When the possession of a camera was still 
limited to a few individuals, Yang sold his ancestral home in Sichuan province and 
spent some of the money to buy a Great Wall sz-1 camera. After starting to take 
pictures for his family and friends, Yang began month-long photographic excursions, 
and made a name for himself as a photographer: He visited 
and photographed natural landmarks such as Lugu Lake, 
Lijiang River, and the Leaping Tiger Gorge, (whose natural 
beauty has made them into popular tourist destinations 
nowadays, but which were not widely known at the time). 
When Yang was 23 years old, in 1986, he participated in an 
expedition that planned to raft the upper reaches of the 
Yangtze River from its glacier source in Tibet and Qinghai 
into Sichuan province. Yang was the designated 
photographer on this journey. The impetus for joining the expedition came when the 
Chengdu Branch of the Chinese Academy of Sciences was looking for young 
explorers who would be willing to raft the upper courses of the Yangtze River from 
Tibet, Qinghai, down to Sichuan province. The expedition was organized in honor 
 
Yang Xin in Kekexili, the “Sonam Dargye Natural Conservation Station” 
in the background. The same photograph appears on the cover of Qinli 
Kekexili 10 nian. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yang Xin in Kekexili, the “Sonam Dargye” Natural Conservation Station in the 
background. The same photograph appears on the cover of Qinli Kekexili 10 nian.  
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of a young Chinese student, Yao Maoshu 尧茂书, who had died in a similar rafting 
attempt just one year earlier in 1985. Yao in turn had been motivated to undertake 
his eventual fatal adventure after an American outdoors man, Ken Warren, in 1983 
had applied with the Chinese authorities to organize a similar rafting expedition, but 
had been forced to abort the mission after encountering too many bureaucratic 
hurdles during the application process.133 Warren’s application was seen by many in 
China as a foreign incursion into what was essentially a genuinely Chinese affair: 
“The Yangtze is the mother river of the Chinese nation; it should be left to the 
Chinese to accomplish the task of first rafting it.” (CJH: 3) Such patriotic sentiment 
ran high especially in Chinese student circles, and eventually spurned Yao Maoshu 
to engage in a one-man rafting expedition all by himself, the costs for which he 
covered at his own expense. In June 1985, he set out in a small rubber boat whose 
name “Descendant of the dragon” (long de chuanren 龙的传人) left little doubt about 
the patriotic dedication of its owner. Several weeks into the journey, on July 24th 1986, 
Yao Maoshu’s boat capsized in the shoals of Jiansha River and he drowned. He was 
32 years old and became a “martyr” to the cause of early Chinese environmentalism 
(CJH: 3-4). The expedition Yang Xin participated in was similarly ill-fated, as ten of 
Yang Xin’s fellow travelers lost their lifes. Yang Xin later published the diaries he 
kept during this expedition as a book entitled “Soul of the Yangtze” (Changjiang hun 
长江魂; CJH) in which he details his and his team’s adventures. 
1986 was the year we rafted the Yangtze River. Apart from our team there 
were two others. Our three teams paid a severe prize for rafting the 
Yangtze, all together 10 of our team members died. I saw with my own 
eyes how my comrades beside me were swallowed by the raging waters 
of the river, I myself narrowly escaped death on several occasions. These 
deaths and near-death experiences have provided me with a rich 
                                                 
133 Warren attempted to raft the Yangtze on two separate occasions. In 1983, the outdoor guide and 
adventurer Ken Warren organized an expedition to raft a 1,970-mile section of the Yangtze River. 
The expedition was canceled, however, after Mr. Warren's group traveled to China and faced 
difficulties in negotiating with the Chinese authorities who wouldn’t issue the necessary permits. In 
1986, Warren and his team started a second attempt. That trip was thwarted, however, after the team’s 
photographer, David Shippee, developed altitude sickness at 14,500 feet and died during the trip. 
Some expedition members abandoned the effort at that point, and Mr. Warren was forced to cancel 
when the time allotted for the trip by the Chinese government ran out. He had completed more than 
1,000 miles. (A report on this second expedition’s tragic events and its aftermath can be found in: 
McGovan 1987: 21-22. 
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experience for wild adventures and explorations for the future, and at the 
same time have formed an unshakable basis for future expeditions to 
seek the Yangtze’s sources. (CJH: 87) 
This book was crucial not only in helping to establish Yang’s reputation as a 
dedicated environmentalist. Yang wrote this book specifically with the intention to 
use the money he would earn from its sale in order to fund his next adventure, the 
establishment of the environmental monitoring station in Kekexili in 1997. The 
station is still in operation, financed by donations and the work of up to 300 
volunteers (many of them ethnic Tibetans). In 2007, Yang wrote another book, this 
time on his conservationist work in Kekexili, entitled “Ten years in Kekexili” [Qinli 
Kekexili shinian 亲历可可西里十年 ] in which he and his volunteers recount their 
adventures.  
Yang’s writings provide examples for yet another pattern in which the sociopolitical 
message of Chinese environmental non-fiction is amplified with the naturescape it is 
set in. In this case, the narrative, revolving around issues such as individual 
engagement, overcoming obstacles, and heroism, is set against the background of 
untamed wilderness found at China’s periphery. There, 
nature is wild, harsh, and picturesque; the elements are 
merciless yet awe-inspiring. But such romanticism also 
pertains to the people inhabiting this wilderness: Men are real 
men who brave danger, ride horses, and carry weapons, 
while the women are proud, exotic, and beautiful (or, in other 
accounts, more welcoming to erotic advances than their Han 
Chinese counterparts). Such accounts combine the nature- as 
well as the ethnoscape of China’s periphery to provide an 
imaginary that strongly resonates with, indeed amplifies, themes popular with their 
readership, often young Han Chinese urbanites with little knowledge about 
environmental issues but fascinated by accounts of adventures in the wilderness and 
encounters with exotic people. The appeal of such wilderness adventures in the name 
of environmentalism can be glimpsed from the following description of Yang’s “Ten 
years in Kekexili”; the official promotional blurb that can be found on the book 
(inside its original cover and also on various websites selling the book) reads as such: 
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Kekexili and the Tibetan antelope have already received widespread 
attention. The protection of the Tibetan antelope has become a rallying 
point for China’s wildlife protection efforts. Ten years ago, the 
environmental NGO “Green River” entered Kekexili and started their 
calling to protect the Tibetan antelope. 
Eight years ago, after the charity sale of “Soul of the Yangtze”, Green River 
established China’s first Ecological Conservation Station; that Green River 
has come so far after ten years is due to the dedication of Green River’s 
volunteers in Kekexili. This book is about the personal experiences of 
these volunteers, their true feelings, their actual emotions, cast into 
writing. Their descriptions let the reader get into touch with the reality 
on the ground in Kekexili, the reader will be deeply moved by the 
tenaciousness and toughness of these full-blooded Khampa men134 and 
their no-nonsense attitude (lit.: “actual guns and real bullets, zhenqiang 
shidan 真枪实弹); at the same time, the selfless dedication of the over 300 
volunteers on the ground in Kekexili will let urban readers find a green 
spiritual grounding (jingshen shang de lüse zhidian 精神上的绿色支点). 
The mentioning of the ethnicity of Yang Ying’s volunteers is to be considered a 
deliberate marketing strategy that tries to touch on established Han-Chinese 
preconceptions of the masculinity, exoticism, and courage of Tibetans (see below). 
Of special interest is the explicit mentioning of “urban readers”, indicating that 
awareness for environmental issues – much like correlating social developments that 
had occurred earlier in Western industrialized nations – often develops among 
educated members of the middle-class with “post-material” values. 
However, aside from such cultural existentialism, the fusion of the wilderness 
imaginary with ethno-cultural observations can also serve as a crucial tool in opening 
up new deliberative spaces. Since Chinese environmental nonfiction set at China’s 
periphery is overwhelmingly produced by Han-Chinese authors (often environmental 
                                                 
134 The Khampa are an ethnic group that traditionally inhabits Kham, an area covering parts of 
Sichuan, Qinghai, and Tibet autonomous province. Over the course of their history, they have 
garnered a reputation as warriors.Tellingly, the entry for “Khampa men” (康巴汉子 in Chinese) in 
the popular Chinese Baike Baidu encyclopedia starts with the following description: 豪爽粗犷的康巴
汉子, 某种程度上已经成为藏族男人的标志. [http://baike.baidu.com/view/1204292.htm] 
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activists and journalists like Yang Xin) who both literally and literarily enter an alien 
landscape at the margins of China’s national territory, inhabited by non-Han ethnic 
groups, this configuration necessarily affects the way in which these writers address 
their subject matter: taking the perspective of the outsider, their writing often dwells 
on matters of ethno-cultural difference, the deliberation of which opens up 
argumentative spaces that allow the author to challenge established truth and 
renegotiate old perceptions. These perspectives, however, are neither homogenous 
nor unproblematic, since ethnic relations within the Chinese social imaginary are 
highly complex and at times even contradictory. 
VI.2 Counter-narratives and ethnicity discourse in 1980s China 
Just as Western environmentalism represents a critique of the modernist mindset, 
“modernity” and “progress” experienced a profound sense of crisis in China after the 
catastrophes wrought by Maoism. The “aesthetics of primitivism”, as Wang Rujie 
(2008) calls it, were a possible way for Chinese intellectuals in the cultural sector to 
reject the prescriptions of Socialist Realism and develop a new language in which to 
express their doubt concerning Chinese modernism, while “uses of the primitive that 
we discern in many literary and visual works of art are not just ways of developing 
the discourse of modernity but also a means of organizing the emotional life flowing 
out of China’s experience of modernization.“ (Wang Rujie 2008: 17) 
The “progress” from the May Fourth intellectual enlightenment to the 
subsequent social reforms and projects of modernization parallels the 
process of literary changes in China from realism to modernism. As the 
heirs of the May Fourth movement, some of the realist writers had 
unknowingly developed their art into a form of mass deception resulting 
in their own ineptitude as intellectuals to resist intolerance of rational 
progress. Many acquiesced and complied with this mass-mindedness 
because the language of enlightenment that has translated China into a 
socialist state still dominated the critical reflections of the Cultural 
Revolution after the death of Mao. Thus the great appeal of the 
aesthetics of primitivism as a compensatory adjustment to a set of one-
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sided conscious attitudes, and thus the journey to China’s backwaters to 
seek one’s roots and lost identities. (Wang 2008: 21-22) 
It has been observed that Chinese attitudes towards “primitive” cultures mirrored 
those displayed by Western observers, as has been amply demonstrated by 
scholarship addressing the literary construction of Tibet in Chinese and Western 
literature: “[…] Tibet was beginning to emerge in the late nineteenth century as a 
romantic landscape to fuel Western fantasies of a utopian stronghold in the midst of 
a politicized, colonial vision of Central Asia. Moreover, Tibet concurrently became 
a complex symbol for Eastern mysticism in general and Buddhism as a generic, 
homogenous entity in particular.” (Korom 2001: 173) 
The romanticism and exoticization, for example, that many observers 
have found pervading Western writings about Tibet, is also typical of 
much Chinese writing on this subject, and not only in the descriptions of 
noble primitivism that constitute much of the work of the "root-seeking" 
school of Chinese literature." [...] Both tend to treat the Tibetans as 
objects in stories of heroic achievement by outsiders, or as victims of 
abuse who are incapable of agency. Perhaps this similarity should not 
surprise us overmuch, since both the Western and the Chinese accounts 
arise within societies with histories as invaders or would-be invaders of 
the Tibetan plateau. (Barnett 2001: 273) 
In 1986, Barmé issued a scathing indictment of China’s (Han) intellectuals' 
infatuation with the primitivist imaginary. He stated that “in young literature and 
arts circles, a ‘border regions fever’ (biansaire 边塞热) has been en vogue for the last 
couple of years. This hankering to set foot into the border regions is an attempt to 
replenish the depletion and hollowness of mainland culture with the magnificence, 
mystery, and naturalness of the borderland minority cultures.” (Barmé 1986: 96)135 
The author traces the beginnings of this fascination with China’s “Wild West” to a 
small group of Sichuanese painters loosely grouped around Chen Danqing 陈丹青. He 
came to national attention almost overnight in the early 1980s when he published a 
series of Realist oil paintings (whose style imitated French Realist artist Jean-
                                                 
135 My translation, the original text was published in Chinese.  
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Francois Millet) portraying the lives of ordinary Tibetans in the Chinese hinterlands. 
According to Barmé, the choice of this sujet indicates a desire of Han intellectuals to 
shed off the constraints of mainstream Chinese culture and rediscover in the mirror 
of The Other a sense of lost self; a longing for simple happiness, harmony, and 
cultural ancestry. However, this was accomplished not through a willingness to 
engage with Tibetan culture eye-to-eye, but by an essentialist and eclectic attitude 
that simply appropriated cultural elements for its own purposes:  
[The painters around Chen Danqing] were by no means willing to emerge 
themselves in these lives wholeheartedly. Maintaining the senses and 
sensibilities of outsiders, they simply helped themselves to the physical 
manifestations and emotional expressions of an alien people, and used 
[this material] to enrich their own enunciatory worlds. (Barmé 1986: 96) 
136 
Such conflicting attitudes are mirrored by the official stance of the Chinese 
government on ethnic relations in the People’s Republic. Ethnic relations within the 
Peoples Republic of China have always been characterized by a strong ambiguity that 
not only relates to daily interactions or cultural representations, but also extends to 
the realm of Maoist theory. Mao Zedong in several key texts, most importantly in 
“On New Democracy”, “On the Ten Major Relationships”, and “On the Correct 
Handling of Contradictions Among the People” had warned against the dual danger 
of “Han Chauvinism” (dahan shawen zhuyi 大汉沙文主义), domination of the Han 
majority over ethnic minorities, and the “local” or “territorial ethnic chauvinism” 
                                                 
136 136 To reinforce this point, it might be interesting to refer to a highly revealing anecdote: Li Qingxi 
李庆西 mentions a discussion that took place in the context of an often referred-to symposium on 
literature held in Hangzhou in December 1984 entitled “Literature of the New Era. Review and 
Predictions” (Xin shiqi wenxue: huigu yu yuce 新时期文学. 回顾与预测). Two prominent Xungen writers, 
Han Shaogong and Li Hangyu, pointed out that so-called traditional culture could be divided into 
“standard” culture and “nonstandard culture”, and advocated that the cultural revival of Chinese 
literature should not limit itself to the narrow framework of “standard culture”, meaning Confucian 
orthodoxy. Han spoke in favor of the traditions of “barbaric” ethnic minorities such as the Chu of 
Hunan province, while Li emphasized the folkways and local customs of the people of Zhejiang as a 
potential source for great literary inspiration. However, their suggestions were eventually not further 
pursued, because critics pointed out that their most formidable problem was fusing “Western” with 
“Eastern” culture. One could hence argue that this was the case because it meant a de-essentialization 
of “Chinese culture”, and that a heterogeneous cultural heritage did not seem appealing to a group of 
intellectuals intent on pursuing what was essentially an agenda driven by cultural-political 
considerations. Can self-essentialization be an emancipatory act?   
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(difang minzu zhuyi 地方民族主义) of individual ethnic groups. While Mao in general 
regarded the self-determination of minority nationalities within China favorably, its 
priority was overwritten by a more profound contradiction that existed on the world 
stage; the historic struggle between imperialism and revolution. The chairman argued 
for a strategic alliance of the CCP with all progressive (i.e. revolutionary) forces 
within the Chinese nation, which incorporated not only different classes within 
society, but also different “peoples”. “In ‘New Democracy’, Mao asserted that self-
determination for minority nationalities was to be deferred until China’s revolution 
united with the world socialist revolution. When that happened, and interstate 
barriers were revisited in a world united by socialism, the question of self-
determination might again become appropriate.” (Howland 2010: 183) What this 
outlook implied was that issues of ethnic relations within China would have to be 
shoehorned into the ideological categories of Marxism-Leninism, above all that of 
class and nation-state. Thus, the business of revolution and the interests of the Socialist 
state overwrote considerations of minority self-determination. Bulag, writing on the 
process of integration of the Mongol population of Inner Mongolia into the PRC after 
1949, concurs when he states “that the Communist approach to non-Chinese 
nationalities before 1949 was deeply influenced by class-nation categories. The 
Mongols and other peoples were understood as oppressed and colonized nations, and 
they were promised self-determination as a way of achieving equality with the 
Chinese people.” (Bulag 2002: 111)  
As Howland (2011) in his account on the theoretical foundations of minority policies 
under Maoism has pointed out, Mao’s perspective caused “profound contradictions 
[…] at the heart of the minority nationalities policy.” (ibid: 186): Mao’s theory not 
only subsumed the interests of China’s ethnic minorities under that of the Chinese 
state as a whole, it at the same time also – and quite paradoxically – enabled the very 
same “Han chauvinism” Mao had argued against: In 1954, Liu Shaoqi 刘少奇 himself 
in his address to the First National People’s Congress declared that China’s ethnic 
minorities should stand with the CCP against the common enemy of imperialism, 
and strengthen their patriotic commitment to the Chinese motherland. Imperialist 
agents were actively trying to undermine the unity of the Chinese peoples by 
supporting puppet regimes and stooges such as the Dalai Lama in Tibet, which 
represented the old, feudal society that Chinese Communism was determined to do 
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away with. But on the other hand, because the minority nationalities suffered from 
“economic and cultural backwardness”, Liu contended that they were unable to 
progress without the help of their Han brethren. Thus, the state had a duty to send 
Han cadres to work in the minority areas, where they would serve and assist the 
minority nationalities to consolidate their internal unity and political maturity, until 
the time when they could assume leadership in the area. “But what” asks Howland 
in his analysis “is chauvinism if not the judgment that a minority is backward and 
that the majority has the solution for its path to progress?” (Howland 2011: 187)  
To be sure, Mao’s stated intention was not to dominate minority 
nationalities, but to bring them into the world socialist revolution. 
Unfortunately for them, Mao’s commitment to revolution relied on an 
imperialist principle and practice of the state, and deferred the question 
of the self-determination of autonomous regions until a future time when 
imperialism was crushed.  Sovereignty was a principle of territory, the 
location of the nation and the state. But as noted above, the victory over 
imperialism proceeded first through the transformation of the nation and 
its society of class divisions; once that transformation had occurred, the 
state would be altered. (ibid. 190) 
Returning to the context of environmental nonfiction, it is this contradiction between 
the self-understanding of the CCP and its leadership (overwhelmingly comprised of 
Han-Chinese cadres) as the main advocate for ethnic minority interests, while 
simultaneously maintaining an attitude of patronizing disregard, indeed contempt, 
for cultural, ethnic, or local idiosyncrasies that is characterizing relations between 
Han majority and ethnic minorities in China to this day. Bulag calls this “the violent 
provincialism of universalism”: “Put differently, this is a conflict between difference 
and universalism. Universalism, or the difference-blind principle, is usually cloaked 
in neutrality, equality, dignity, and individualism. Its critics, on the contrary, 
frequently point out its hypocrisy as imposing ‘one hegemonic culture’ and see it as 
‘highly discriminatory’. (Bulag 2002: 132) Therefore, socio-cultural reality in China 
is often, and increasingly so, characterized by growing frictions between the Han 
Chinese majority and national minorities who feel increasingly subjected to 
chauvinistic and indeed racist attitudes: In a study conducted in the 1990s, Blum 
(2001) analyzed the attitudes of Han Chinese respondents towards different ethnic 
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minority groups, and found that Tibetans were typically seen as primitive, wild, dirty, 
and “backward”. Ethnic minorities, according to Howland, often appear but nothing 
more than colorful exotic accessories within the mainstream Chinese media landscape: 
In place of unity, scholars in the past fifteen years have noted the 
persistence of differentiation in China, of a sort akin to colonialism and 
exoticism. Largely in the interests of tourism and the art and artifacts 
businesses, China’s minorities have been feminized and eroticized: 
minorities are often represented by women draped in colorful costumes 
or nude in exotic backgrounds. Their primitiveness and free ways of life 
complement the discipline of the modernizing Han nationality, and 
underline the point that the inclusion of China’s minorities has come at 
the cost of their cultural subordination to the Han majority. (Howland 
2010: 191) 
It is the tension between cultural hegemony and particularity that imbues this topic 
with relevance: As mentioned before, the notion of a public sphere as proposed by 
Habermas or Anderson was analytically closely connected to the concept of the 
nation state, and was hence burdened with issues such as homogenization and 
essentialization. Homi Bhabha stresses the analytical importance of challenging the 
concept of the nation state by paying greater attention to so-called “counter-
narratives”. Anderson's overly homogenous notion of the public sphere needed to be 
overcome by focusing on previously disenfranchised voices. In Nation and Narrative 
he writes: 
Counter-narratives of the nation that continually evoke and erase its 
totalizing boundaries - both actual and conceptual - disturb those 
ideological maneuvers through which ‘imagined communities’ are given 
essentialist identities. (Bhabha 1990: 300) 
To challenge essentialist identities – that im- or explicitly overlook the plurality of 
voices within society and drown out minority voices by paying too much attention 
to majority or national identity – the public sphere can be restored to its original 
heterogeneity. The emphasis of cultural difference over cultural homogeneity is an 
important part of such counter-narratives:  
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[Cultural difference] addresses the jarring of meanings and values 
generated in-between the variety and diversity associated with cultural 
plentitude; it represents the process of cultural interpretation formed in 
the perplexity of living, in the disjunctive, luminal space of national 
society […]. The question of cultural difference faces us with a disposition 
of knowledge or a distribution of practices that exist beside each other, 
Abseits, in a form of juxtaposition or contradiction that resists the 
teleology of dialectic sublation. In erasing the harmonious totalities of 
Culture, cultural difference articulate the difference between 
representations of social life without surmounting the space of 
incommensurable meanings and judgments that are produced within the 
process of transcultural negotiation. (Bhabha 1990: 312)  
Chinese environmental nonfiction at times represents a Han Chinese critique of Han 
Chinese cultural hegemony, and respectively an advocacy for cultural particularity, 
hybridity, and difference, and can also be understood as an act of political 
assertiveness by Chinese environmental authors: does cultural pluralism equal 
political pluralism?  
The following analysis presents two distinct yet interconnected literary 
representations of the wilderness imaginary in Chinese environmental nonfiction. 
One focuses on the topic of heroism and individual struggle, the other one on 
spirituality and the pursuit of a meaningful life. In both cases, the nature- as well as 
the ethnoscape of China’s periphery play a crucial role as literary amplifiers to 
highlight the message through comparison with the “other”. 
VI.3 A land for heroes 
Environmental nonfiction’s representation of China’s periphery as the land of 
adventure and individualism has to be understood in the context of the literary as 
well as the social and cultural currents of the 1980s. The “root-seeking” movement, 
the search for individuality and free space, China’s youths’ celebration of non-
mainstream culture often employed the imaginary of the wilderness to give voice to 
their new sensibilities. The wilderness imaginary – and China’s border regions with 
their connotations of exoticism and adventure in particular – lent themselves to 
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literary explorations that focused on issues of escape and individual fullfilment. 
“Norlang” (Nuorilang 诺日朗), a poem cycle by well-known “misty” or “obscure” poet 
Yang Lian 杨炼, might be the best example of a literary trend that fused the search for 
individuality with the Tibetan wilderness imaginary. Yang Lian and a number of 
other poets became known in China’s literary scene through their affiliation with the 
journal Jintian 今天 (“Today”), a non-official publication, between 1978 and 1980. 
Coined “obscure” or “misty poetry” (Menglongshi 朦胧诗) by their critics, the school 
sparked no small amount of debate within the Chinese literary establishment, which 
found fault with the school’s rejection of officially sanctioned aesthetics, its often 
hermetic and “obscure” imaginary, and charged their proponents with displaying 
“unhealthy” tendencies, and being overly individualistic and/or chauvinistic. 137 
While this ostentatious rebellion meant that Yang’s Norlang cycle was singled out for 
criticism during the “Anti Spiritual Pollution” campaign in late 1983, the poet later 
in the decade received a considerable amount of official recognition and, according 
to Edmond, was “seems to have been happy to take advantage of the growth in 
official publishing opportunities in the 1980s, while still actively participating in the 
unofficial scene.” (Edmond 2006: 119)138 
In Yang Lian’s work, the connection between individualism and nature plays a 
crucial role: The school “played a key role allowing the ‘I’ to re-enter Chinese poetry 
and by opening up literature as a site for exploring subjectivity.” (Edmond 2004: 72) 
As Xie (1989) has pointed out, it thus has to be understood in the context of the socio-
cultural changes rocking China at the time, and in the context of larger debates of the 
relationship of Chinese tradition and modernity, and China’s relationship with the 
                                                 
137 For a collection of articles in this literary debate, see: Yao 1989; also: Xiang 1985 for an account of 
the criticism leveled against the school. 
138 For a detailed study of Yang Lian’s publication history, see: Edmond 2006. He addresses the poet’s 
initial ostentatious refusal to publish his work in official, i.e. government-controlled publications, an 
act that he argues can be understood not only as a political statement, but also as a strategic marketing 
decision: “Publishing unofficially was a statement of dissent, an attempt to create an alternative 
cultural sphere that did not rely on the favours of those in positions of power. But this oppositional 
and independent role was undermined by the utilitarian aspect of unofficial publications. That is, 
unofficial publication was not directed simply at creating a separate realm for literature outside official 
regulation but was also an integral part of attempts by writers such as Yang to establish themselves 
within the official literary field.” (Edmond 2006: 119) This two-pronged approach of maintaining a 
critical distance from the political establishment while at the same time seeking its protection is 
another indication for the hybrid form of civil society in China as argued in previous chapters. 
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West. In the quest for this new subjectivity, landscape played a decisive role as a 
screen against which the ‘I’ could be projected against: The ‘I’ within the landscape 
could hence be understood as a stand-in for other binaries such as subjectivity and 
objectivity, the [cultural] “self” (ziwo 自我) engaging with the “world” (shijie 世界), or 
– as Kubin puts it – to merge “personal experiences and social perspectives” (Kubin 
1993: 31) to form a new non-orthodox sociality. “The new sociality in Yang's poetry 
challenged the strict boundaries of subjectivity in China, at the moment when the 
country was moving from collectivism to rampant individualism. [...It] negotiates 
value in a dialectic play between self and other, the ‘I’ and the landscape. It opposes 
both the socialist Chinese literary system and an aesthetic of pure poetry, which was 
initially necessary in order to break free of the political demands of that system.” 
(Edmond 2004: 74)   
There has been substantial debate within the literature over the role of landscape, and 
also nature, in Obscure Poetry. While Bonnie McDougall in her discussion of Bei 
Dao's poetry (another “misty” poet), argues that “nature offers a refuge for the 
oppressed and the weary” (id. 1985: 252), Yeh identifies the author’s role in Misty 
Poetry as “Nature’s Child” and argues that “nature in Misty Poetry is portrayed in a 
predominantly positive way and is often contrasted to negative social systems. 
Nature promises freedom from inhibitions imposed by society [...].” (Yeh 1991: 409) 
Lo echoes a similar sentiment when he states that “for Misty poets like Yang Lian, 
nature designates the place where true and pure experience can be taken hold of in 
opposition to the leveled and denatured kinds.” (Lo 1998: 92) The author also 
criticizes Yang’s work for “the Enlightenment vision of man's domination over 
nature.” (ibid: 113), and for his willingness to employ nature as a way to ascribe 
meaning to his own social identity: “The individual experience (to be more accurate, 
the experience of a modern Chinese subject) described in Yang’s poetry is explicitly 
associated with nature. Nature becomes a ‘world’ for the experience to take place as 
well as a space to record and inscribe reference ineffable experiences in history, 
especially when the official historiography tends to present a highly filtered 
experience of the social collectivity.” (ibid: 95) What is noteworthy here is that the 
nature experience in these accounts is of high artificiality, as it is written by and 
directed at what Yeh calls “frustrated urbanites” for whom literary escapes into wild 
nature provide a welcome break from the travails of everyday life in China’s cities. 
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Given this background, it is not surprising that Zhang Xudong attacks Yang and his 
contemporaries for valorizing “the political illusions of searching for a lost, 
immanent social value”, and exhibiting a “monolithic monumentality.” Despite the 
undeniable essentialization of Chinese culture and romantization of nature, Yang 
Lian’s work especially in Norlang is interested in non-orthodox cultural traditions 
that can complicate, redefine, and enrich the officially sanctioned cultural canon, as 
Edmonds (2004) points out.  As the author himself states in the introduction, 
“Norlang”, the topic of the poem cycle, is the name of a great waterfall in Sichuan 
province known for its natural beauty as well as a male Tibetan deity). 
In “Norlang”, which is the name of a male god in Tibetan, as well as a 
mountain and waterfall in Sichuan, Yang draws on a Tibetan tradition in 
order to examine and complicate the assumptions of self and collective 
identity, and counteract the oppressive Han tradition. Nevertheless, this 
use of Tibetan culture is also a case of cultural appropriation and thus 
within the Chinese imperialist tradition. (Edmond 2004: 74-75) 
Whatever the interpretation, “Norlang” and the surrounding discussion illustrates 
how the invocation of a particular naturescape, that of China's wilderness at the 
periphery, in lockstep with the invocation of non-Han, minority cultures can be used 
to create counter-narratives that challenge not only aesthetic, but also political 
hegemonic discourses. The naturescape hence again serves as a crucial amplifier to 
the underlying topic the respective author wants to convey.  
Although nonfiction, Yang Xin’s “Soul of the Yangtzi” has a strong narrative drive 
that allows the reader to re-live the author’s adventures through his first-person 
narration. The sense of danger and adventure of the expedition is enhanced by the 
fact that the author is a child of the city, and as such unaccustomed to the rough life 
that awaits him and his friends in the wildlands of the Himalayan. After reaching 
their point of departure with trucks, train, and on horseback the expedition is supplied 
with rafts at Shuiwenzhan, a military outpost in Qinghai Province. Soon, the team is 
far removed from any signs of civilization. When it loses its way in the middle of a 
confusing network of waterways, lakes, and ponds that spans a high plateau, Yang – 
who is among the youngest and most physically fit of his team – is sent ahead to scout 
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the area from a higher point of view. Alone in the wilds he spots movement in the 
grass plains below his position: 
Wolves. The friends we met yesterday at Shuiwenzhan told us that there 
are many wolves here in the no-man’s land that stretches over the next 
800 li [ca. 400 kms]. In the past, the wolves roamed in packs of many 
hundreds, until the local militias organized hunts to wipe them out, as did 
the herders and the army with their jeeps. Now, there are not many 
wolves left. But end of last year, the pilots of an emergency helicopter 
discovered a pack of over 60 wolves. At the time, we did not take their 
story to heart, who would have thought that the first expedition I am 
taking part in would run into them? Freezing and hungry, I am shaking 
with fear. Little golden lights are dancing in front of my eyes. One of my 
legs is wobbly from kneeling in the cold water, I breathe heavily, one of 
my hands is clutching the camera hanging down my neck. I have come to 
raft the Yangtze, to die among the waves and billows of the Yangtze would 
be a hero's death, what would it matter to be eaten by wolves? The 
wolves are still coming closer, I couldn’t fend off all of them if they rushed 
me all at once. I wished somebody came to help me, what did I have to 
play the tough guy earlier, going all alone to scout for the road? 
Now it is too late anyway, if I have to die I might just as well go down 
fighting: fortes fortuna adjuvat, as they say [xialu xiangfeng yongzhe 
sheng 狭路相逢勇者胜]. I draw the Tibetan dagger from my belt, and with 
my last strength and a mighty roar, I charge towards the wolves. Maybe 
it’s because I am wearing a red duvet jacket, maybe those wolves have 
never seen a red creature storming towards them out of the water - they 
turn around and make a run for it. I am besides me with excitement: You 
want to chicken out? I’ll get you! Screaming I chase after them until I 
reach the shores of a lake, but those wolves are long gone without a trace. 
Panting, I collapse on the ground. (CJH 43-44) 
Yet not only wildlife, but river itself represents a danger the expedition needs to face. 
After a few calm days of rafting, the currents of the Yangtze become more dangerous. 
  
204 
 
 
The allure of the periphery 
 
  
June 21st: In the afternoon, our boats enter a gorge. I do not have a map, 
so I do not know where it is leading, just that these mountains are 
especially beautiful. The sheer cliffs towering above us are made of 
limestone, at their feet wild grass is growing abundantly, as if the rock 
walls were growing out of the green. High up, the mountain sides are 
riddled with caves and cracks in the rock, a scenery as far as the eye can 
see like from a shanshui landscape painting. With one hand I keep our 
boat on course, with the other hand I photograph this scenery. As we are 
swept into the gorge, I hear from the boat ahead a cry that turns into a 
big ruckus, but they are far ahead so I can’t see what is happening. I am 
later being told that they spotted a bear, standing by the side of the river. 
Some of the team members were becoming anxious, and Yu Cheng had 
readied his gun, yet the bear had not moved and just stood there, 
watching. Xu Xinzhi put up his camera and started filming. As the boats 
were almost ahead, the bear suddenly threw itself into the water towards 
the foremost boat. Its crew shouted in panic and prepared to fight off the 
bear, but when the beast was only a few meters away, it suddenly swam 
to the opposite shore and disappeared into the mountains, its pelt 
dripping with water. (CJH 51) 
What is notable in this paragraph is the contrast between pastoral tranquility and the 
danger posed by wilderness, and the speed with which the face of nature changes in 
an instant. The contemplative mood of the author, inspired by the picturesque 
landscape suddenly changes when nature shows its dangerous side in form a wild 
animal that poses a clear danger to the team members. The paragraph below follows 
immediately after the encounter with the bear. As Yang’s team enters further into the 
gorge, they are for the first time confronted with the full power of an untamed river. 
Suddenly, the contemplative shanshui scenery – already unsettled by the encounter 
with the bear – turns into a place where Yang and his friends are forced to fight for 
their lives. 
The waters of the gorge are becoming wilder and wilder; as we turn 
another corner the river ahead is fuming with white spume. This is the 
first time I am encountering the perilous shoals of the Yangtze, and I am 
mortally afraid, nothing has prepared me for this. The other boats have 
  
205 
 
 
The allure of the periphery 
 
  
been swept ahead out of sight, only two little boats remain, and I feel like 
I am all alone. Before I can gather my thoughts, the currents have already 
flung my little raft into the cataracts; it is being thrown up and down, left 
and right. The waves are crashing onto us higher and higher, half a meter, 
one meter, pounding our boat that is suddenly filling with water, and 
drenching me head to toe. Amidst the crashing waves that are hitting us 
from all sides, I frantically row left, row right, trying to steady the boat. 
Under the attack of the waves, our boat is lifted up, it almost seems as if 
it is hanging in free air and the oars are barely touching the water. 
Mercifully, there is one last wave, and I take this opportunity to bring the 
raft back on course. (CJH 51-52) 
While Yang Xin is Han Chinese, other accounts of individual acchievment in the 
context of environmental nonfiction are often filtered through the lens of race. The 
literary representation of the supposed bravery of Tibetans in particular presents the 
reader with an appealing counterpart that challenges established notions of propriety. 
Such accounts can display a significant level of cultural essentialism as mentioned 
above, but sometimes also feature a distinctive commitment to nuanced portrayals of 
cultural particularities. This breaking-up of established perspectives through the 
prism of ethnicity discourse can be visited in Heavenly Beads (Tianzhu 天朱), a 2009 
book-length reportage written by Han-Chinese environmental investigative journalist 
Liu Jianqiang 刘鉴强. He worked as a deputy editor of chinadialogue.net, a bilingual 
Chinese-English online magazine with a focus on environmental issues in China, 
who also worked as a senior investigative reporter for Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern 
Weekend).139 Some of Liu’s most influential articles included his September 2004 
exposé on the controversial Tiger Leaping Gorge Dams in southern Yunnan 
Province. After reading Liu’s story, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao ordered the project 
suspended pending a central government investigation. His article on the Summer 
                                                 
139 Liu was featured on the front page of the Wall Street Journal on December 21, 2006 about the rise 
of Chinese investigative journalism. He was also featured in China Ink, the Changing Face of Chinese 
Journalism, a book published by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland: 2008 In 2009, his story 
on the Tiger Leaping Gorge won the TNC-SEE Award for Environmental Reporting. Liu’s story on 
China’s environmental movement won the SOPA 2008 Award for Excellence in Reporting on the 
Environment from the Society of Publishers in Asia. Liu was a 2005 nominee for the State 
Environmental Protection Administration’s “China Environmental Protection Person of the Year” 
award. 
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Palace Lake reconstruction (in March 2005) resulted in the country’s first state-level 
public environmental hearing held by the State Environmental Protection 
Administration.  
Heavenly Beads contains accounts of the author’s encounters and interviews with 
Tibetan of various walks of life; lamas, farmers, NGO workers, businessmen who are 
only unified by the fact that they strive to protect the environment and cultural 
traditions of Tibet. Liu’s (who speaks Tibetan) portraits are remarkable inasmuch as 
he spent many months with his subjects, often going to great lengths to win their trust 
and get them to open up to the Han Chinese outsider. As one reviewer of the book 
puts it:  
I appreciate Heavenly Beads for the author’s efforts to approach and 
understand Tibetan people with respect. Unlike most travelers and 
visitors to Tibetan areas, who are just fascinated by scenic landscapes and 
exotic customs, [the author] went further, knocking open the hearts of 
people there, listening to them and learning from them. His penetration 
into the innermost world of his subjects brought him to personal tales far 
more fascinating than exotic scenes, and resulted in a book that is being 
regarded as “a unique history of contemporary Tibet and its people”.140 
One can argue that the mere multi-facetted representation of Tibetan culture and 
society can be understood at creating a “counter-narrative” as described above, since 
it im- or explicitly challenges the essentialist attitudes found in most Chinese-
language writing regarding Tibet. The author himself at many points of the narrative 
challenges his own perspective, reminding the reader of his bias. The following quote 
establishes the author’s intent as a quest for a fairer view unbalanced by ideological 
restraints: 
When I was 7 years old, my brother and I one evening went to the next 
village to see [the 1963 produced propaganda film] "Serfs" (Nongnu 农奴
). The miserable life of the poor Tibetan peasants scared me so much I 
didn't dare to open my eyes, I didn't want to watch the movie anymore, 
                                                 
140 http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/3612-Books-understanding-Tibet. For 
the Chinese version, refer to: http://www.chinadialogue.net/books/3612-Books-understanding-
Tibet/ch [both accessed 2011-10-11] 
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and I implored my elder brother to take me home. It is my least favorite 
movie, and the oppressive and gloomy picture it painted set the tone for 
my basic understanding of the Tibetan people.  
Until 1987, when I attended middle school in Shouguang, Shandong 
province: One day, I read in the newspaper that People's Literature, in Vol. 
1 and 2 of 1987 had published the novel "Stick Out Your Tongue Or You’ll 
Have Nothing" [by Ma Jian], and that it had severely defamed and 
insulted the image of our Tibetan compatriots, misrepresented the life of 
the Tibetan people, and violated the Party's and the government’s 
policies regarding nationalities and religion, instigating the discontent 
and righteous anger of our Tibetan compatriots. The issue of People's 
Literature had been banned, and the editor, a man named Liu Xinwu, 
been dismissed from his post.  
Without hesitating for one second, I rushed into our school's library, and 
searched and searched for this particular issue of People's Literature, but 
couldn't find it. The librarian gave me a wink and said: “It's useless, the 
issue has been sacked.” I thought: “I wonder what it says? How did it 
‘misrepresent the life of the Tibetan people’? What IS their actual life 
like?” At this point, all I knew about the Tibetans had been what “Serfs” 
had told me. Spellbound, I stood in front of the book shelf, and thought 
about the Tibetans: Do they have the same life as I? (HB: 81) 
The same commitment to nuance and self-examination can be found in the 
interviews with Tibetan environmental protectionists. In contrast to other literary 
accounts mentioned above, Heavenly Beads is notable for refusing to engage in 
simplistic essentialist or romantic assertions about Tibetan society and maintaining 
a respectful attitude, while at the same time not shying away from portraying social 
reality in all its complexity. The themes introduced before, individualism, individual 
achievement, and personal dedication to the cause of environmentalism also all 
feature a prominent role. Liu’s account offers several powerful portraits of (Tibetan) 
individuals who often struggle not only against the harsh natural environment they 
live in, but much more against social constraints and prejudice, often represented by 
the Han-Chinese dominated establishment.  
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We meet one of the main protagonists of the book, the Tibetan Gama 嘎玛, full name 
Karma Samdrup 如凯·嘎玛桑珠, an environmental activist (he is the founder of the 
Three Rivers Environmental Protection Association) and also a very wealthy merchant 
dealing in Tibetan antiques and jewelry. The book begins with the author, Liu, 
frantically racing to Beijing airport on an August day in 2006. He has just received a 
call from Samdrup who has arrived from Lhasa at Beijing only to find his three pieces 
of luggage containing antiques and heavenly beads missing. 
Samdrup is described as having a sturdy muscular frame that makes him stand out of 
the Han Chinese around him. A thick braid of pitch-black hair falls down to his lower 
back, his broad flat face is adorned with a long “exotic” moustache, “in the style of 
Gesar Khan”141 which – as the author observes – together with his goatee forms the 
character gong 公 (“public”, also “fair-minded” or “unselfish”) on his face. (Later, the 
author remarks that this is quite fitting since Samdrup always talks about taking care 
of others and attending to communal and public matters.)  His intimidating and 
unrefined appearance, together with that fact that he speaks Mandarin only poorly, 
plays to the stereotype of the “uncivilized” and “wild” Tibetan often held in 
mainstream Chinese society. The author speculates that his “foreign” appearance 
might have increased the hostility of the Starbucks staff that refuses to let him see the 
surveillance tapes of their store where the luggage was last seen.  
However, this superficial impression is contrasted with Samdrup’s composed, indeed 
admirable, demeanor in the face of a potential devastating financial loss: When Liu 
receives the call, Samdrup has just reported the theft to the airport police, and is 
having a meal at Kentucky Fried Chicken. “Son of a gun (hao jiahuo 好家伙)”, the 
author marvels, “to have an appetite in this situation!” Scurrying into the great 
Arrivals Hall of Beijing Airport, Liu spots Samdrup calmly observing the comings 
and goings of the crowd. The Tibetan does not seem to be especially worried about 
the loss of his extremely valuable merchandise. When asked about the approximate 
value of the goods, he dismissively estimates it at around 10 million Yuan, and has a 
good laugh at Liu’s expense when the latter is trying not to faint at the prospect of 
                                                 
141 King Gesar, or Geser was the legendary king of Ling, immortalized in the Epic of King Gesar said to 
date from the 12th century. The epos is still widely disseminated throughout central Asia through 
various oral traditions.  
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losing such a sum. Later, when it turns out that his luggage was simply erroneously 
stored away by the staff of the adjacent Starbucks and is returned to its rightful owner, 
Samdrup not only takes the trouble to formally apologize to all employees for the 
disturbance has caused, but lightheartedly jokes: “Today is a day of great fortune, I 
won 10 million in a single day”. This portrait establishes the noble and “truly” 
civilized character of the Tibetan by reversing mainstream notions of savagery and 
etiquette. At one point, Liu calls his home city of Beijing dismissively as “so-called 
civilized” (HB: 1)  
The portrayal of Samdrup also features a noticeable reference to relationship between 
Han Chinese and Tibetans, as far as masculinity is concerned. Samdrup’s calm stoic 
demeanor in the face of (potential) ruin stands in stark contrast to the behavior of the 
Chinese who are portrayed as petty or hapless. Such representation resonates with 
the established trope of the Han Chinese as the “fragile scholar” (Geng 2004) in 
contrast to the Tibetan warrior.  Hillman and Henfry find that “Tibetans are routinely 
masculinized” in contemporary representations in China (Hillman/Henfry 2006: 
251), in contrast to southern ethnic minorities in China that usually are characterized 
by the effeminateness. Some scholars argue that the sexual metaphor is also one of 
domination, in which the literal or figurative femaleness of minority peoples defines 
them as subordinate to the Han majority. (ibid) In contrast, the masculinization of 
northern ethnicities in central Asia serves as a foil for Han Chinese fantasies about 
the construction of a martial identity. Thus, “we find that Han Chinese impressions 
of Tibetan men never stray far from ‘danger’, ‘fighting’, and ‘sexual conquest’, the 
ingredients of a hypermasculinization.” (Hilman/Henfry 2006: 261)  
Western pastoral writing 
I would like to point out that Western pastoral writing also has a tradition of 
employing the “aesthetics of primitivism” as a language to challenge seemingly 
firmly established perspectives on “appropriate” social behavior: As Leo Marx points 
describes in The Machine in the Garden, a Virginian planter named Robert Beverly in 
1705 published The History and Present State of Virginia, an early example of American 
pastoral writing trying to give voice to the experience of European settlers amidst the 
vastness of the new American continent. (Marx 2000: 75 ff.) In Beverly’s History, the 
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“landscape provokes a utopian vision” (ibid: 77) of America as an edenic garden 
providing material as well as spiritual abundance. The original inhabitants of this 
garden, the native Indians, exert a strong allure on the European author who 
enthusiastically praises the luxuries and pleasures of primitive life in the embrace of 
abundant, unspoilt nature. The Indians, in the words of Beverly, live “without the 
Curse of Industry, their Diversion alone, and not their Labour, supplying their 
Necessities. [...] None of the Toils of Husbandry were exercised by this happy People.” 
(cited in Marx 2000: 80) While the History does not fail to mention incidents of war 
and conflict between Indian tribes and European settlers, the Indians are presented 
in an “almost entirely favorable” light (79). At the end of his accounts, Beverly is 
overcome with much shame and grief about the treatment the Indians have endured 
at the hand of the white settlers, who have not only decimated the natives but also 
inadvertently destroyed the “primitive utopia” that had such an intoxicating effect 
on Beverly. He laments: “And indeed all that the English have done, since their going 
thither, has been only to make some of these Native Pleasures more scarce, by an 
inordinate and unseasonable Use of them”, and hence the Indians have “reason to 
lament the arrival of the Europeans, by whose means they seem to have lost their 
Felicity, as well as their Innocence.” (cited in Marx 2000: 81) 
The key argument in this context is that through a deliberate reversal of perspectives, 
space for the deliberation of new voices and new perspectives opens up:  
When in 1763, a white mob committed a massacre amongst the Indian population 
in Paxton, western Pennsylvania, Benjamin Franklin took command of a local militia 
to restore order and protect the survivors from further violence. Later, in his Remarks 
Concerning the Savages of North America (1784), Franklin condemned the use of the 
term “savages” for Native Americans and wrote that “savages we call them, because 
their manners differ from ours, which we think the perfection of civility; they think 
the same of theirs”. Referring to the Paxton massacre, Franklin turned the phrase 
onto the European perpetrators of the carnage, calling the killers “Christian White 
Savages” to illustrate the point that morality and decency were not related to or 
wholly owned by any one culture: “O ye unhappy Perpetrators of this Horrid 
Wickedness!” [20] Instead, Franklin wrote approvingly about Indian society, and 
especially about the practice of tribe councils which reached agreement by 
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deliberation and consensus, the adoption of which he felt would be beneficial for the 
construction of a strong healthy American civil society. As Johansen puts it: 
There is in the writings of Franklin, as well as those of Jefferson, a sense 
of using the Indian example to recapture natural rights that Europeans 
had lost under monarchy. The European experience was not to be 
reconstructed on American soil. Instead, Franklin (as well as Jefferson) 
sought to erect an amalgam, a combination of indigenous American 
Indian practices and the cultural heritage that the new Americans had 
carried from Europe. In discussing the new culture, Franklin and others 
drew from experience with Native Americans, which was more extensive 
than that of the European natural rights philosophers. The American 
Indians' theory and practice affected Franklin's observations on the need 
for appreciation of diverse cultures and religions, public opinion as the 
basis for a polity, the nature of liberty and happiness, and the social role 
of property.  (Johanson 1982: 84) 
Thus, we can see in the writing of Franklin on the American Indians how the 
argument in favor of respect for and tolerance of diverse modes of living, one of the 
cornerstones upon which American civil society would be built, was greatly helped 
by being able to draw on the image of the cultural Other, in this case the native 
Americans, in order to provide a positive and healthy model against which to 
construct the Self. Johansen continues: 
Franklin's cultural relativism was perhaps one of the purest expressions 
of Enlightenment assumptions that stressed racial equality and the 
universality of moral sense among peoples. Systematic racism was not 
called into service until a rapidly expanding frontier demanded that 
enemies be dehumanized during the rapid, historically inevitable 
westward movement of the nineteenth century. Franklin's respect for 
cultural diversity did not reappear widely as an assumption in Euro-
American thought until Franz Boas and others revived it around the end 
of the nineteenth century. Franklin's writings on Indians express the 
fascination of the Enlightenment with nature, the natural origins of man 
and society, and natural (or human) rights. They are likewise imbued with 
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a search (which amounted at times almost to a ransacking of the past) for 
alternatives to monarchy as a form of government, and to orthodox state-
recognized churches as a form of worship. (ibid: 84) 
The issue of counter-narrative is even more relevant when within the larger context 
of international environmental writing, or even more broadly speaking of 
environmentalism, which it could be argued constitutes a large, comprehensive 
counter-narrative to modernity itself. In this context, the representation of The Other 
is a recurring and very prominent trope. This is especially true for the representation 
of minority people and so-called indigenous cultures, the academic consideration of 
which has received no small amount of attention under the concept of “indigenous 
knowledge”: 
Just as the development of the concept of indigeneity was a reaction to 
modernity’s delocalizing impacts, so was the rise in interest in indigenous 
knowledge in part a response to modernity’s deskilling vision of and 
consequences for local communities. In an explicit effort to counter the 
dominant development discourse, indigenous knowledge scholars 
argued that indigenous peoples possess unique systems of knowledge 
that can serve as the basis for more successful development 
interventions. (Dove 2006: 195)  
Often, counter-narratives to Western modernity were given a personalized form 
through accounts of “primitive” or “native” people whose societies represented a 
tangible alternative to industrialized society. Despite the fact that the introduction of 
concepts such as indigenous knowledge into developmental discussions was based 
on at least partially on empirical validity, such representation from its outset were 
inherently beset by issues of cultural essentialization and exoticism. These tropes are 
not confined to academic circles or environmental writing alone, but have also have 
become firmly established in new-age-inspired and later mainstream popular culture 
and cinema: The 1990 Western epic Dances with Wolves starring Kevin Costner, or 
more recently James Cameron’s Avatar (in which alien inhabitants of a distant planet 
whose culture and appearance closely resemble that of Native American tribes try to 
fight off the exploitation of their planet my a ruthless human “military-industrial 
complex”) are prominent examples.  
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Sonam Dargye 
Arguably the most famous example for the use of this imaginary is the portrayal (and 
celebration) of the life and death of Sonam Dargye (chin. Jiesang Suonandajie 杰桑·索
南达杰) in Chinese environmental nonfiction. He was the secretary of the working 
committee of Zhiduo County and dedicated protectionist who acquired posthumous 
fame in China after being killed in the line of duty by a group of poachers. His life 
and work are addressed in detail in a chapter entitled “Wilderness” (huangyuan 荒原). 
In 1992, Sonam Dargye first targeted the illegal gold diggers who had poured into 
the region by the tens of thousands. Their prospecting activities caused significant 
damage to the ecosystem, and many gold diggers turned to poaching once the gold 
rush had subsided: the Tibetan antelope is an endangered species seen only near the 
dangerous peaks of western China. The wool of its undercoat is famed all over the 
world for its quality. Although trade has been banned under international law, the 
garments continue to be bought, almost exclusively outside China, reportedly for 
$1,400 to $15,000 apiece. Poachers make less than $100 per pelt, already a small 
fortune in China. But the price escalates as the fur is smuggled abroad and sent to 
scarf makers and retailers.  
When Sonam Dargye arrives in Kekexili in 1992, fewer than 50,000 antelopes are 
left, their packs cut down by the poachers’ AK47s to just a few dozen each, at most 
reaching the low hundreds. The narrative in Heavenly Beads establishes the stage for 
the ranger’s struggle against impossible odds: Kekexili, the Himalayan high plateau 
is described as a place of great cruelty but also beauty, imbued with almost mystical 
qualities: “Kekexili means ‘beautiful maiden’ in Mongolian. [...] In the epic of King 
Gesar, Kekexili is the realm of spirits and demons, where no grass will grow, where 
King Gesar buried evil spirits in the ground so that the water has become undrinkable. 
A beautiful female spirit lives there, Adalamo 阿达拉毛, a demon who ensnares King 
Gesar with her feminine wiles for nine years. Maybe the area is named after her.” 
(HB: 95) But the natural environment is harsh and the climate vile, men cannot live 
there for any extended periods of time. This is the territory given to Sonam Dargye 
to police, an almost impossible job given its vastness and hostility to life, where the 
warmest area has an annual temperature average of minus 4 degrees Celsius, 
temperatures can drop to -50 degrees Celsius, and wind speeds are the highest in the 
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Himalayan. In fact, all Sonam Dargye and his men can do is to “enter” (jinqu 进去) 
Kekexili for short patrols that must not take up extended periods of time: The men 
cannot leave their cars to sleep in tents due to the high wind speeds and dangerous 
temperatures, and their outdated equipment is constantly on the verge of breaking 
down. But the danger also comes from poachers, illegal gold diggers and criminals: 
“This is not only no-man’s land, it’s also no-law land!” (HB: 95), the “battlefield” 
(zhandi 战地) on which the rangers fight against the poachers. Out-manned and out-
gunned, against an enemy that can afford modern jeeps and machine guns, they time 
and time again try to protect the antelope population of Kekexili, and too often their 
attempts are thwarted when they arrive too late at the site of yet another massacre.  
Sonam Dargye’s portrait as sketched out by Liu Jianqiang paints the picture of a stoic 
warrior who only cares about fulfilling his duty as a ranger and is not concerned 
about ingratiating himself to his superiors. He maintains “the conduct of a chivalrous 
warrior with a strong sense of justice, he helps the weak and supports the poor. Many 
hate him, but many admire him.” (HB: 88). Sonam Dargye’s personality as well as 
professional conduct stands in stark contrast to that of the Han Chinese cadres in 
charge of the overall territory, as well as their Tibetan lackeys, who are busy fighting 
petty bureaucratic skirmishes. They are out of place in the harsh wilderness Sonam 
Dargye patrols and find his social graces somewhat “uncultivated” (at one point he 
treats visiting Han officials to boiled Tibetan marmot which they find disgusting), but 
Sonam Dargye is also the only one who understands the importance of 
environmental protection. Often, he gets into trouble with local party officials for 
putting environmental issues before economic considerations: “He has thought about 
these problems long before his superiors have. They only care about resources.” (HB: 
93-94) Portrayed this way, Sonam Dargye is a “loose cannon”, somebody who does 
not care about his own advancement, or about giving his (Han Chinese) superiors 
frank and honest opinions. Often, he decides matters in his jurisdiction according to 
his own sense of justice and honor, protecting those he feels are most vulnerable: 
“The greatest thing I have ever done?” he muses, “not to pass along taxes to my 
superiors, and not to collect taxes from the people (duishang bu jiao shui, duixia bu 
zheng shui 对上不交税, 对下不征税)”. (HB 89) What is of note in the account of his life – 
which for all intents and purposes is the glowing portrait of a gruff yet selfless hero – 
is the way in which his conduct is pitted against that of the Han Chinese 
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establishment that simply does not see the importance of his work, and thus does not 
grant him the equipment and manpower he needs to do his job adequately. The 
narrative thus turns the reader’s notion of “civilized” and “competence” on its head, 
forcing him to ask whose values had been in the right place all along. 
Sonam Dargye’s motivation comes not so much from any sort of formal education 
or advanced ecological awareness, but from his own sociocultural background: 
"Although he has not received any Buddhist education, the deeply anchored 
traditional Tibetan culture - for example the notion of the equality of all creatures, 
the commandment not to kill, environmental protection - have caused him to care 
about the fate of the Tibetan antelope and other wildlife. Despite the lack of funds or 
equipment, he is fully committed to the task of preservation, an almost impossible 
job given the vastness of the territory he needs to patrol: “I'm the world's greatest 
CEO, I am in charge of 50,000 square kilometers”, he jokes, “but I don't have one 
dime in my pocket, which also makes me the world's poorest CEO.” (HB: 91)  
The narrative of “Wilderness” ends with a climactic confrontation: After chasing a 
group of game thieves all over the plateau, in almost unbearable climatic conditions, 
Sonam Dargye and his team of four men capture twenty poachers and several trucks 
loaded with fresh kills. As they are making the long trek back to civilization, the 
captives one night turn on their captors when the rangers are exhausted from having 
to guard their prisoners and the trucks day and night. The last passage of the chapter, 
entitled “A hero’s death”, ends thusly: 
Before Sonam Dargye gets out of the car, his driver can hear him think 
aloud: “Maybe something's wrong.” He pulls out his rusty .54 cal pistol. 
“I've been careless”, he mumbles, then gets out and walks ahead.  
From across the other side, the injured man walks over, as if to greet him. 
Once at same level, he suddenly leaps forward, grabbing Sonam Dargye. 
The two men struggle back and forth, suddenly Sonam Dargye throws his 
opponent to the ground, raises his gun and the other man will never rise 
again. The .54 has been fired! 
Gunfire starts to ring “Bam! Bam! Bam!”, a volley of bullets coming his 
way. All cars turn on their headlights, their beam on Sonam Dargye. The 
.54 in hand, he rushes them, into the lights and into the gunfire, like the 
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lone hero on stage taking on many enemies at once, like a Tibetan 
antelope that is caught in the headlights, without orientation, easy to kill. 
Sonam Dargye seems hit, he goes down on one knee, painfully tries to 
seek cover behind a car. He ducks down, but the gunfire continues, Han 
Weilin and Jin Yanzu only hear “crash”, “Bang! Bang! Bang!” the sound of 
the bullets hammering into the car.  
The guns are not firing anymore; Kekexili falls quiet again, into deadly 
stillness. After a long while, one of the poachers runs towards Sonam 
Dargye ‘s truck and yells: “Drive away, or you'll get the same!” 
The driver roars off, in the passing light of the car he sees Sonam Dargye 
stretched out on the ground, gun in one hand, gun clip in the other. His 
furious eyes are wide open, but his body is completely still, just like an ice 
sculpture. 
Nobody dares to approach him. Even in death, he terrifies people. (HB: 
115) 
It is notable that Liu Jianqiang is not present when these events occur. His account 
is based on eye-witness testimony provided by Dargye’s colleagues present at the time, 
and interviews conducted years later with his friends, family, and fellow 
protectionists. Yang Xin’s Kekexili provides a much more matter-of-fact report of 
Sonam Dargye’s death (KKXL: 32-33) that coincides with Liu’s account as far as the 
basic order of events is concerned: The rangers are overpowered by their captives, 
Sonam Dargye charges into the headlights and is shot to death, his body is left on the 
ground and is discovered later, frozen stiff, with his eyes open and his hands still 
holding the gun he was about to reload. Liu’s account in this particular instance 
exceeds the boundaries of that can legitimately be called “nonfiction”, as far as it 
adds considerable dramatic tension to the scene. This addition underscores the theme 
of heroism that the narrative has woven around Sonam Dargye, and can be read as 
indicative for the degree to which his role in the cause of environmental 
protectionism has been mythologized. 
Eventually, Sonam Dargye’s death (which throughout all the accounts it is 
mentioned is referred to as “sacrifice” xisheng 牺牲, usually used for refer to fallen 
soldiers fighting a just cause) brings the issue of preservation to the attention of the 
  
217 
 
 
The allure of the periphery 
 
  
entire country: In 1995, he is conferred the title of “Environment Defender” by the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection and the State Forestry Administration, and in 
September of 1997, Yang Xin, who has become fascinated with his heroic story, 
constructs the  Sonam Dargye Natural Protection Station located on the foot of Kunlun 
Mountain, east of Kekexili.  
VI.4 A land of spirituality 
The second strain of imaginary in this form of literary representation is an enduring 
reference to the spiritual dimension of Tibetan society and nature, which in turn 
elevates its protection to a similary metaphysical dimension. Often, this is achieved 
through descriptions of quotidian Tibetan life. Since the 1980s, Tibet has served as a 
locality onto which Han Chinese projected their desire for a spiritual life that was 
richer than what mainstream socialist culture could provide. 142  
Let us consider for example “Chasing Dreams at Snow Mountain” 雪山寻梦 by Shen 
Xiaohui 沈孝辉 , a student of Tang Xiyang and participant of his Green Camps 
analyzed in the previous chapter. His book describes his “ecological journey” into 
Tibet. In the chapter “Entering Shangri-La”, the author addresses Hilton’s “Lost 
Horizon”, and how it fathered the term “Shangri-La” as a name for a natural utopia. 
He describes the travel of the term into China, from a Hongkongese businessman 
(Robert Kuok 郭鹤年) who built the first Shangri-La themed hotel in Singapore in 
                                                 
142 This does not mean, however, that such projections were always met with satisfactory results for 
those in search for them. We might point to Ma Jian's 马健 1987 work “Stick Your Tongue Out, Or 
You’ll Have Nothing” (Liangchu ni de shetai huo kongkong dangdang 亮出你的舌苔或空空荡荡). It 
builds on the themes established in Ma’s Red Dust, the lone (Han Chinese) wanderer's search for 
spirituality and freedom away from Chinese mainstream society in Tibet. Instead of finding his 
spiritual calling, however, the young author is appalled by the backwardness of Tibetan society, his 
account depicts graphic scenes of incest, poverty, sex, and superstition. (The story has been banned 
by the Chinese government, see below). On the other hand, Stick Your Tongue Out can be viewed as 
a “counter-narrative” Bhabha speaks of, one that disturbs the image of the nation as China would like 
to see it. (Koetse 2010: 53) 
Nor does this imply that such counter-narratives have to be peaceful, conciliatory, or even pleasant. 
The connection between (often borderline racist) nationalism, machismo chauvinism, and wilderness 
imaginary in Chinese literature is yet another form of counter-narrative to the officially sanctioned 
discourse. Jiang Rong's 姜戎 novel “Wolf Totem” (Lang tuteng 狼 圖 騰), published in 2004, which 
was immensely popular in China and ranks very high on the list of all-time Chinese bestsellers, has 
caused criticisms due to its allusion to race politics and social darwinism. Despite its huge success and 
influence, it has spurred relatively little academic attention within Western academia. (See e.g.: 
Henningsen 2006) 
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1971, to the search of the location of the “actual” Shangri-La. Shen explains that in 
1994, musical anthropologist Xuan Ke 宣科 after extensive study proclaimed to have 
found Shangri-La, and that it was located in Dêqên Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 
in the Chinese province of Yunnan. In 1997, after long deliberations, the provincial 
authorities concurred with Xuan Ke’s assessment, and Zhongdian 中甸 county in 
Dêqên changed its name officially to “Shangri-La” (Xianggelila 香格里拉) in an effort 
to attract tourism. (Shen 60-64)143 
 Shen is fully aware of the fictionality of Shangri-La, a fact that does not seem to 
trouble to author in the slightest. To the contrary, just as later the county changes its 
name since it perceives such an act in its own economic interest, Shen, the green 
traveler, has no problem in appropriating the term Shangri-La to his own ends. In his 
writing, the connotation that is associated with the term point towards a commitment 
to natural protection: 
Suppose Dêqên Prefecture had maintained Shangri-La as it was intended 
[my emphasis], a beautiful pure land [Note: the Chinese term here, jingtu 
净土, is a Buddhist term, Sukhāvatī, the Western land of bliss] not yet 
exploited and alienated by modern industry, an unadorned village with 
pure, sincere, and kind inhabitants not yet affected by modern 
civilization’s interference and assimilation, would it really matter whether 
Hilton’s novel was true or real? Even if there had been no “Lost Horizon”, 
wouldn’t Shangri-La still have existed in Dêqên Prefecture? Shangri-La, 
first stop on Green Camp’s long journey to Baimaxueshan (literally, White 
Horse Snow Mountain). (Shen 1998:64) 
Thus charged with metaphysical significance, the quest to protect nature hence also 
becomes a quest for spiritual meaning for China’s environmental activists. The 
following is a passage from Yang Yin’s “Ten years in Kekexili”, which describes the 
ceremony celebrating the completion of the Sonam Dargy Environmental Protection 
Station after many trials and tribulations: 
                                                 
143 Shen’s book is written after the confirmation of Dêqên as the “official” Shangri-La, but before its 
official change of names. 
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August 19th [1998]: The wind blows strong this morning, as we are all 
standing in front of our just finished protection station. All eyes are on a 
national flag that rises steadily, clear and resonant rings out the national 
anthem, carried towards the Kunlun Mountains by the howling wind. At 
sunset, Secretary Zhaduo, [his wife] Baima, their two children, and myself 
together with Luola –representing our volunteers – climb the 
watchtower. We are fulfilling the dream Sonam Dargye had during his 
lifetime: that in death, he might be united with Kekexili. His ashes wave 
down from the tower towards the near river and the hills, as his soul 
becomes one with Kekexili. His successors who have vowed to protect 
Kekexili have just arrived at this mystical (shenqi 神奇) place; Sonam 
Dargye can rest at ease. (KKXL: 65) 
Of special significance in this passage is the merging of their hero’s soul with the very 
landscape through a burial ceremony, thus imbuing not only their mundane task, but 
also the very object of their efforts – nature – with a spiritual quality. 
Similarly, spirituality plays a central role in Tang Xiyang’s chapter detailing Green 
Camp’s visit to Tibet in A Green World Tour (reprinted also in CCC: 350-364). The 
very first paragraph establishes the connection between Tibetan culture, nature, and 
ecological issues. Man, nature, culture blend together to an inseparable one. Entering 
Tibet, especially Lhasa, Tang observes that “the atmosphere of religion blows in 
one’s face” (CCC: 355) As the participants of Green Camp drive along the dusty 
mountain road snaking towards Lhasa, they drive past a Tibetan pilgrim who, in 
Tang’s description, displays a resolute and proud expression despite his torn clothes 
and shabby appearance, prostrating himself in the ground. Some of the camp 
participants remark jokingly that: “This is the most devout form of an ecological 
journey”. One should note that the Chinese word employed here to describe their 
reactions, xixue 戏谑, means to joke, to banter, but also to ridicule, indicating that the 
Han visitors maintain an ironic distance to the display of devout religiosity, thus 
indicating the cultural distance that separates them from the object of their curiosity. 
Members of the team talk about if and how “natural and social phenomena” in Tibet 
have something to do with the awareness of natural protection: 
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Participant Lang Yan 郎艳: Religion is some sort of ideology. People 
understand nature’s meaning through their consciousness, and that’s 
when they begin to approach the truth. When mankind still had no access 
to science, religion was a major force for protecting nature. We see the 
Tibetan people here are of an inartificial honesty (chunpu 淳朴) and 
devotion. They are chunpu because they are good and kind and they are 
devout because they are persevering. Their material condition might not 
be as ours by far, but their spiritual world is abundant and plentiful. I took 
the photo of an old Tibetan granny. A friend of mine after looking at the 
photo told me: In the expression of this old woman, there is something, 
apart from great kindness – something that is very hard to see in the eyes 
of other people: peaceful tranquility. It looks like the deep 
comprehension of live by a weather-beaten old human being. From her 
expression we can read out that Tibet is a way of living (Xizang jiushi 
yizhong shenghuo fangshi 西藏就是一种生活方式). (CCC: 355) 
While there is no indication that this statement is uttered in anything other than the 
best of intentions, it allows us to visit the essentializing attitude of the outsider’s gaze 
in its purest manifestation: Tang and his friends approach Tibet as outsiders, curious 
tourists, never being able or willing to abandon this position. The photo episode 
involuntarily illustrates this perfectly. A photo of a Tibetan woman, taken by a Han 
tourist, commented on by another (presumably) Han Chinese, discussing the nature 
of “the Tibetan people”. Another Green Camp participant replies: 
Participant Wang Baojian 王宝建: I have been to Tibet twice, and I have 
had a similar feeling; In Tibet, the relationship between man and nature 
is harmonious, and the relationship between people is also harmonious. 
The Tibetans live amidst a blue sky, white clouds, and the grass plains, the 
raise livestock, eat mutton, drink milk tea, live in tents, use dung as fuel, 
and when they die a sky burial is performed. Traditional people, and 
people’s tradition, they’re all similarly pure (chunjing 纯净). [...] The 
harmony between man and nature, and between people, comes from the 
fact that the Tibetans are at peace with themselves. Man must not only 
pursue a material life, but also a spiritual life. In today’s world there is an 
overflow of desire for material wealth that has led to enormous 
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ecological destruction, the result of only caring for material things, but 
spiritual ones. Tibetan Buddhism gives the Tibetans another spiritual 
world, one that strives to bring spirit and body in harmony that unifies 
the inner self with the world. I think on the most fundamental level this 
is the reason for the nature between man and nature, and between 
people, and it is also an important prerequisite for the establishment of 
a new ecological civilization.” (CCC: 356) 
However, what is interesting are not the essentializing comments made by some of 
Green Camp’s participants, but how Tang Xiyang uses these homogenizing sweeping 
statements in order to start a deliberation on the value of engaging with opposing 
viewpoints. He lists a long lists of arguments on the relationship between religion, 
nature, and environmental protection, and shows how the encounter of the The 
Other can be used as a stimulant to think about the self. I will just list a few of these 
arguments here: 
Although division between these opinions cannot be considered 
extreme, there are some viewpoints that are diametrically opposed.  For 
example, some people say: „The Tibetans are only chunpu because they 
are backward.” Others say that “The reason Tibetan society is chunpu lies 
in the fact that their spiritual world is so rich and noble.” Yet still others 
may say that this argument is an entirely moot point, and that, from a 
macro level, regardless of individual people, what we might call “noble 
spiritual world“ and “backward style of living“ are one and the same. […] 
Some say: “Religion is an overly idealistic philosophy, and not something 
we should rely on.” The other side might say: “That’s prejudice, religion 
has a humanitarian spirit, it is a quest for an ideal, a framework that 
transcends the pursuit of worldly material possessions.  Hence, the 
quintessence of religious culture is also the quintessence of human 
culture. […]” 
Some say that using religion as a way to protect the environment is a 
scientific tragedy. Others might say that in the past, we were used to pit 
science and religion against each other. In fact, religion and science each 
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have their respective use and power; both are needed in the process of 
human existence. (CCC: 358) 
Eventually, Tang reminds the reader that it is only the exposure to different 
viewpoints, in this case in the form of a different cultural as well as natural 
environment, which will achieve such a deliberative process: 
Such sharp contrasts of opinion cannot be found in any book, or heard in 
any lecture hall; you cannot touch upon them or think them up when you 
are just sitting in Beijing. What we have experienced [in Tibet] is not 
suffering and ignorance, to the contrary, it has enriched our thinking, 
opened our eyes, and deepened our knowledge. (CCC: 369) 
Liu’s Heavenly Beads provides a more nuanced approach in this regard as it focuses 
on the inner life of the Tibetans it portrays and allows them to speak on their own 
behalf. Often, the narrative combines quests for spirituality with issues of individual 
struggle non-conformism discussed earlier. One example for this is the account of a 
protectionist named Nima 尼 玛 , a young Tibetan man working for an 
environmentalist organization based in Sichuan province. His background is 
described as that of an angry youth who often gets into trouble, a pizi that would well 
fit into one of Wang Shuo’s stories. He is characterized as the “black sheep” of his 
family, his own mother calls him A-guo 阿郭, an inferior mixed-breed yak (HB: 242). 
As a middle school student in Lhasa, he gets into an almost lethal fight with a 
Buddhist monk who tries to embezzle an expensive wrist watch belonging to an old 
woman. Nima comes to her help, resulting in the corrupt monk threatening him with 
a knife. In the ensuing fight, Nima cuts the monk down with his Tibetan dagger, 
while himself receiving a stab into the lower abdomen. (HB: 229) In another instance, 
Nima gets into a bar fight over a girl with a man named Zhaxi 扎西 (whom the reader 
already knows as an dedicated environmental protectionist): After smashing a beer 
bottle on Zhaxi’s skull, the latter comes back with a posse of blade-brandishing 
friends. The police arrive just in time to prevent Nima from being killed, but not 
before skulls are cut open in a wild brawl.  
However, these events introduce Nima to the clique of proud and determined Tibetan 
environmentalists: He becomes a student of Zhaduo 扎多, a protectionist who sees 
the young man’s potential and views an assignment in Tibet’s wilderness as the 
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perfect way to bring some structure into his life: “To have Nima sitting in an office 
would be a tragedy, let’s unleash him, give him an assignment outside in the wilds to 
bring his talents to full fruit.” (HB: 246). In a long interview (HB: 242 ff.) that is 
printed in form of a long narration at the end of the chapter, Nima reflects on his 
troubled past and his difficulty to come to terms with his place in the world: 
“In the past, I used to recite sutras every day right after getting up. I don’t 
do that anymore, maybe every other day I recite them once. [...] My faith 
is not anymore the thing that is deepest in my heart, I tend to forget it 
now. It seems to fade away slowly, but where did it go? I don’t know. 
Fortunately I like this job. What makes me a proud now is that I do 
something that is beneficial for Tibet. Even though I now live in the city, 
surrounded by Han people and foreigners, I have not abandoned the 
Tibetan people. I now protect the Tibetan environment, and the Tibetan 
culture, I now work on behalf of my people. (wei wode minzu zuo shi 为我
的民族做事) I fight for the rights of the Tibetan people, and I can serve as 
a bridge between the world and the Tibetan people. When I enter Tibet 
on official business, and protect the holy mountains and divine lakes 
(shenshan shenghu 神山圣湖), I can pray daily at holy mountains or at a 
temple. Who gets a chance like that? My work and my faith are closely 
interlinked, and so I can hold on to my faith.” (HB: 247) 
When compared with the observations of Tang Xiyang’s Green Camp in Tibet, we see 
a vast difference in terms of nuance in the two statements. By granting Tibetans their 
own voice, and not shying away from complicated issues such as the struggle for 
cultural identity, religious faith, and the individual’s place in society, the author asks 
the reader to question their own pre-conceived assumptions.  
Such dedication to nuance is not only found in the literal account of Tibetan lives, 
but also in the visual depiction of the Tibetan protagonists of the book. Usually, there 
is a distinct lack of photographic representation of Tibetans in the Chinese press, as 
Blum (2001) notes, and existing depictions center around portraying Tibetans in an 
exoticized setting, most often wearing traditional attire. She speculates that this must 
be either the result of a deliberate policy of withholding information about the true 
situation in Tibet or simply a reflection of a general lack of interest in the place. (Blum 
  
224 
 
 
The allure of the periphery 
 
  
2001: 128) In contrast to this, Liu Jianqiang’s book features numerous photographs 
of Tibetan men and women from all walks of life in all forms of attire, traditional and 
modern.  
  
Examples of visual representation of Tibetan environmentalists featured in Heavenly Beads. From left to right: 
Karma Samdrup, Sonam Dargye, Samdrup’s wife Zhenga, environmentalist leader Zhaduo and his colleague 
Nima. (HV: V-VI) 
The joys of individual achievement 
The themes of individual achievement, fight against bad odds, and quests for a 
meaningful life have a socio-political resonance: Yang Xin near the end of “Ten years 
in Kekexili” can report how a few years after the establishment of his protection 
station, his colleague Liang Congjie participates in a joint Sino-German symposium 
on environmental challenges in China and Germany, held in Berlin with experts on 
China’s civil society and environmental protection. A German scholar in his talk 
opines that the Chinese populace has a lack of environmental awareness and that 
there are no real (i.e. independent) NGOs in China. These remarks cause Liang 
Congjie to very casually mention the fact that Yang Xin’s Green River organization 
financed the establishment of a environmental protection monitoring station in the 
inhospitable no-man’s land of Kekexili on 4,500 meters through the charity sale of 
Yang’s book, not taking a dime from the government, yet lending advice to 
government agencies for free. If Germany could point to anything comparable to this? 
The German falls silent. Yang further relates how he and Liang Congjie after this 
incident traveled to Germany, only to find out that almost no environmental 
monitoring stations or education centers in its natural reservations and public gardens, 
and that the government in almost all cases was financing or subsidizing 
environmental organizations of this kind. “This situation is entirely the opposite to 
how we financed and established the Sonam Dargye Environmental Monitoring 
Station” (KKXL: 217), and quite proudly points to the independent way in which he 
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established his own project. On another occasion, Yang Xin is being interviewed by 
an American journalist who ask him that he has heard that 90% of the funding of 
Chinese environmetnal NGOs comes from foreign institutions, government funds, 
and private donors. Yang, again with pride, points to the fact that it was the sale of 
the book that allowed him to establish the monitoring station, which in turn formed 
the basis for his grass-roots organization that keeps funding the work of Green River. 
(KKXL: 217) 
______ 
The case of Kahrma Samdrup also highlights the dangers of environmentalism in 
China: In 2010, only one year after the publication of Heavenly Beads, and only four 
years after having been named “philanthropist of the year” by China Central 
Television (CCTV), he was arrested and accused of robbing graves and stealing 
cultural artefacts. He was eventually sentenced to 15 years in prison.  The trial was 
widely viewed as a punishment for his outspoken defense of his two siblings, Rinchen 
Samdrup and Jigme Namgyal, both of whom had publicly denounced a local police 
chief who had hunted endangered species in a Tibetan nature preserve. Samdrup 
maintains his innocence and repeatedly stated he had been tortured during six 
months of custody in an effort to exact a confession. 144  Heavenly Beads has 
subsequently been banned by the Chinese authorities.  
 
  
                                                 
144 JACOBS, Andrew. “Tibetan Environmentalist Receives 15-Year Sentence.” (2010-06-25) The 
New York Times: A12. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/world/asia/25tibet.html?_r=0 
 VII. Conclusions 
This present thesis has demonstrated how an analysis of sociopolitical imaginaries in 
environmental nonfiction can provide insight into the underlying concepts and 
cultural repertoires that shape societal interactions in the context of 
environmentalism in China. 
These imaginaries are heterogeneous and multi-facetted. The recognition of the 
environmental crisis, not only in China but on the global level, has resulted in a 
panoply of literary responses found in environmental nonfiction that have tried to 
come to terms with the scale of ecological problems, assign blame, and offer possible 
solutions. Inherent in these writings, sometimes found between the lines, sometimes 
frankly articulated, is a shared understanding that their authors, their supporters, and 
indeed their readers share (indeed are entitled to) a special social responsibility in the 
context of China’s environmentalist framework.  
Different authors have formulated different positions on what this role ought to be. 
In order to carve out their respective niches, environmental activist-authors can rely 
on the diversity of Chinese cultural traditions that contain varying precedents for the 
relationship between social actors and government bureaucracies. Secondly, the rich 
variety of literary responses in Chinese cultural history that have tried to give voice 
to the nature experience itself has provided authors of modern environmental 
nonfiction with a rich toolkit of imaginaries, vocabularies, and landscapes 
(sometimes figuratively, sometimes literally) that serve as aesthetic vehicles for their 
sociopolitical arguments.  These results also might address one of the initial questions 
of this thesis, namely why citizen activism in China has so notably coalesced around 
environmental issues; the naturescape – charged with sociopolitical, historical, and 
aesthetic meaning – is uniquely qualified to facilitate political discourse due to its 
traditional cultural connotations. 
Moreover, this thesis has found further evidence that the conflictual perspective 
between on state-society relations in China is not tangible; environmental nonfiction 
to a large part advocates for a constructive relationship between civic and 
governmental actors, a stance that is substantiated by a rich variety of cultural 
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precedents that have often emphasized conciliatory modes of interaction over 
conflictual ones. However, this is not to say that perspectives on state-society 
relations formulated in Chinese environmental nonfiction are simplistic or overly 
accommodating.  
To the contrary, environmental nonfiction authors in China have created an 
elaborate variety of nuanced perspectives on the social dimension of Chinese 
environmentalism. As this thesis has demonstrated, a reading of their works shows 
that green authors in China take highly differentiated stances on various levels of 
government agencies; while the central government is often espoused as a source of 
help, understanding, and benevolent protection, environmental nonfiction does not 
shy away from strategies that involve publicly shaming, exposing, naming, or 
otherwise pressuring local government agencies that are often cast as the true 
perpetrators of environmental calamity. This strategic alignment again follows long 
established precedent found in the Chinese social imaginary and has taken on various 
faces; loyal remonstrance, the cultivation of personal character, the propagation of 
civilizatory progress, or the celebration of individual struggle in the service of China’s 
ecosystem. Just as Edin stated that Chinese party-state maintains the ability to be 
selectively effective in terms of its governance capability, Chinese environmental 
nonfiction is selectively supportive or selectively confrontative in its stance towards 
government institutions. 
Similar to the conceptualization of the relationship between civic and official actors, 
the relationship between the authors of Chinese environmental nonfiction and their 
readers is multilayered and complex. On the one hand, environmental authors clearly 
aim to highlight the importance of their task by casting themselves and their 
readership as being part of a cutting-edge movement that will be indispensable for 
China’s journey into the 21st century. On the other hand, such an understanding at 
times results in noticeable elitist attitudes that voice contempt towards the broader 
Chinese populace for not measuring up to the lofty standards propagated in 
environmental nonfiction. 
Chinese environemental nonfiction, however, can not only be understood as an 
agency shaping social developments, it is also influenced by the social 
transformations the People’s Republic has been undergoing. Its readership it largely 
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comprised of members of China’s new urban middle class, often young people who 
are materially secure enough to concern themselves with “post-material” values. This 
asymmetry in the social dispersion of their readership has caused environmental 
nonfiction to often address issues that correlate or at least touch upon its respective 
readership’s cultural tastes and biases: accounts of adventure, self-discovery, and 
travel in China’s natural environment often go hand in hand with accounts that 
feature exoticist, essentialist, and/or nationalistic attittiudes towards China’s ethnic 
minorities and the West. 
This thesis represents a step towards unlocking the previously understudied body of 
Chinese environmental nonfiction. While this study tried to explore the intricacies of 
sociopolitical imaginaries in the context of environmental activism, future research 
is presented with a multitude of possible research questions from which this material 
might be further analyzed. 
In this context, one possible topic might be the question how the introduction of 
foreign-language terms and concepts (especially English) have shaped the 
environmental vocabulary that forms the body of Chinese “greenspeak”. Such an 
endeavor might not just entail a precise archaeology of the complex processes of 
translation, adoption, and acculturation by which a set of specialized vocabulary is 
introduced into a linguistic and cultural framework, but also address questions 
relating to the construction of discursive authority that accompanies the formation of 
linguistic canons.  
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